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 Abstract 
The production of propositional language is unique and central to the human experience. Distinct 
from core spoken language skills (e.g., reading, naming, repeating), propositional language is 
voluntary, spontaneous, and novel to a context. Before producing propositional language, the 
speaker must conceptualise or formulate a message for expression. This preverbal stage of 
conceptualisation represents the interface between broader cognition and language. However, 
experimental studies addressing the relationship between cognition and spoken language in non-
aphasic populations are scarce, and thus the interplay between language and cognition remains 
poorly understood. The aim of this thesis was to investigate the role of attention in propositional 
language production.  
 
This thesis includes four studies. The first study (Chapter 2) is an investigation of connected 
speech in mild stroke patients without aphasia (N = 18) and matched healthy controls (N = 21). We 
analysed the coherence and cohesion of connected speech samples, and assessed baseline cognitive 
skills including sustained attention, selective attention, and executive functions. Cohesion and 
coherence impairments were found in the stroke group relative to controls. Correlations between 
language measures and attention and executive skills revealed that better performance on the 
attention and executive tasks was associated with more cohesive and coherent speech. This pattern 
of results suggests that attention and executive cognition play a role at the stage of message 
formulation during propositional language production.  
 
The second study (Chapter 3) details an investigation of spontaneous speech and the frontal 
attentional process of ‘energization’ in a case series of five patients with progressive supranuclear 
palsy (PSP) and a matched healthy control group (N = 30). The process of energization refers to the 
initiation and sustaining of a response over time. We identified patterns of energization in 
spontaneous speech samples, word fluency, and an experimental concentration task. Four of the five 
patients with PSP had a response pattern clearly indicative of fluctuations in energization, whereas 
healthy controls were able to maintain consistent responding over time. Our results demonstrate a 
specific role of energization in spontaneous speech production.  
 
The third and fourth studies (Chapter 4) employed a novel experimental picture description task to 
investigate the role of attention and emotion in propositional language production. This 
Propositional Language Task required the verbal description of an emotional (positive or negative) 
picture, while ignoring an emotion word distractor (related vs. unrelated). Initially, this task was 
completed by a large group of healthy adults (N = 93), and the results revealed that participants 
 were significantly slower to initiate speech in response to negative, compared to positive, emotional 
pictures. This suggests that the emotional content of the stimulus influences the conceptualisation of 
a message to be expressed.  
 
In a follow up study, the Propositional Language Task was completed by four patients with PSP and 
a healthy older control group (N = 26). The primary finding of the previous study was replicated in 
the sample of healthy older adults. An additional detailed analysis of the speech content was 
conducted to explore whether the distractor word interfered with the content of the propositional 
language produced. We found that distractor words appeared in the speech of the patients with PSP, 
despite being instructed to avoid the use of those words. Interestingly, when distractor words were 
unrelated to the picture, healthy controls incorporated the concept activated by the distractor word 
into their sentences. We interpreted the distractor word interference effects as relating to attentional 
failures during message formulation.  
 
Overall, this thesis provides evidence that attention and other aspects of cognition that modulate 
attention (e.g., emotion) play a role during the conceptualisation of a message. Our findings have 
important theoretical implications for models of spoken language production, and clinical 
implications for the treatment of disorders of propositional language. 
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Chapter 1. General Introduction 
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There is no skill more fundamental to the human experience than language (Levelt, Roelofs 
& Meyer, 1999). Spoken language is unique to humans, and the language of our environment is 
acquired early in life. By the age of five, children have developed a mental lexicon of 
approximately 1500-2000 meaningful words, and by adulthood this has grown to almost 100 000 
words (Levelt et al, 1999; Levelt, 2001). Adults are skilled at fast and accurate communication, 
generating between two and four words per second and erring less than twice per 1000 words on 
average (Levelt, 2001).  
The study of language has traditionally focused on core language skills (e.g., phonology, 
semantics, naming, reading, grammar, repeating, comprehension). However, language production as 
a gestalt is more complex than the sum of these core skills. When spoken language is spontaneous, 
voluntary and includes the generation of novel ideas, it is known as propositional language: this is 
the focus of the current thesis. A proposition is an idea unit, and ultimately propositional language 
is how ideas are communicated.  Propositional language is used to relay information, direct action, 
convey emotions, tell stories and entertain others, and is a crucial agent for teaching and learning. It 
is the essence of everyday communication.  
The terms ‘propositional language’, ‘spontaneous speech’, ‘connected speech’, ‘narrative 
speech’ and ‘discourse’ are used throughout this thesis, and although they are often not 
differentiated in the literature, there are some distinctions to highlight. Propositional language is 
most commonly referred to as spontaneous speech, and these terms are largely interchangeable. 
While a single sentence can be classed as propositional language, connected speech is produced 
when at least two sentences are linked. Broadly speaking, discourse is conversational language that 
involves at least two individuals, and narrative speech is the narration of a topic, primarily for the 
purpose of entertainment (van den Broek, 1994). Note, however, that these distinctions are not 
universal and may differ between disciplines.  
Propositional language can be elicited in various ways. For example, picture description 
tasks usually require a speaker to generate language centred on a complex or composite scene in 
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which multiple actions are taking place (Brady, Armstrong, & Mackenzie, 2005). Alternatively, the 
examiner may ask an open-ended question or provide a topic cue; for example, an individual may 
be asked to speak about their favourite actress or film (Robinson, Shallice & Cipolotti, 2006), retell 
a familiar story (e.g., Cinderella; Saffran, Berndt & Schwartz, 1989), relive a past experience 
(Blank, Scott, Murphy, Warburton & Wise, 2002; Ulatowska, North & Macaluso-Haynes, 1981), or 
discuss any familiar topic (Law, Young, Pinsker & Robinson, 2015).  
The last decade has seen a more cognitive flavour emerge in the study of language, 
acknowledging the inherent executive nature of propositional language production and considering 
the role of broader cognition and non-language functions.  The current thesis aims to explore the 
role of cognition, particularly attention, in propositional language production.  
A Historical Context: ‘Thought and Language’ 
The notion of a close link between cognition and language has a rich history, appearing 
across the fields of philosophy, psychology, neurology, and linguistics. In 1781, the philosopher 
Kant defined thinking as ‘talking with oneself’. A century later, this idea was mirrored by the 
English neurologist Hughlings Jackson, who wrote ‘to utter words is not necessarily to speak. To 
speak is to propositionise’ (Jackson, 1879, p. 205). Similarly, linguist Müller (1887) argued that 
words represented a ‘coin’, and that ‘thought’ and ‘articulate sound’ were the two sides of the coin. 
Around the same time, evidence for a role of the frontal lobes in spoken language production began 
mounting, although it was dominated by the notion of a language centre hosted in the frontal lobes. 
Famously, the left inferior frontal gyrus became implicated in spoken language production when 
Broca (1861a, 1861b) reported the seminal case of a patient with generally intact comprehension 
and intellectual skills but with speech output impaired to such a severe degree that he was 
nicknamed after his only spontaneous utterance ‘tan’. Broca discovered on autopsy that this patient 
had a lesion to the lateral surface of the left inferior frontal lobe, and went on to document this 
finding multiple times. Thus, his namesake brain region, which encapsulates Brodmann Areas (BA) 
44 and 45, became viewed as the key region responsible for articulation of speech.  
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At the time, Hughlings Jackson rejected the ‘simplistic’ notion of the neuroanatomical 
localisation of complex processes such as language, although his views went largely unrecognised 
until half a century later (Luria, 1970). Nowadays, the region known as ‘Broca’s Area’ is slightly 
different to that described by Broca himself; there is considerable inter-subject variability in the 
cytoarchitecture of Broca’s Area (Amunts et al., 1999), and re-examination of Broca’s patients 
using high-resolution magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) has shown that their lesions extended 
more medially than was originally reported (Dronkers, Plaisant & Cabanis, 2007). Moreover, 
Broca’s Aphasia1, or expressive aphasia, describes a set of symptoms relating to articulation of 
speech, namely telegraphic speech, agrammatism and impaired repetition (Mohr et al., 1978).  
By the early 20th century, Jackson’s ideas regarding the broader ‘executive’ or ‘thought’ 
component of language were re-emerging in opposition to the localisationist accounts, and guided 
the leading neurologists of the time; the broader ‘thought’ component of spoken language was again 
being considered (Luria, 1970). For example, French neurologist Marie (1906) viewed aphasia (i.e., 
impairment of verbal language) as a disturbance of intelligence. In England, Head (1926) was 
influenced by Jackson’s work, although he took a slightly different view, arguing that an 
independent non-language component (the ‘formulation’ of thought) was coupled with skilful 
‘expression’ to produce language. German neurologist Goldstein wrote extensively on the 
relationship between language and thought. He posed that conceptual and linguistic processes 
represent different levels that interact during spoken language production. Goldstein (1948) 
suggested that ‘the transformation into language begins usually during the formation of thoughts’ 
(p. 116), and therefore ‘in defect of language, thought processes may come abnormally to the fore’ 
(p. 115).  
With the progression of the 20th century, the rise of behaviourism saw the field of 
psychology shift towards observable behaviour. However, some theorists continued to comment on 
a relationship between thought and language. For example, Jenkins (1969, cited in Benson, 1994) 
hypothesised that 1) thought is dependent on language, 2) thought is language, and 3) language is 
                                                1	Broca’s Aphasia is not limited to lesions of Broca’s Area (Mohr et al., 1978). 
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dependent on thought, and he presented evidence for all three. Despite the notion of a fundamental 
link between language and thought appearing in the literature repeatedly, theories and hypotheses 
often lacked specificity regarding the particular cognitive processes involved. Comprehensive 
models of spoken language production began to emerge from the 1970s onwards, and while many 
implicated broader cognition, again cognitive mechanisms and processes were imprecise (see 
below; e.g., Dell, 1986; Frederiksen, Bracewell, Breuleux & Renaud, 1990; Levelt, 1989; 1999; 
Sherratt, 2007). To this day, experimental investigations pertaining to the language-cognition 
interface are rare.  
Models of Spoken Language Production  
Models of spoken language production provide theoretical frameworks to understand the 
processes that transform a conceptual idea into overt speech. Dynamic accounts tend to emphasise a 
minimum of three stages of spoken language production, although frameworks differ in their 
descriptions of the interactions between the stages (e.g., Dell, 1986; Dell, Chang & Griffin, 1999; 
Frederiksen et al., 1990; Garrett, 1980; 2000; Jakobson, 1980). The three stages generally include: 
1) a preverbal stage of conceptualisation or ‘message formulation’, 2) linguistic formulation, and 3) 
overt articulation. 
Message formulation. Levelt (1989; 1993; 1999) posited one of the more comprehensive 
models of spoken language production. His dynamic blueprint of the speaker model gives particular 
regard to preverbal message formulation, the stage he termed the ‘conceptualizer’ (see Figure 1a). 
This stage involves the generation of a communicative intention and conceptual plan. Levelt (1999) 
specified that during conceptualisation, the speaker attends to a current focus, shifts attention to new 
topics as required, monitors what has been said, and retrieves information from long-term memory 
(e.g., conceptual frameworks for spoken language, knowledge about the world, information about 
the place and time, etc.). The outcome of this stage is a preverbal conceptual plan that is not yet 
linguistic. It is also known as the ‘conceptual preparation’ stage (Robinson et al., 2006). 
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Figure 1a.  Levelt’s ‘Blueprint of the Speaker’ model of spoken language production. Figure 
reproduced from Levelt, W. J. M. (1999). A blueprint of the speaker. In C. M. Brown & P. Hagoort 
(Eds.), The neurocognition of language (p. 87), by permission of Oxford University Press. 
 
Linguistic formulation. Following conceptualisation, the preverbal plan is transformed into 
a linguistic structure (Levelt, 1999). This involves matching items from the mental lexicon to the 
concepts activated during the formulation of the message, a process that is lexically driven (e.g., 
Dell, 1986; Frederiksen et al., 1990; Levelt et al., 1999). Specifically, Levelt (1999) stipulated that 
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linguistic formulation occurs via grammatical and morpho-phonological encoding. Grammatical 
encoding involves accessing and selecting items from the lexicon, and results in the generation of a 
syntactic ‘surface structure’. Exactly how lexical access and selection occurs is still debated, but 
some suggest that it is through networks of activation and inhibition (e.g., Dell, 1986; Marini, 
Andreetta, Del Tin & Carlomango, 2011a). Morpho-phonological information is then encoded, 
whereby morphemes and their corresponding phonemes are accessed and selected, and prosodic, 
intonational, and syllabic details are integrated (Levelt, 1999). The outcome of the linguistic 
formulation stage is ‘internal speech’ (termed ‘phonological score’; Levelt, 1999). 
Articulation and monitoring. Finally, the phonological score must be phonetically 
encoded and articulated. Phonetic encoding involves the construction of a sequence of articulatory 
gestures to produce an ‘articulatory score’ (Levelt, 1999). Motor execution of the articulatory score 
results in overt speech output. Levelt’s (1999) ‘blueprint of the speaker’ model includes a ‘feedback 
loop’, which involves self-perception and monitoring of the phonological and articulatory scores, 
and allows the speaker to evaluate whether the content of their message matches their intention 
(Levelt, 1989) 
Multi-layered discourse production model. A framework offered by Sherratt (2007), 
which was adapted from the model developed by Frederiksen et al. (1990; Frederiksen & Donin, 
1991; Frederiksen & Stemmer, 1993), mirrors that of Levelt (1999) and gives particular regard to 
the conceptualisation stage. Sherratt (2007) proposed that message formulation is triggered by an 
input, and begins with the generation of a conceptual frame or the retrieval of a frame structure 
from memory. This is followed by the insertion and integration of semantic information from 
memory, which may include knowledge of the setting, events, and communicative partners. 
Information is then selected for expression, based on what the speaker believes needs to be made 
explicit to the listener, and topics are prioritised to be presented in a sensible and coherent order 
with appropriate sentence structures. Evaluative aspects of cognition are required during this 
process of selection and prioritisation, to make judgments regarding what information is most 
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relevant to the context, listener, and task. Finally, propositions are generated and sequenced to 
reflect the selection and prioritisation of information, in line with the linguistic structure. In both the 
Levelt and Sherratt models, the outcome of the preverbal message formulation stage is a conceptual 
structure that is not yet ‘language’ per se, but contains the requisite information for linguistic 
formulation and articulation. Critically, conceptualisation represents the point at which broader 
cognition and language meet. 
Static models of language production. In contrast to dynamic models, static frameworks 
propose that the production of spoken language is based on the integration of microlinguistic and 
macrolinguistic dimensions (e.g., Kintsch, 1994; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978). Broadly defined, 
macrolinguistic processes relate to the between-sentence functions, or the higher-order 
organisational qualities of spoken language (e.g., relating utterances to each other [cohesion] or the 
overall theme/topic [coherence]), while microlinguistic processes relate more to within-sentence 
functions, at the lexical or syntactic level (Marini et al., 2011a). With regard to dynamic models, 
macrolinguistic processes tend to relate to the stage of conceptualisation, as they are responsible for 
coordinating and integrating conceptual information, and involve broader cognition (Glosser & 
Deser, 1991). It has been suggested that microlinguistic functions are related to the stage of 
linguistic formulation (Marini et al., 2011a).  
The Role of Attention 
Models and theories of spoken language production generally acknowledge that there is 
some degree of interplay between language and broader cognition, whether this is considered to be 
a discrete ‘conceptualisation’ stage (e.g., Levelt, 1999) or a broad ‘macrolinguistic’ dimension (e.g., 
Kintsch, 1994), or whether it is discussed in terms of ‘thinking for speaking’ (e.g. Slobin, 1996; 
2003; Dipper, Black & Bryan 2005) or as an ‘interfacing representation’ (e.g., Bock, 1982). One 
aspect of cognition that has been repeatedly postulated to play a key role in spoken language 
production is attention. Although a multitude of attention models exist (e.g., Broadbent, 1957; 
Corbetta & Schulman, 2002; Duncan, 2006; Kane & Engle, 2002, Pashler, 1984, Posner & 
  9 
Peterson, 1990; Sohlberg & Mateer, 2001; Stuss et al., 2005), common to all is the notion of 
attention as a domain-general resource, of finite capacity, that is flexibly allocated to tasks as 
required. Attention is arguably the most fundamental aspect of cognition, necessary for all complex 
behaviours including language (Villard & Kiran, 2017). 
Frontal ‘supervisory’ attentional processes. Many classic models of attention include an 
‘executive’ component, originally thought to be associated with the frontal lobes (Mesulum, 1985; 
Posner, 1988; Posner & Peterson, 1990). The executive component of attention is a top-down 
process that is under voluntary control, and is responsible for ensuring that behaviour remains in 
line with task goals. This idea of an ‘executive’ or ‘anterior’ attentional system was adopted by 
Stuss, Alexander, Shallice, Picton and others (e.g., Stuss et al., 2005; Stuss & Alexander, 2007; 
Stuss, Shallice, Alexander & Picton, 1995) who sought to fractionate the notion of a single 
executive system by defining and localising a set of component attentional processes. They viewed 
attention as the basis of executive function, and therefore considered that attentional processes must 
subserve goal-directed behaviour (Stuss et al., 1995). Stuss and Alexander (2007) proposed a triad 
of ‘supervisory’ attentional processes associated with discrete frontal regions: 1) energization, 
superior medial; 2) task setting, left lateral; and 3) monitoring, right lateral2. Energization is the 
process of initiating and sustaining a response, task setting is establishing a stimulus-response 
relationship, and monitoring requires checking the task over time and adjusting behaviour 
accordingly (Stuss & Alexander, 2007; Stuss, 2011). In the current thesis, we have opted to frame 
attention in line with Stuss and colleagues, by referring to the specific frontal attentional processes 
within other attentional constructs. For example, in Chapter 2 we discuss sustained attention as 
being underpinned by energization and monitoring, while selective attention is related to task 
setting. In line with the idea that attentional processes subserve goal-directed behaviour, we discuss 
‘executive functions’ as specific task-based constructs, not cognitive processes per se. The term 
                                                
2 Stuss and Alexander (2007) note that while lesions to specific frontal regions produce observable deficits in particular 
attentional processes, it may be that networks encompassing both frontal and posterior regions subserve these 
attentional processes. 	
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‘executive control’ relates to the processes of task setting and monitoring, as Stuss and Alexander 
(2007) argue that these are the attentional processes that most closely resemble higher-order or 
‘executive functions’.  
Attention and language. Three decades ago Sohlberg and Mateer (1989) argued that 
attention or executive functions may be implicated in the production of complex language. Levelt 
(1999) went into more detail, suggesting that conceptual processes for spoken language production 
may require a general sustained focus as well as a more specific allocation of attention to a current 
focus. Static accounts of language production acknowledge that macrolinguistic processes are 
mediated by higher-order cognitive mechanisms (e.g., Kintsch, 1994; Glosser & Deser, 1991).  
Alexander (2006) discussed the production of narrative discourse as a complex, goal-
directed behaviour, noting that impairments in discourse production more closely resemble 
disorders of action planning than they do any typical form of aphasia. He proposed that if complex 
language production, such as narrative discourse, can be thought of as a goal-directed behaviour, 
then disorders of spoken language, such as Broca’s aphasia, transcortical motor aphasia (TCMA), 
dynamic aphasia and mutism, can be conceptualised as attentional or executive impairments. Goal-
directed behaviours require elements of executive control, namely intent, planning and sustained 
effort over time. According to Alexander (2006), when producing a narrative one must ‘develop an 
overall communicative goal or intention, sustain activity to reach that goal, monitor progress to the 
goal, inhibit intrusions that are not relevant to the goal, and be attentive to the listener’s 
expectations and reactions’ (p. 236). The elements of higher-order or ‘executive’ control are clear. 
Alexander (2006) noted that although narrative production is thought of in terms of a long time 
frame (e.g., minutes), the pertinent processes occur within much briefer time scales, perhaps a 
moving window of a few seconds’ duration.  
Alexander’s (2006) paper set the triad of frontal attentional processes proposed by Stuss et 
al. (1995; 2005; 2007) into the context of language production, as they can be considered a set of 
component processes that subserve goal-directed behaviour and thus are critical for the production 
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of complex propositional language. The three frontal attentional processes are evident when the 
speaker decides what information is relevant and appropriate with regard to the goal, the listener’s 
needs and the context (task setting), then initiates and sustains their attention to the topic and their 
communicative intention (energization), and finally checks whether their language output is 
consistent with their established intention and remains appropriate as the context changes 
(monitoring). These core ideas are also reflected in Sherratt’s (2007) model of discourse generation, 
in the ‘selection and topicalisation of information’ (task setting), the ‘generation, selection and 
chunking of propositions’ (energization), and the ‘top-down and bottom-up processing’ that occurs 
throughout the discourse process (monitoring). In this way, attentional processes can be considered 
a set of component processes that subserve goal-directed behaviour and thus are critical for the 
production of complex propositional language. 
Language and Attention: Evidence from Clinical Investigations  
One method of gaining insight into language processes is to investigate populations in which 
these abilities are disrupted. For example, several studies have linked aphasia (an impairment of 
verbal language) to attentional deficits (see Villard & Kiran, 2017 for a review). It has been 
demonstrated that individuals with aphasia show impaired performance compared to controls on 
tasks measuring visual, auditory and cross-modal-orienting attention (Robin & Rizzo, 1989), 
divided attention (Erickson, Goldinger & LaPointe, 1996), sustained attention (‘vigilance’: Laures, 
2005), and selective attention (Peach, Newhoff & Rubin, 1993). Moreover, language deficits tend to 
be more pronounced as attentional demands increase (Murray, Holland & Beeson, 1997). Indeed, 
Hula and McNeil (2008) have proposed that aphasia occurs due to the impairment of attentional 
processes that support language. However, this view has not gone uncontested, and the degree to 
which attention and language impairments are associated in aphasia remains the subject of debate 
(Murray, 2012; Villard & Kiran, 2017).  
Left hemisphere damage is generally associated with typical forms of aphasia (e.g., 
Wernicke’s aphasia, Broca’s aphasia, anomic aphasia), but macrolinguistic difficulties have been 
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documented in patients with right hemisphere brain damage (e.g., Bloom, Borod, Obler & 
Gerstman, 1993; Marini, 2012; Sherratt & Bryan, 2012). The spontaneous speech of patients with 
right hemisphere damage has been described as tangential and rambling (e.g., Alexander, Benson & 
Stuss, 1989), characterised by the increased use of clarity disruptors (e.g., indefinite terms, filler 
sentences, empty phrases, task-related comments), a paucity of informative content, problems 
developing a narrative structure, impairments in cohesion and coherence, and issues with the 
pragmatic aspects of language such as humour, sarcasm and irony (e.g., Bartels-Tobin & Hinckley, 
2005; Brownell, Potter, Bihrle, & Gardner, 1986; Marini, Carlomagno, Caltagirone & Nocentini, 
2005; Sherratt & Bryan, 2012). This stands in contrast to relatively preserved core language abilities 
(Marini, 2012). The language deficits observed following right hemisphere damage have been 
attributed to attentional or ‘executive’ dysfunction (e.g., Bartels-Tobin & Hinckley, 2005).  
Along similar lines, executive dysfunction has been argued to contribute to impairments in 
pragmatic aspects of language (Bosco, Parola, Sacco, Zettin & Angeleri, 2017) and poorer story 
structure (Coelho, Liles & Duffy, 1995) in patients with traumatic brain injury. Patients with 
frontotemporal dementia, including those with progressive nonfluent aphasia, semantic dementia 
and a disorder of social comportment and executive dysfunction, also show deficits in narrative 
discourse production compared to controls (Ash et al., 2006). Interestingly, Ash et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that those with the social/executive variant were not aphasic, yet showed the most 
profound impairments in the organisation of their narratives, particularly in relating utterances to 
one another and maintaining the overall theme. Likewise, patients with Lewy body spectrum 
disorder show deficits in local and global ‘connectedness’ and theme maintenance of language 
output (Ash et al., 2011). Ash et al. (2011) reported that local connectedness and theme 
maintenance correlated with performance on tasks of executive functions (word fluency, digit span 
backwards, Stroop test). 
Regardless of whether language deficits are primary, as in aphasia, or observed on a more 
organisational or conceptual level, the role of attention is a common theme. However, more than 
  13 
any other language disorder, frontal dynamic aphasia has allowed for the most extensive 
investigations into mechanisms of propositional language. 
Frontal dynamic aphasia. The term ‘frontal dynamic aphasia’ was coined by Luria but 
previously described by Goldstein (1948) as ‘central motor aphasia’, a subtype of TCMA, and is 
characterised by severely reduced propositional language output in the context of intact articulation 
and core language functions (e.g., naming, reading, repetition, comprehension). Luria described 
patients with this type of impairment as being ‘completely deprived of spontaneous speech and 
seldom using it for the purposes of communication’ (Luria, 1970, p. 199), and suggested that it 
resulted from a breakdown of internal speech. He noted that it most often arose following lesions of 
the inferior parts of the left frontal lobe, anterior to Broca’s area. Dynamic aphasia may be 
classified as either ‘pure’ or ‘mixed’, depending on whether additional grammatical, lexical or 
articulatory deficits are present (‘mixed’) or not (‘pure’) (Robinson, Shallice & Cipolotti, 2005). 
However, in both its pure and mixed forms, a severe reduction in propositional language output 
remains the core impairment (Robinson et al., 2005). Also discussed as ‘aphasia without aphasia’, 
or an ‘aspontaneity of thought’, dynamic aphasia is pertinent because it sits at the language-
cognition border, and therefore affords a unique opportunity to investigate the mechanisms of 
conceptualisation or message formulation.   
The term ‘dynamic aphasia’ has since been refined, and recent evidence points to two 
distinct subtypes. The first subtype is associated with a specific selection deficit, and most often 
occurs following lesions to the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG; Costello & Warrington, 1989 
[ROH]; Robinson, Blair & Cipolotti, 1998 [ANG]; Robinson et al., 2005 [CH]; for a similar pattern 
from a left basal ganglia lesion see Crescentini, Lunardelli, Mussoni, Zadini & Shallice, 2008 
[OTM]). The selection deficit in these patients is observed on sentence level generation tasks, where 
the oral generation of a word or sentence is required in response to a sentence (e.g., When you go to 
bed, turn off the: ‘light’) or single word stimulus (e.g., Spain: ‘Spain is a country in Europe’). A 
characteristic selection deficit is observed such that performance is impaired when a stimulus elicits 
  14 
multiple competing propositions (e.g., There was nothing wrong with the: ‘car’, ‘person’, 
‘computer’, etc.) as compared to when a dominant proposition is elicited (as per examples above). 
A similar effect was reported in a study of neurological patients with focal LIFG lesions (Robinson, 
Shallice, Bozzali & Cipolotti, 2010), and thus the LIFG has been implicated in selection for 
propositional language in healthy subjects (e.g., Blank et al., 2002). Consequently, high-level 
‘proposition selection’ has become a well-established mechanism of conceptual preparation, and 
propositional language deficits can be attributed to this faulty mechanism.  
However, there is a second, rarer, subtype of dynamic aphasia: patients who present with the 
hallmark reduction of propositional language output but whose performance remains intact on 
sentence-level selection tasks. Instead, these patients fail tasks that require the spontaneous 
generation of multiple connected sentences, for example on picture description or topic discussion 
tasks. This dynamic aphasia subtype is generally observed in patients with diffuse bilateral frontal 
and subcortical damage, and has been documented in several case studies over the last two decades. 
Importantly, a common thread emerges in the interpretation of these cases: the role of attentional or 
‘executive’, higher-order mechanisms. 
Just over 20 years ago, Esmonde, Giles, Xuereb and Hodges (1996) documented three 
patients with progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP) who presented with intact naming and 
comprehension skills in contrast to severely reduced spontaneous speech and impaired word 
fluency. The authors suggested that there was a breakdown of the higher-level language processes 
such as planning and initiation. In the same year, Snowden, Griffiths and Neary (1996) reported the 
case of KC who had the hallmark reduction in propositional language output in the context of a 
progressive language disorder related to frontal lobe degeneration. KC had preserved naming skills 
and was mostly intact on sentence generation tasks, but was impaired on verbal fluency tasks and 
had notable difficulties when open-ended speech was required, as well as marked impairments on 
verbal and nonverbal sequencing tasks. The authors concluded that her propositional language 
disorder reflected a profound impairment in temporal integration, which is an organisational aspect 
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of language, and noted a possible influence of non-linguistic factors such as attention, self-
monitoring and checking.  
Similarly, Gold et al. (1997) reported patient CO who presented with dynamic aphasia after 
suffering bilateral striatocapsular infarctions and a secondary right hemisphere infarct. CO showed 
impairments on tasks tapping frontal executive functions (i.e., Wisconsin Card Sort Task, Trail 
Making B task), and had reduced verbal and nonverbal fluency. The authors suggested that his 
dynamic aphasia might be best attributed to executive dysfunction, specifically related to deficits in 
developing lexical and semantic strategies and forming concepts.  
Around a decade ago, Robinson et al. (2006) documented the case of KAS, who presented 
with pure dynamic aphasia in the context of PSP. KAS failed tasks that required the generation of 
multiple connected sentences (e.g., topic discussion). KAS was also impaired in verbal and 
nonverbal fluency tasks. The authors termed the underlying faulty mechanism the ‘generation of a 
fluent sequence of novel thought’; they proposed that KAS had a deficit in generating potential 
topics or messages (‘generation’), and then in focusing attention on a single message and shifting 
attention to new messages (‘fluent sequencing’).  
Similar to KAS, Bormann, Wallesch and Blanken (2008) presented the case of HK, who 
showed the characteristic reduction of spontaneous speech and preserved core language skills. His 
performance on executive (verbal fluency), attention and working memory tasks was impaired. 
Bormann et al. (2008) concluded that, like KAS, HK had an impairment in the ability to generate a 
‘fluent sequence of novel thought’, and agreed with Robinson et al. (2006) that attentional or 
executive deficits might underlie his propositional language impairment.  
Within the last few years, Robinson et al. (2013, 2015a) have documented two more cases of 
dynamic aphasia. The case of MC (Robinson, 2013) is unique in that he showed deficits in selection 
among competitors (as per the first dynamic aphasia subtype), but was also impaired in the 
generation and fluent sequencing of novel thoughts (similar to KAS and HK). Most recently, the 
case of WAL demonstrated a pure ‘generation of ideas’ deficit without a concurrent sequencing 
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impairment, as he showed marked reductions in the number of items generated across eight 
different verbal and nonverbal fluency tasks (Robinson, Spooner & Harrison, 2015a). The authors 
discussed this finding in terms of impaired energization: a frontal attentional process described by 
Stuss and Alexander (2007) (Robinson et al., 2015a).  
The recurrent mention of attention and ‘executive functions’ as relating to the paucity of 
spontaneous speech in dynamic aphasia suggests a key role for these processes in propositional 
language. Overall, the work by Robinson et al. on dynamic aphasia has elucidated three discrete 
conceptual preparation mechanisms: 1) selection, which is associated with lesions to the left inferior 
frontal gyrus (e.g., Robinson et al., 1998 [ANG]; Robinson et al., 2005 [CH]), 2) the generation of 
novel thoughts (Robinson et al., 2015a [WAL], and 3) their sequencing, which implicates bilateral 
frontal and frontostriatal areas (e.g., Robinson et al., 2006 [KAS]; Bormann et al., 2008 [HK]). Note 
that recent evidence from a case of jargon aphasia, an acquired language disorder in which a vast 
quantity of meaningless spontaneous speech is produced, has made a case for a fourth conceptual 
preparation mechanism related to the ‘termination processes’, or a ‘brake’ that stops the generation 
of new messages (Robinson, Butterworth & Cipolotti, 2015c). Robinson (2013) discussed these 
conceptual preparation mechanisms as mapping onto Butterworth’s (1980) four ‘control module’ 
functions proposed to underpin the spoken language generation process - initiate, operate, check 
and terminate – which can be coarsely linked to the frontal attentional processes of Stuss and 
Alexander (2007).  
Neural Correlates of Propositional Language: Evidence from Neuroimaging 
Functional imaging in healthy adults. To understand the neuroanatomical regions 
involved in propositional language production, functional brain imaging (e.g., functional magnetic 
resonance imaging [fMRI] or positron emission tomography [PET]) constitutes a powerful mode of 
investigation. By observing the brain ‘at work’, the localised brain activity that underpins specific 
cognitive processes can be better understood. However, studying language using brain imaging 
presents a unique set of challenges beyond those already associated with imaging techniques, as 
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naturalistic speech can result in unpredictable head movements, which can be a major issue for 
fMRI (Gracco, Tremblay & Pike, 2005). Nonetheless, imaging studies have identified multiple 
brain regions that support spoken language (for a review, see Price, 2012); however, precise regions 
and associated functions remain hotly debated (see Wise & Geranmayeh, 2016). Due to the 
complex nature of propositional language production, it is unsurprising that a broad array of brain 
regions have been implicated, as language production involves many levels of processing as well as 
the integration of multiple linguistic and non-linguistic components (Blank et al., 2002; Troiani et 
al., 2008).  
In a seminal PET study, Braun, Guillemin, Hosey and Varga (2001) investigated the cortical 
brain areas involved in narrative production in native English speakers and users of American Sign 
Language (ASL). By contrasting imaging data across experimental conditions, the authors were 
able to highlight the brain regions associated with narrative production, regardless of the production 
modality (i.e. spoken English vs. ASL). Braun et al. (2001) reported increased blood flow to a 
widespread ‘network’ of brain regions during discourse production, including the frontal 
operculum, anterior insula, supplementary motor areas, lateral premotor areas, medial prefrontal 
cortices, superior and middle temporal areas, inferior angular gyri, lateral occipital regions, 
precuneus, posterior cingulate and parahippocampal gyri. Activation in the anterior regions was 
predominantly left-lateralised and posterior activation was more bilateral. The authors argued that 
the progression from bilateral regions (posterior) to left-lateralised regions (anterior) coarsely 
reflects the stages of spoken language production, such that the conceptual and lexico-semantic 
levels are supported by bilateral regions and the left-lateralised anterior regions are associated with 
phonology and articulation3 (Braun et al., 2001).  
In the following year, Blank et al. (2002) investigated the production of propositional 
language (e.g., describing personal experiences) and non-propositional language (‘automatic’: e.g., 
counting backwards, reciting nursery rhymes) in healthy adults using PET. The authors largely 
                                                3	Braun et al. (2001) highlight that the involvement of anterior regions is likely not limited to articulatory functions, and 
note particularly that medial and superior frontal regions may be involved in initiation, planning, and drawing 
inferences.  
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reproduced the results of Braun et al. (2001), identifying a number of brain regions that were 
activated to a greater degree during propositional, compared to non-propositional, language 
production. These regions included the superior and middle frontal gyri, supplementary motor area, 
posterior cingulate, angular gyri and left middle temporal gyrus. The authors speculated that 
interactions between temporal and frontal regions are necessary for the formulation of propositional 
language (Blank et al., 2002). Interestingly, several of the regions reported by Braun et al. (2001) 
and Blank et al. (2002) (bilateral angular gyri, posterior cingulate, medial prefrontal cortex, 
precuneus) were later identified as key nodes of the default-mode network (DMN). The DMN is 
generally considered to be active during ‘passive’ thinking; this might include internally 
reminiscing, thinking about future events, or thinking about the self (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna & 
Schacter, 2008). As spoken and internal or silent reminiscences are cognitively similar, it is logical 
that descriptions of past experiences, as per the propositional language tasks in the Braun et al. 
(2001) and Blank et al. (2002) studies, activate these brain regions.   
Using fMRI, Troiani et al. (2008) reported somewhat similar results: during the description 
of a picture story, bilateral inferior frontal cortices, and left dorsal frontal, temporal-parietal and 
temporal-occipital regions, were activated. The authors speculated that inferior frontal regions 
support the high-level organisational component of narrative production, dorsal frontal areas may 
be associated with working memory, and temporal-parietal-occipital regions are involved with the 
integration of semantic information and inferring meaning (Troiani et al., 2008). Another fMRI 
study demonstrated involvement of the precuneus during high-level conceptualisation of a message 
(Grande et al., 2012). 
Taken together, these studies alongside others (e.g., Awad, Warren, Scott, Turkheimer & 
Wise, 2007; Brownsett & Wise, 2010; Tremblay & Small, 2011) suggest that propositional 
language production is supported by a widely distributed ‘network’ of brain regions. There is some 
evidence that initiation processes and top-down or organisational aspects of language are associated 
with frontal-parietal brain regions (Blank et al., 2002; Braun et al., 2001; Brownsett & Wise, 2010; 
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Grande et al., 2012; Troiani et al., 2008), and temporoparietal activation reflects engagement of a 
semantic support system (Braun et al., 2001; Troiani et al., 2008) and lexical processes (Braun et 
al., 2001).  
Converging neuroanatomical evidence from clinical populations. Functional brain 
imaging evidence from healthy adults regarding the neuroanatomical correlates of propositional 
language is corroborated by clinical findings. Importantly, the involvement of frontal regions in 
high-level organisational aspects of spoken language stands in line with the findings of Stuss et al. 
(2005; 2007) from patients with frontal lesions, and the conjecture of Alexander (2006), that frontal 
attentional processes are crucial for the formulation of propositional language. Furthermore, 
‘executive’ functions, which relate to higher-order cognitive control, are thought to be supported by 
a frontal-parietal network of brain regions (e.g., Barbey et al., 2012; Niendam et al., 2012).  
With regard to articulation, imaging studies of particular clinical populations have been key 
in defining a ‘speech production network’ specifically involved with articulation aspects of 
language. For example, nonfluent primary progressive aphasia is a variant of the language 
presentation of frontotemporal dementia, and is characterised by progressive decline in motor 
speech and grammatical skills. Imaging of patients with this disorder provides evidence for a role of 
the left inferior frontal gyrus, anterior insula, supplementary motor areas and striatal regions in 
articulation (Grossman et al., 1996; Nestor et al., 2003; Gorno-Tempini et al., 2006), as well as 
white matter tracts such as the superior longitudinal fasciculus (e.g., Galantucci et al., 2011) and 
frontostriatal pathways in the left hemisphere (Mandelli et al., 2014). Additionally, Borovsky, 
Saygin, Bates and Dronkers (2007) investigated propositional language production in left 
hemisphere stroke patients with aphasia via an open-ended autobiographical interview. Using 
voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM; see Bates et al., 2003), the authors reported that 
damage to the anterior insula, inferior frontal gyrus, sensorimotor and anterior temporal regions was 
associated with less grammatical complexity and a lower quantity of spoken language, and damage 
to the angular gyrus and the posterior middle and superior temporal gyri was associated with poorer 
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semantic variation (Borovsky et al., 2007). The convergence of imaging evidence in healthy and 
clinical populations demonstrates that broadly distributed brain regions are involved in 
propositional language production, although the processes of conceptualisation, lexico-semantic 
integration and articulation differ slightly in their neuroanatomical underpinnings.  
Single Word Retrieval: Evidence from Picture Naming 
The production of propositional language involves a complex interplay between concept-
level (macrolinguistic) and word-level (microlinguistic) processes. Up to this point we have 
discussed conceptual processes in terms of attentional and executive control at the connected speech 
level, but at some point microlinguistic processes must also be considered. Is there evidence for the 
role of broader executive control at the single word level? 
A body of work on semantic processing in picture naming provides insight. Thompson-
Schill et al. (1998) asked patients with focal frontal lesions to generate a verb from each noun 
presented, and found that damage to the LIFG (specifically BA 44) was associated with poorer 
performance when selection demands were high. The authors argued that the LIFG has a role in 
selecting between simultaneously active, semantically-related competitors; this effect is related to 
the selection deficit in Robinson and colleagues’ patients with dynamic aphasia ANG (1998) and 
CH (2005), although at a conceptually different level of the language production system. However, 
the task in the Thompson-Schill et al. (1998) study did not require the retrieval of semantic 
information per se, and therefore Schnur et al. (2005; 2006; 2009) extended on this work using a 
picture naming paradigm. As expected, they found LIFG damage was associated with increased 
blocking errors (i.e., increased errors when naming pictures in semantically homogenous trials), and 
therefore argued for a specific role of the LIFG in lexical selection. They attributed the increase in 
errors to an increase in competition from semantically-related items, and went on to describe the 
mechanism at play as a ‘controlled selection’ mechanism.  
Similarly, Jefferies et al. (2006; 2007; 2008) employed a picture-naming paradigm, with a 
group of stroke aphasic patients who had sustained damage to the left prefrontal or temporoparietal 
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regions. The authors reported a specific pattern of semantic deficits, describing their refractory 
nature: that is, picture-naming performance was poorer after retrieving names of semantically-
related items. The authors argued that this deficit pattern was attributable to a failure of executive 
control processes, which would be recruited to direct retrieval towards relevant semantic features by 
resolving competition between simultaneously activated items. However, a recent study of stroke 
patients with damage to the left prefrontal area demonstrated that the LIFG is not always necessary 
for lexical selection (Riès, Karzmark, Navarrete, Knight & Dronkers, 2015); instead the authors 
suggested that the LIFG might host a ‘boosting’ mechanism, or top-down cognitive-control 
mechanism, that comes into play when lexical selection is difficult. Further reinforcing the link 
between non-language skills and language functions is a series of studies on object use in patients 
with semantic aphasia (e.g. Corbett, Jefferies, Ehsan & Lambon Ralph, 2009a; Corbett, Jefferies & 
Lambon Ralph, 2009b), where these patients were found to be impaired in naturalistic object use 
and specific object use tasks. In contrast to patients with semantic dementia, a condition in which 
the core semantic representations are degraded, the performance of the patients with semantic 
aphasia reflected a deficit of cognitive control (Corbett et al., 2009a). Recently, Thompson et al. 
(2018) demonstrated that patients with ‘dysexecutive syndrome’ showed a pattern of semantic 
cognition akin to patients with semantic aphasia, and argued that this constitutes evidence for an 
executive control component of semantic retrieval. Overall, this work highlights the non-language 
mechanisms underpinning semantic skills, which are fundamental to the successful production of 
propositional language.  
This body of literature is pertinent because it demonstrates a role for executive control even 
at the single word level. We can conceptualise this executive control mechanism in terms of 
attentional control, or selective attention, which is executive in nature and requires the focus to be 
narrowed to what is relevant in the context of competing stimuli.  
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The Role of Emotion 
The role of attention discussed up to this point mainly implicates executive control or 
anterior attentional processes, which are voluntary and under top-down control, operating to direct 
behaviour towards a goal. The production of propositional language is indeed a conscious, 
voluntary, deliberate, goal-directed activity, and therefore an influence of attentional or executive 
control is logical. However, influential models of attention also postulate the existence of a parallel 
stream of ‘bottom-up’ attention, which is automatic and stimulus-driven (e.g., Corbetta & 
Schulman, 2002; Posner, 1980). These two components of attention, also known as the ‘dorsal’ and 
‘ventral’ streams, or ‘endogenous’ and ‘exogenous’ control, have been found to be associated with 
anatomically distinct networks of brain regions (Corbetta & Schulman, 2002). The allocation of 
limited attention resources is determined by a combination of top-down and bottom-up processes, 
relating to the features of the stimuli and the goal-directed control systems (Desimone & Duncan, 
1995). Inherently linked with the capture of attention is emotion. Emotional stimuli draw attention, 
place greater demands on attentional resources than neutral information, and are prioritised for 
processing (Yiend, 2010). There is a plethora of research in this area, although the paradigm used 
most extensively to investigate attention to emotion is the visual search. Visual searches require 
selective attention to particular stimulus features, and the speed at which targets are identified 
provides the basis for the development of theories of visual selective attention (Müller & 
Krummenacher, 2006). The consensus among studies is that negative emotional information, most 
often anger or fear relevant, is detected faster and is more distracting than neutral stimuli (e.g., Fox 
et al., 2000; Juth, Lundqvist, Karlsson & Öhman, 2000; Öhman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001; see also 
‘happy’ and ‘sad’: Frischen et al., 2008; Williams, Moss, Bradshaw & Mattingley, 2005). Thus, 
emotion is a salient source of information and is prioritised for attentional processing. If attention is 
involved during message formulation, it is logical that factors that modulate or attract attention, 
such as emotion, must also be examined.  
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For the purpose of this thesis, emotion was selected as a key modulator of attention because 
emotion itself is critically and intuitively linked with propositional language. Hughlings Jackson 
noted this more than a century ago, citing that patients who were unable to produce speech on 
command or voluntarily were often able to do so under the influence of intense emotion (Jackson, 
1879). He reported that patients with ‘loss of speech’ (i.e., essentially mute), would emit swear 
words when annoyed with other patients, or cry out ‘no!’ when angry or surprised. Other examples 
include a woman who was heard to remark ‘take care’ when someone was in danger, and a man 
utter ‘God bless you, my dear’ to his wife as he died. These examples suggest that the speaker’s 
emotional state can influence their language production abilities. Jackson (1879) specifically 
discussed the preservation of ‘emotional language’, as opposed to ‘intellectual language’, in patients 
with ‘loss of speech’, and posited that even simple utterances such as ‘yes’ and ‘no’ could be 
propositional in nature when produced in response to an emotional event.  
Furthermore, the communication of socially relevant information is imperative in 
establishing relationships and group cohesion. Successful social communication requires social 
cognition, a major component of which is emotion recognition. Emotions need to be decoded 
accurately and emotional information must be efficiently integrated to allow relevant information to 
be communicated. It has been proposed that emotional knowledge is stored within the semantic 
system (DeHouwer & Hermans, 1994); this suggests that emotional information may be drawn on 
while semantic information is being inserted and integrated during message formulation (e.g., 
Sherratt, 2007). Given its intrinsic relationship with language, alongside its influence on attentional 
processing, emotion was selected as a key attention-modulating variable in our investigation of the 
relationship between attention and spoken language production.  
The Current Thesis 
The current thesis investigates the role of attention, and the relationship between attention 
and emotion, in the formulation of a message for expression via propositional language. Attention is 
the primary focus in Chapters 2 and 3, which present studies exploring the relationship between 
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sustained attention, selective attention, executive functions and the frontal attentional process of 
energization and propositional language. Chapter 4 is divided into two studies, and introduces the 
role of emotion as a modulator of attention, examining the interplay between emotional and 
attentional processes in propositional language.  
The investigations in this thesis will be approached from two perspectives: 1) clinical 
neuropsychology, with the inclusion of two different patient populations (Chapters 2, 3, Study 2 
Chapter 4), and 2) cognitive psychology, using a large sample of healthy adults (Study 1 Chapter 
4). Chapter 2 includes a group of mild stroke patients and matched healthy controls, and Chapters 
3 and 4 include a case series of patients with progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP) and a matched 
healthy control group. Importantly, none of the patients in the current studies were classified as 
aphasic. Existing research has identified that attentional processes are implicated in aphasia (e.g., 
Villard & Kiran, 2017); however, the focus of the current study is at the level of message 
formulation. Language and cognition are notoriously difficult to disentangle, as many tests of 
cognition require some degree of language, even if to simply understand task instructions. This 
challenge is compounded if language articulation is impaired, as it becomes unclear whether task 
responses (or lack thereof) are related to language or cognition. Therefore, in order to investigate 
propositional language at the conceptual or ‘idea’ level, we opted to include mild stroke and PSP, 
because in these patients core language skills generally remained intact, but they presented with 
difficulties more related to the ‘executive’ aspects of language. This is complemented by the 
investigation of the propositional language of healthy adults in Study 1 of Chapter 4.  
 Stroke. Stroke, also known as cerebrovascular accident (CVA), occurs when the blood 
supply to the brain is disrupted. It is defined by the World Health Organization as ‘rapidly 
developing clinical signs of focal (or global) disturbance of cerebral function lasting more than 24 
hours or leading to death with no apparent cause other than of vascular origin’. The study of stroke 
patients lends itself to the investigation of cognition and language, as language, executive and 
attentional deficits are commonly reported following stroke (Joniken et al., 2006). One of the most 
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common neuropsychological sequelae of stroke is executive dysfunction, which occurs in up to 
40% of acute stroke patients. Attention problems are also common, and often persist beyond three 
years post stroke (Hyndman & Ashburn, 2003). 
Much of the research to date on language and attention in stroke has included samples of 
patients with aphasia (e.g., Murray et al., 1997), or selected samples based on damage to specific 
regions or hemispheres. In contrast, the study presented in Chapter 2 includes an unselected sample 
of stroke patients without aphasia. The aim of the study was to investigate two macrolinguistic 
processes: cohesion and coherence of connected speech. Furthermore, we explored the relationship 
between the cohesion and coherence of connected speech and sustained attention, selective 
attention, and executive functions. To our knowledge, no other study to date has investigated the 
role of higher-order attentional and executive functions in propositional language in both right and 
left hemisphere stroke patients simultaneously. The stroke group included in Chapter 2 afforded a 
direct hemispheric comparison as all patients completed the same tasks.  
Progressive supranuclear palsy.  PSP is a rare atypical parkinsonian degenerative disorder, 
with a prevalence estimated at 5-7 per 100 000 (Schrag, Ben-Shlomo & Quinn, 1999). Patients 
typically present with a supranuclear gaze palsy, akinetic rigidity, balance problems, and a history 
of backwards falls. Although impairments in language production are common with the progression 
of the disorder, (e.g., nonfluent aphasia, apraxia of speech; Rohrer et al., 2010), the second subtype 
of dynamic aphasia has been documented in PSP more than any other single pathology (Esmonde et 
al., 1996; Robinson et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2015a). Cognitive dysfunction, particularly in the 
executive domain, is a common feature of the disorder (Rittman & Rowe, 2012). Patterns of cortical 
and subcortical atrophy are evident in PSP, particularly in the bilateral frontal lobes and midbrain 
(Paviour, Price, Jahanshahi, Lees & Fox, 2006). Moreover, there is a prominent basal ganglia 
dysfunction (Burciu et al., 2015), implicating frontostriatal circuits.   
A case series of five patients with PSP is the focus of Chapter 3, and four patients are 
included in Study 2 of Chapter 4. Chapter 3 addresses spontaneous speech patterns in PSP, with a 
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specific focus on ‘energization’ as an underlying process. Chapter 4 employs a novel experimental 
task to explore the role of emotion and distraction in propositional language, with the aim of 
comparing the contribution of emotional and attentional processes to language production between 
patients with PSP and healthy age-matched controls.  
Summary. Overall, the ability to produce propositional language is central to the human 
experience, yet remains poorly understood. The overarching aim of this thesis is to investigate the 
role of attention and emotion in the formulation of a message. This research has the potential to 
inform the development of strategies for patients in whom propositional language is impaired, 
which may improve communication and minimise social isolation. Moreover, an improved 
understanding of the interface between language and broader cognition has theoretical implications, 
as current models of spoken language production could be expanded on to acknowledge or include 
more specific cognitive mechanisms. 
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Chapter 2: Cohesive and Coherent Speech Deficits in Mild 
Stroke  
  28 
Preamble 
The work contained in this chapter has been published in Brain & Language (Barker, Young 
& Robinson, 2017). Figures, tables and formatting have been adapted to fit the thesis format. As 
this chapter was prepared as in independent piece of work, parts of the introduction will repeat 
information presented in the General Introduction. Some terminology has been altered to be 
consistent with subsequent thesis chapters and to reflect the current state of the field. 
Abstract 
Spoken language production theories and lesion studies highlight several important 
prelinguistic conceptualisation processes involved in the production of cohesive and coherent 
connected speech. Cohesion and coherence broadly connect sentences with preceding ideas and the 
overall topic. Broader cognitive mechanisms may mediate these processes. This study aims to 
investigate 1) whether stroke patients without aphasia exhibit impairments in cohesion and 
coherence in connected speech, and 2) the role of attention and executive functions in the 
production of connected speech. Eighteen stroke patients (8 right hemisphere stroke [RHS]; 6 left 
[LHS]) and 21 healthy controls completed two self-generated narrative tasks to elicit connected 
speech. A multi-level analysis of within and between-sentence processing ability was conducted. 
Cohesion and coherence impairments were found in the stroke group, particularly RHS patients, 
relative to controls. In the whole stroke group, better performance on the Hayling test of executive 
function, which taps verbal initiation/suppression, was related to fewer propositional repetitions and 
global coherence errors. Better performance on attention tasks was related to fewer propositional 
repetitions, and decreased global coherence errors. In the RHS group, aspects of cohesive and 
coherent speech were associated with better performance on attention tasks. Better Hayling test 
scores were related to more cohesive and coherent speech in RHS patients, and more coherent 
speech in LHS patients. Thus, we documented connected speech deficits in a heterogeneous stroke 
group without prominent aphasia. Our results suggest that broader cognitive processes may play a 
role in producing connected speech at the early message formulation stage. 
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Introduction 
Connected speech is a continuous sequence of utterances produced by a speaker to 
meaningfully convey thoughts and ideas (Crystal, 1980). In connected speech, meaning is conveyed 
via propositions, the smallest idea unit derived from an utterance containing a subject, verb and 
modifiers (Mozeiko, Lê & Coelho, 2010). Propositional speech is connected speech in which the 
speaker links together propositional units in order to communicate thoughts or ideas that are novel 
to a specific context (Jackson, 1874).  
Message Formulation Processes in Connected Speech 
Conceptualisation. Existing models of spoken language production emphasise three 
distinct stages: prelinguistic conceptualisation, linguistic formulation, and articulation and 
monitoring of the verbal message (Dell et al., 1999; Frederiksen & Stemmer, 1993; Garrett, 2000; 
Jakobson, 1980; Levelt, 1989; Sherratt, 2007). Levelt (1989; 1993; 1999) posited a prelinguistic 
stage of conceptualisation, during which a communicative intention is generated (see Sherratt, 2007 
for a similar account). At this stage, a speaker attends to the current topic or focus, shifts their 
attention to new topics as the communicative context demands, and monitors conversation. The 
result of conceptual preparation is a preverbal message that is not yet linguistic but contains the 
necessary conceptual structure required for linguistic formulation and articulation. During this 
stage, macrolinguistic processes organise conceptual information into appropriate propositions by 
use of linguistic and conceptual-semantic links that connect speech with preceding ideas and the 
general topic as a whole (Marini et al., 2011a). The effective production of meaningful connected 
speech depends largely on intact macrolinguistic abilities. Such processes include the connection of 
sentences by means of cohesion and coherence, which will be the two conceptual processes 
investigated in the current study (see Figure 2a).  
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Figure 2a. Schematic representation of key idea generation mechanisms for connected speech 
production: high level processes. NB: This figure does not represent a full model of spoken 
language production as articulation stages are omitted. 
 
Cohesion. Cohesion is accomplished by the use of cohesive devices: linguistic markers that 
serve to form the structural and semantic connectivity between elements of speech (Halliday & 
Hasan, 1976). Originally, Halliday and Hasan (1976) described five categories of cohesive devices: 
reference, conjunctive, ellipsis, substitution and lexical. However, this study will investigate only 
the three most common cohesive ties in normal narrative speech, which are reference, conjunctive 
and lexical ties (Mentis & Prutting, 1987) (see Appendix B). A word is considered a cohesive 
marker if its meaning cannot be adequately interpreted without understanding its relation to some 
other preceding element of speech (Tanskanen, 2006). A text is considered cohesive if the elements 
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are linked together, but coherent if the sum of the links results in meaningful communication. A text 
can be cohesive (i.e., accurately linked) but not necessarily coherent (i.e., conveying meaning). 
Consider the example: The man went to church / Church rhymes with birch / The birch tree grew 
tall and wide.  These utterances are cohesively linked but do not form a coherent whole.  
Coherence. The ability to maintain thematic unity by integrating propositions or idea units 
into a coherent representation is often quantified at two levels: local and global (Kintsch & van 
Dijk, 1978). Local coherence refers to the abstract conceptual links between contiguous utterances 
that maintain meaning within connected speech. It may be disrupted when there are abrupt changes 
in topic or missing or erroneous use of reference, for example, the incorrect use of pronouns (Marini 
et al., 2011a). Global coherence reflects the degree to which propositions are organised or 
structured with respect to the overall goal, theme or topic. It involves establishing conceptual links 
between distal utterances (Marini et al., 2011a). Problems maintaining global coherence may 
manifest as tangential, repetitive or irrelevant speech, or utterances that are conceptually 
incongruous to the overall topic or story (Christiansen, 1995; Marini et al., 2011a; Sherratt & 
Bryan, 2012).  
Supervisory Attentional and ‘Executive’ Processes and the Conceptualisation of Connected 
Speech 
The link between cognition and language functions has a relatively long history. Almost a 
century ago, Head (1926) argued for two components of language: the formulation of thought and 
its skilful expression. The emphasis on ‘thought’ suggests an independent non-language component. 
Luria noted that impairments in establishing narrative intent mirror action planning deficits, and are 
related to the frontal lobes (Luria & Tsevtkova, 1968). In 1989, Sohlberg and Mateer suggested that 
attention-related processes could be implicated in complex language production. More specifically, 
Alexander (2006) highlighted a role for attention mechanisms in the message formulation stage of 
spoken language production. This is in line with a parallel body of work led by Jefferies and 
Lambon Ralph on controlled semantic processing, which further highlights the link between 
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executive processes and language by demonstrating that executive control processes are recruited to 
resolve competition between simultaneously active, semantically-related, representations (e.g., 
Jefferies & Lambon Ralph, 2006; Jefferies et al., 2007; 2008).  
Three general supervisory ‘executive’ attentional processes, associated with the frontal 
lobes, were identified by Stuss and Alexander (2007) as critical in language production: 1) 
energization - initiating and sustaining a response; 2) task setting - establishing a stimulus-response 
relationship through trial and error learning; and 3) monitoring - the process of checking a task over 
time and accordingly adjusting behaviour. These three broad processes may also underlie other 
executive abilities such as selection, inhibition and strategy generation/implementation. In the 
current study we conceptualise these attentional processes as sustained attention and selective 
attention. The processes underlying sustained attention, which is the ability to directly focus and 
maintain attention for an extended period of time (Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway, & Nimmo-Smith, 
1996), are 1) the ability to initiate and maintain the intention to respond (i.e. energization), and 2) 
ongoing monitoring of one’s actions or evaluation of the task goal in combination with 
environmental status (i.e. monitoring) (MacPherson, Turner, Bozzali, Cipolotti, & Shallice, 2010). 
In connected speech, sustained attention is important for idea generation, maintaining the intention 
to respond, sustaining attention to the discourse focus, and the ongoing monitoring and evaluation 
of the state of the communicative context and the relevance of what has been, to what may be said 
(Alexander, 2006; Levelt, 1999; Sherratt & Bryan, 2012). By contrast, selective attention is more 
‘executive’ in nature, and involves focussing on one relevant source of information for cognitive 
processing when multiple competing sources are available (Smith & Jonides, 1999). In connected 
speech, selective attention is important for choosing ideas or propositional content to be conveyed, 
while simultaneously inhibiting those irrelevant or unimportant to the discourse focus (i.e. 
task/goal-setting) (Gold & Arbuckle, 1995; Rogalski, Altmann, Plummer-D’Amato, Behrman, & 
Marsiske, 2010). It is also important for topic maintenance and appropriate referencing (Coelho, 
Youse, Le, & Feinn, 2003). Levelt (1999) specified that during conceptualisation the speaker must 
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allocate their attention to a current focus or something specific to be expressed (i.e., selective 
attention). Similarly, Sherratt and Bryan (2012) described how selection and topicalisation of a 
message requires that the speaker sustain attention to and select the necessary, relevant information 
from the conceptual structure. 
The role of attention during message formulation has also been discussed in the context of 
dynamic aphasia: a language output disorder characterised by severely reduced propositional 
language in the context of well-preserved nominal and comprehension language skills. Robinson, 
Shallice and Cipolotti (2006) reported patient KAS who presented with sparse, perseverative and 
echolalic spontaneous speech, which the authors attributed to a deficit in her ability to fluently 
sequence novel thoughts. The authors speculated that this reflected a deficit in focusing attention on 
a specific message to be expressed, followed by difficulty in shifting attention to a new message, at 
the level of conceptual preparation (for similar pattern see also Robinson, 2013). Recently, 
Robinson et al. (2015a) reported a similar patient, whose dynamic aphasia was argued to be 
attributable to difficulty generating ideas, largely resembling an ‘energization’ deficit. The link 
between selective attention and the production of propositional speech is also highlighted in other 
case studies of dynamic aphasic patients who present with a selection deficit in verbal generation 
(e.g., Robinson et al., 1998; Robinson et al., 2005).  
Lesion Studies and Neural Correlates of Connected Speech 
Generally, the non-language dominant (right) hemisphere is critical in production of speech 
beyond the sentence level.  Patients with right hemisphere damage are documented with 
impairments in the organisational and informative aspects of connected speech, which impacts on 
coherence (Bartels-Tobin & Hinckley, 2005; Davis, O’Neil-Pirozzi, & Coon, 1997; Marini, 2012), 
and relating meaning between utterances, which affects cohesion (Bloom, Borod, Obler & 
Gerstman, 1993; Marini et al., 2005). These right hemisphere damage deficits have been explained 
by attentional and executive disturbances (Myers, 1997; Sherratt & Bryan, 2012; Tompkins, 1995). 
In contrast, damage to the language dominant (left) hemisphere results in word and sentence 
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production deficits with relatively preserved global discourse structure (e.g. Marini, Caltagirone, 
Pasqualetti & Carlomagno, 2007; Ulatowska, Freedman-Stern, Doyel, Macaluso-Haynes, & North, 
1983). However, patients with left hemisphere damage may also be impaired in the use of cohesion, 
which has led to the assertion that impaired macrolinguistic abilities in these patients may have a 
linguistic basis or occur due to difficulties recruiting microlinguistic processes for macrolinguistic 
purposes (Andreetta, Cantagallo & Marini, 2012; Andreetta & Marini, 2015). 
With regard to executive processes, executive dysfunction is the most common cognitive 
problem following stroke. Executive deficits are reported in just less than half of all stroke patients, 
and may occur to a degree regardless of stroke location (Nys et al., 2007).   
Current Study   
To date, the relationship between the conceptual processes of cohesion and coherence in 
connected speech has not been investigated in a stroke population. This is despite evidence to 
suggest that connected speech difficulties may be related to impaired attention following stroke. 
Studies in right hemisphere stroke patients have shown attention and executive functions are 
associated with coherence and cohesion (Bartels-Tobin & Hinckley, 2005; Sherratt & Bryan, 2012), 
though no studies to date have investigated the relationship between executive/attention and 
cohesion/coherence deficits in left hemisphere stroke patients. A clearer understanding of the 
deficits underpinning connected speech impairments has clinical implications with regard to 
treatment and rehabilitation. 
This study investigated whether stroke patients without aphasia exhibit impairments in 
cohesion and coherence in connected speech. Being non-aphasic, the stroke group in the current 
study had largely preserved core language abilities. First, we hypothesised that stroke patients 
would perform significantly worse on cohesion and coherence measures compared to healthy 
controls. Secondly, in line with research showing patients with right hemisphere damage have more 
difficulty with macrolinguistic aspects of speech (e.g., Sherratt & Bryan, 2012) we hypothesised 
that right hemisphere stroke (RHS) patients would be more impaired relative to left hemisphere 
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stroke (LHS) patients on coherence and cohesion in connected speech. Furthermore, we 
investigated the role of attention and executive functions in connected speech production.  We 
predicted that stroke patients would be impaired relative to controls on attention and executive 
function measures, and that these measures would be positively associated with more complete use 
of cohesion and fewer errors of cohesion and coherence in stroke patients. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants included 18 stroke patients who met the following criteria: (a) diagnosis of 
stroke (not TIA) by their treating neurologist; (b) presence of a lesion evident on MRI or CT scan; 
(c) English as their first language. Patients were excluded if they: (a) had a neurological history 
other than stroke; (b) had a history of alcohol abuse; (c) were currently experiencing a severe degree 
of anxiety or depression; or (d) had severe cognitive4, vision or hearing impairment that would 
affect task performance. Stroke patients were not selected based on any specific impairment. The 
demographic and clinical characteristics of stroke patients are detailed in Law et al. (2015) as the 
stroke patients were recruited for several studies (also in Appendix A). The stroke group included 
six patients with left hemisphere lesions, eight right hemisphere lesions and four patients with 
bilateral damage (see Appendix A). 
Stroke patients were matched to 21 healthy controls that had English as their first language 
and no neurological or psychiatric history. This study was approved by The Prince Charles Hospital 
and The University of Queensland Human Research Ethics Committees.  
As shown in Table 2a, the stroke and control groups did not differ significantly in terms of 
age, gender, years of formal education, or premorbid ability, estimated from reading performance 
on the National Adult Reading Test (NART-R; Nelson & Willison, 1991) (all p > .05). 
Furthermore, the LHS and RHS subgroups did not differ significantly from controls in age, gender 
or premorbid ability; however, the RHS group had a lower number of years of education than the 
                                                
4 A severe cognitive impairment was defined as cognitive impairment across 2 or more domains (i.e., attention, 
language, memory, executive function) that was significantly below (>2SDs) premorbid estimates.  
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control group, p = .007. The right and left stroke subgroups were equivalent in chronicity, p > .05. 
The stroke group was not aphasic, as defined by significantly impaired performance on the 
language baseline tasks (i.e., < 5th percentile cut-off). However, one stroke patient (RHS) performed 
below the 5th percentile in naming and word comprehension. 
Procedure 
 Participants were administered all baseline and experimental connected speech tasks in one 
session, with breaks as required. Narrative speech samples were recorded using a Sony ICD-BX112 
voice recorder for transcription purposes. The cognitive and language baseline measures assessed 
the following: current intellectual function (Advanced Progressive Matrices, APM; Raven, 1976); 
short-term and working memory (Digit Span: WAIS III - Wechsler, 1997); naming (Graded 
Naming Test - McKenna & Warrington, 1980); single word comprehension (Synonyms Test - 
Warrington, McKenna & Orpwood, 1998); sentence repetition (3-6 words in length - McCarthy & 
Warrington, 1984) and reading (NART-R errors).  The complex picture description of the Cookie 
Theft scene (Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Examination 3rd Edition – Goodglass, Kaplan & Barresi, 
2000) gave a production measure of words spoken per minute and the mean length of utterance 
(MLU= total narrative words / total sentences – Saffran, Berndt & Schwartz., 1989). Finally, two 
word fluency tasks assessed the executive aspect of language function (Benton, 1968): phonemic 
fluency, where participants were required to generate as many words as possible beginning with the 
letters F, A and S for one minute each, and semantic fluency, where participants were given one 
minute to generate as many animals as possible.  
Connected speech tasks. Participants were given two self-generated narrative discourse 
tasks. In the first task, participants were asked to retell the story of Cinderella from memory in as 
much detail as possible (Saffran et al., 1989). For the second task, participants were asked to talk 
about any topic of their choice for a maximum of one minute, which followed a period of up to one 
minute to think of the topic before being prompted to begin. During both speech tasks examiner 
disruption was minimal with only general encouragement provided (e.g., ‘Go on’, ‘Mmm’). 
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The speech samples were transcribed and coded by two trained judges. Transcription 
included all words, sounds and repeats. Contractions were counted as two words (i.e., haven’t = 
have not). Each sample of connected speech was segmented into utterances, that is, a well-formed 
sentence except where prosodic or phonologic counter indication suggested otherwise (Marini et al., 
2011a). Acoustic, semantic, grammatical and phonological criteria were used to segment utterances 
in a successive fashion.   
As general guidelines suggest that a corpus of 150 to 300 words (Bastiaanse & Jonkers, 
1998; Saffran et al., 1989) is necessary for adequate speech analysis, a composite score was 
generated by summing the scores across all variables for the two self-generated narrative tasks (free 
topic discussion + Cinderella story) to obtain the total number of utterances, and then calculating 
percentage scores for each variable as a proportion of the total utterances (e.g., total tangential 
utterances / total utterances x 100). 
Cohesion. Cohesion was scored using the classification system developed by Halliday and 
Hasan (1976). Three types of cohesive ties were examined: reference, conjunction and lexical5 (see 
Appendix B for operational definitions). The total number of cohesive ties for each category was 
obtained and each was judged according to their adequacy (adapted from Liles, 1985). Two 
categories of adequacy were used: (a) complete— if the information referred to by the cohesive 
marker was easily found and unambiguously defined (e.g., The mother is standing at the sink // she 
is washing the dishes); (b) error—incomplete such that the information referred to by the cohesive 
marker was not provided in the text (e.g., Cinderella lived in the castle // they had children) or if the 
listener was guided to ambiguous information elsewhere in the text (e.g., The father and the boy are 
playing with the ball // he is jumping high to catch it). There were seven outcome measures of 
cohesion: total complete reference ties, total complete conjunctive ties, total reference errors, total 
conjunctive errors, total complete cohesion (a composite score: complete reference + complete 
                                                
5 First person pronouns (e.g., I, you) were not included in the analysis of reference (Halliday & Hasan, 1976). However, 
when a first person plural pronoun (e.g., we) functioned cohesively it	was scored as a cohesive device (e.g., in the series 
of utterances: / My wife was dying / what	was I to do / we were on our own /, the use of ‘we’ refers directly to 
information in the preceding speech). 
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conjunction), total cohesive errors (a composite score: reference errors + conjunction errors) and 
total complete lexical ties6. Each measure of cohesion was expressed as a percentage of the total 
number of words uttered. 
Coherence. Coherence was scored along two dimensions: (1) errors in local coherence or 
the semantic relatedness between contiguous utterances; (2) errors in global coherence or the 
relatedness of remote utterances with the overall theme or topic (Marini et al., 2011a). The total 
number of topic switches and missing referents (as per Marini et al., 2011b) were added to create a 
total number of local coherence errors, which was then expressed as a percentage of the total 
number of utterances.  As local coherence overlaps with application of referential cohesion it is 
important to differentiate when errors of cohesion and local coherence could be considered 
independent. Take the example of the cohesive errors given previously, Cinderella lived in the 
castle // they had children, could also be considered an error of local coherence as it contains a 
missing referent and an abrupt topic shift. The second example (i.e., The father and the boy are 
playing with the ball // he is jumping high to catch it) would be considered a cohesive error only. 
Another example of a failure of local coherence is evident in the utterances: / they put it . . . / he 
went to the local doctor /. The first utterance remains unfinished while in the second utterance new 
information is introduced (topic switch) and a cohesive error occurs.  
Errors of global coherence include utterances that are tangential, conceptually incongruent 
with the story, propositional repetitions, or filler sentences (Marini et al., 2011a; see also 
Christiansen, 1995). An utterance was considered: 1) tangential when it contained a derailment in 
the flow of discourse with respect to the information already provided in a preceding utterance; 2) 
conceptually incongruent when it included ideas not directly addressed by the task; 3) a 
propositional repetition where the speaker repeated ideas, showing a lack of novelty, or directly 
restated utterances, reflecting perseveration; and 4) a filler utterance when it was an empty phrase 
that did not provide any additional information to the overall task or was a direct comment about 
                                                
6 Complete lexical ties were evaluated independently and were not included in total complete cohesion or total cohesive 
errors scores.		
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the nature of the task. The total number of tangential sentences, conceptual incongruence errors, 
propositional repetition errors and filler sentences were expressed as percentages of the total 
number of utterances. Finally, the number of propositional repetitions, tangential, conceptually 
incongruent, and filler utterances was totalled and expressed as a percentage of the total number of 
utterances to yield an index of global coherence errors. Thus, there were six outcome measures of 
coherence: local coherence errors, propositional repetitions, tangential utterances, conceptually 
incongruent utterance, filler sentences, and global coherence errors (a composite measure: 
propositional repetitions + tangential utterances + conceptually incongruent utterance + filler 
sentences). 
Attention and supervisory executive function tasks. Attention was measured using the 
Elevator Counting and Elevator Counting with Distraction subtests from the Test of Everyday 
Attention (TEA - Robertson et al., 1996). Elevator Counting (EC) is a measure of sustained 
auditory attention, which requires the participant to count strings of tones. Elevator Counting with 
Distraction (ECD) is a more complex selective attention and auditory-verbal working memory task. 
It requires the participant to count a series of low tones while ignoring interspersed high tones. 
Verbal initiation and suppression were measured using the Hayling Sentence Completion Test 
(Burgess & Shallice, 1997), whereby the participant is read aloud a short sentence with the final 
word omitted, and asked to orally generate a single word to complete the sentence. This is either a 
sensible word (initiation - Section A; e.g. ‘When you go to bed, turn off the … light’), or an 
unconnected word (suppression - Section B; e.g., in this example ‘… banana’). There are 15 
sentence stems in each section of the Hayling Test. RTs are calculated with a stopwatch, and reflect 
the time between the end of the experimenter’s sentence stem and the onset of the participant’s 
response, rounded down to the nearest whole second. The Hayling task was administered in 
accordance with the published manual (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). The Initiation RT and 
Suppression RT Sub-scaled Scores (SS) were derived from the total response times (RT) for 
Sections A and B, respectively. The Suppression Error SS was derived from the number of ‘blatant’ 
  40 
and ‘subtle’ errors produced in suppression of a natural completion in Section B. These three SSs 
were then combined to form the Hayling Overall SS, which ranges from 1 to 10 and corresponds to 
percentiles (e.g., a SS of 6 corresponds to the 50th percentile and is indicative of average ability in 
initiation and suppression). The Hayling task was chosen to measure supervisory executive 
functions of interest because it is comprised of sentences and context and is therefore most relevant 
to connected speech. The Hayling task affords a measure of verbal initiation in a semantic context 
(Section A) and verbal suppression, which reflects the executive process of inhibition in a language 
context (Section B). Healthy controls are typically unimpaired for both the initiation and 
suppression sections (e.g., Burgess & Shallice 1996). By contrast, patients with focal frontal lesions 
are reported to be unimpaired on the initiation section but impaired on the inhibition section (Errors 
and RTs) (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Robinson et al., 2015b). Thus, we predict that stroke patients 
will be impaired on the suppression but not initiation sections, resulting in decreased Overall SS, 
Suppression RT SS and Suppression Error SS relative to controls. Moreover, performance on the 
Hayling task has been linked to ‘monitoring’ (e.g., Hornberger & Bertoux, 2015), which is one of 
three attentional processes that comprise Stuss and Alexander’s (2007) framework of ‘supervisory’ 
or ‘anterior’ attention.  
Statistical Analyses 
The stroke and control groups were compared on all measures using Bonferroni-corrected 
independent t-tests. Violations to homogeneity of variance were corrected using Levene’s adjusted 
degrees-of-freedom or, in the case of severe violations, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test 
was conducted. The chi-square test of independence was used for categorical data (e.g., gender). 
One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Bonferroni-corrected t-tests were used for subgroup 
analyses (LHS, N = 6 versus RHS, N = 8 versus controls). At the subgroup level, a smaller control 
group (N = 8) was used for comparison to avoid confounds due to group size differences. This 
group was closely matched to the left and right hemisphere stroke groups on age, sex, education and 
premorbid IQ. Given the lower education of the RHS group, years of education was entered as a 
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covariate in the analyses of cohesion and coherence. Four patients were removed from the subgroup 
analyses, due to lesions affecting both hemispheres (N = 2), or patients having bilateral white matter 
changes that were more prominent than their focal lesions (N = 2) (see Appendix A). In cases where 
the assumption of equal variances was violated, the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was used 
followed by Mann-Whitney U tests. In addition, non-parametric Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients were undertaken between connected speech and attention/executive measures for the 
variables for which stroke patients were impaired. The LHS group performed very close to ceiling 
on both attention measures, which precluded interpretation of correlations. Therefore, correlations 
were only undertaken between attention and connected speech measures for the stroke group as a 
whole and the RHS group. For the executive measures, correlations were performed for the whole 
stroke group and both subgroups.  
Results 
Cognitive and Language Baseline  
A summary of cognitive and language baseline measures is presented in Table 2a. On 
cognitive baselines, there was no significant difference between the whole stroke group and control 
group on Digit Span (forwards: t(23) = .67, p > .05, d = .29; backwards: t(23) = 1.66, p > .05, d = 
.69; total: t(23) = 1.54, p > .05, d = .63) or the Advanced Progressive Matrices, t(35) = 1.85, p > .05, 
d = .60. However, the RHS group performed significantly below the control and LHS groups on the 
Matrices (t(12) = 2.36, p < .05, d = 1.32 and t(10) = 2.67, p < .05, d = 1.56, respectively). For the 
language baseline tests, comparisons were Bonferroni corrected for seven linguistic variables. The 
stroke and control groups did not differ significantly on measures of sentence repetition, t(37) = 
1.34, p > .05, d = .47 or single word reading, t(33) = 1.96, p > .05, d = .60. On the Graded Naming 
Test, stroke patients named significantly fewer objects than healthy controls, t(37) = 2.94, p < .01, d 
= .94. Although the subgroup ANOVA was not significant, F(2, 19) = 4.33, p > .01, ηp2 = .31, t-
tests revealed that the RHS group named significantly fewer objects than controls, t(14) = 2.97, p < 
.05, d = 1.49. This may reflect the lower education level of the RHS group; thus, education was 
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controlled for in the cohesion/coherence analyses. Stroke patients performed significantly below 
controls on the Synonym Test, t(35) = 4.08, p < .001, d = 1.32. Subgroup analysis confirmed this, 
F(2, 17) = 7.67, p < .01, ηp2 = .47, and t-tests revealed that the RHS group scored lower than 
healthy controls, t(13) = 4.19, p < .01, d = 2.15. The stroke group produced significantly fewer 
words than the control group on the Cookie Theft Scene description, t(37) = 2.99, p < .01, d = .95, 
however, subgroup analysis was not significant, F(2, 19) = .97, p > .05, ηp2 = .09. On the Cookie 
Theft task, the mean utterance length was shorter for the stroke group than the controls, t(37) = 
4.04, p < .001, d = 1.30. Subgroup analysis confirmed this, F(2, 19) = 7.06, p < .01, ηp2 = .43, with 
the RHS group producing a significantly shorter mean length of utterance than controls, t(14) = 
4.00, p < .01, d = 1.98. The stroke group as a whole performed significantly below the control 
group on the phonemic word fluency task, t(37) = 7.64, p < .001, d = 2.46, but not the semantic 
word fluency task, t(37) = 2.60, p > .01, d = 0.84, which confirms a degree of executive language 
difficulty in this group. Subgroup analysis revealed that the LHS group generated significantly 
fewer words than controls on phonemic fluency, t(12) = 4.40, p < .01, d = 2.48. 
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Table 2a. Demographic, cognitive and attention / executive function measures for stroke patients 
and healthy controls: mean (standard deviation and range). 
 Group 
 Controls Stroke 
  
N = 21 
All  
N = 18 
Left  
N = 6 
Right  
N = 8 
Demographics     
Sex  (M:F) a 7:14 11:7 3:3 5:3 
Handedness  (R:L) a 20:1 17:1 5:1 8:0 
Ageb 64.2  
(7.6; 49-79) 
65.8  
(10.7; 47-84) 
66.5  
(12.0; 54-84) 
62.0  
(8.4; 47-73) 
Educationc 13.6  
(2.8; 10-19) 
13.3  
(3.6; 9-23) 
13.8  
(2.8; 9-16) 
11.4  
(1.8; 10-15)** 
Chronicityd 
− 
284.5  
(167.9; 44-684) 
281.7  
(134.7; 124-494) 
344.6  
(192.1; 94-684) 
Cognitive and Language Baseline 
Premorbid Ability  
(NART-derived FSIQ) 
109.8  
(7.7; 94-122) 
102.6  
(13.2; 77-123) 
104.6  
(14.8; 84-123) 
100.3  
(13.5; 77-123) 
APM (/12) 7.4  
(2.6; 2-12) 
5.7  
(3.0; 1-11) 
7.3  
(2.6; 5-11)† 
3.7  
(2.2; 1-6)* 
Digit Span     
       Forwards 10.6 (2.1; 7-14) 9.9 (2.1; 5-14) 8.8 (2.1; 5-11) 10.9 (1.9; 8-14) 
       Backwards 6.9 (2.2; 5-10) 5.5 (1.7; 3-9) 5.5 (1.5; 4-8) 5.6 (1.6; 3-8) 
       Total 17.4  
(4.0; 13-24) 
15.2  
(2.9; 10-20) 
14.3  
(2.7; 10-18) 
16.5  
(3.0; 11-20) 
Graded Naming (/30) 21.8  
(3.9; 14-28) 
18.0  
(4.2; 10-25)**  
19.8  
(4.4; 13-25) 
15.6  
(3.7; 10-21)* 
Synonyms Test (/50) 45.1  
(3.9; 37-50) 
39.1  
(5.1; 29-47)*** 
41.6  
(5.0; 34-47) 
36.6  
(4.4; 29-41)** 
Sentence repetition (/10) 9.9 (0.3; 9-10) 10.0 (0.0; 10-10) 10.0 (0.0; 10-10) 10.0 (0.0; 10-10)  
NART errors (/50) 16.9 (6.3; 7-30) 22.6 (10.7; 6-43) 21.0 (12.1; 6-38) 24.4 (10.9; 6-43) 
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Word Fluency 
       Phonemic (FAS) 49.0  
(11.0, 26-72) 
22.7  
(10.3; 7-46)*** 
18.2  
(6.8; 9-28)*** 
28.5  
(11.3; 15-46) 
       Semantic (Animals) 19.1  
(5.6; 8-31) 
15.0  
(3.8; 6-20) 
14.2  
(3.5; 11-19) 
15.6  
(4.7; 6-20) 
Cookie Theft scene     
       Words per minute 134.3  
(35.7; 58-182) 
99.2  
(37.6; 25-184)** 
91.2  
(39.3; 25-128) 
103.1  
(44.6; 60-184) 
       Mean length of 
utterance 
7.9  
(1.0; 6.4- 9.1) 
6.7  
(0.8; 5.3-9.0)*** 
7.1  
(1.0; 6.3-9.0) 
6.3  
(0.7; 5.3-7.1)** 
Attention/Executive Function Tasks    
Attention Tasks     
       Elevator Counting 
(/7) 
6.8 (0.5; 5-7) 6.2 (1.1; 3-7) 6.5 (0.5; 6-7)  5.9 (1.6; 3-7) 
       Elevator Counting 
with Distraction (/10)  
7.5 (3.2; 1-10) 5.0 (3.4; 0-10)* 7.0 (3.0; 2-10) 3.1 (3.2; 0-10)* 
Hayling Sentence 
Completion  
    
       Overall SS 5.1 (1.8; 1-8) 3.0 (2.1; 1-8)** 2.7 (2.1; 1-6) 3.6 (2.3; 1-8) 
       Initiation RT SS 5.7 (0.8; 3-7) 5.0 (1.1; 3-6) 4.2 (1.3; 3-6) 5.4 (0.5; 5-6) 
       Suppression RT SS 5.0 (1.7; 1-7) 3.2 (2.0; 1-8)** 2.5 (2.3; 1-6) 3.7 (2.2; 1-8) 
       Supp. Error SS 5.5 (2.2; 1-8) 3.2 (2.5; 1-8)** 3.3 (3.2; 1-8) 3.3 (2.4; 1-7) 
Note. NART FSIQ = National Adult Reading Test Predicted Full Scale IQ; APM = Advanced 
Progressive Matrices; SS = Scaled Score; Hayling Overall SS Range 1-10, Initiation SS Range 1-7, 
Suppression / Suppression Error SS Range 1-8, 6 = Average. a Scores for sex and handedness 
represent ratio (not mean) scores. b Age in years.  c Education in years. d Chronicity (time since 
stroke) in days. Significant difference from controls following Bonferroni correction, * p < .05; ** 
p < .01; ***p < .001. Significant difference from left stroke † p <.05. Four stroke patients were 
excluded from L vs. R analyses due to bilateral damage (see Appendix A). NB: For subgroup 
comparisons (i.e. left and right stroke vs. controls), a closely matched smaller control group was 
used (N = 8; see methods). 
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Cohesion and Coherence in Stroke Patients vs. Controls 
Cohesion. A summary of cohesion connected speech measures is presented in Table 2b (see 
also Figure 2b). Bonferroni corrections were applied as follows: measures of complete cohesion 
were corrected for three variables (complete reference ties, complete conjunctions, complete lexical 
ties), measures of errors of cohesion were corrected for two variables (reference errors and 
conjunctive errors), and composite scores of cohesion were corrected for two variables (total 
complete cohesive ties, total cohesive errors). As hypothesised, stroke patients used significantly 
fewer complete cohesive ties, t(29) = 5.02, p < .001, d = 1.78, and made more cohesive errors 
overall, t(16) = 3.65, p < .01, d = 1.39, compared to healthy controls. Stroke patients used fewer 
complete reference ties, t(27) = 2.55, p < .05, d = 0.88., complete conjunctives, t(29) = 4.77, p < 
.001, d = 1.66, and made more errors of reference, t(15) = 3.38, p < .01, d = 0.78 and errors of 
conjunction, t(29) = 3.22, p < .01, d = 1.13 than controls. Stroke patients did not differ significantly 
from controls on the number of complete lexical ties, t(29) = 2.32, p > .01, d = 0.84. 
 Subgroup analyses (N = 18) confirmed a significant effect of group for total cohesive errors, 
F(2, 15) = 7.15, p < .01, ηp2 = .49, and errors of conjunction, F(2, 15) = 5.71, p < .05, ηp2 = .43; 
however, the effect of group on complete cohesive ties, complete conjunctions, reference ties and 
errors of reference was non-significant (F(2, 15) = 3.97, p > .01, ηp2 = .35; c2 (2, N = 18) = 6.67, p 
> .01; F(2, 15) = .60, p > .05, ηp2 = .07; F(2, 15) = 4.77, p > .01, ηp2 = .39, respectively). T-tests 
revealed that both the RHS and LHS groups made a greater number of cohesive errors than controls 
(RH: t(10) = 4.11, p < .01, d = 2.28; LH: t(11) = 3.05, p < .05, d = 1.64) and conjunction errors 
(RH: t(10) = 3.83, p < .01, d = 2.16; LH: t(11) = 2.87, p < .05, d = 1.54). Furthermore, the RHS 
group used fewer cohesive ties and complete conjunctions, and made significantly more reference 
errors than controls (t(10) = 2.71, p < .05, d = 1.62; t(10) = 3.29, p < .01, d = 1.99; t(10) = 3.62, p < 
.01, d = 2.01, respectively). 
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Table 2b. Cohesion measures of connected speech: means and standard deviations for all, left and 
right hemisphere stroke and healthy controls. 
 Group 
 
 
Controls  Stroke 
 
 
N = 19 
 
All 
N = 18 
 
Left 
N = 6 
 
Right 
N = 8 
Measure M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Total number of 
utterances 
277.0 45.1  257.8 64.9  216.5 61.5  297.0 55.4 
Complete reference (%) 7.3 2.7  5.4* 1.4  5.4 1.5  5.3 1.0 
Reference errors (%) 0.4 0.6  1.8** 1.4  1.8 1.3  2.6** 1.2 
Complete conjunctions 
(%) 
6.3 1.1  3.8*** 1.8  4.0 2.4  4.2** 0.9 
Conjunction errors (%) 1.7 1.0  3.2** 1.6  3.5* 1.8  3.4** 1.1 
Complete lexical (%) 6.9 2.8  4.6 2.8  4.9 3.9  5.1 0.7 
Complete cohesive ties 
(%)  
13.4 2.2  9.2*** 2.5  9.4 3.1  9.4* 1.4 
Cohesive errors (%) 2.2 1.3  5.0** 2.6  5.3* 2.5  6.1** 2.2 
Note. N = 18 for controls, N = 13 for stroke group, n = 5 for right stroke group. Significant 
difference from controls following Bonferroni correction, * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001. NB: 
For subgroup comparisons (i.e. left and right stroke vs. controls), a closely matched smaller control 
group was used (N = 8; see methods). 
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Figure 2b. Means (expressed as a percentage of total utterances) for all measures of cohesion in 
connected speech, for stroke patients and healthy controls. Significant difference from controls 
following Bonferroni correction, * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Coherence. A summary of coherence connected speech measures is presented in Table 2c 
(see also Figure 2c). Stroke patients made significantly more local coherence errors, t(17) = 3.27, p 
< .01, d = 1.24, global coherence errors, t(16) = 2.79, p < .05, d = 1.06, and propositional 
repetitions, t(16) = 3.71, p < .01, d = 1.42, compared to healthy controls, in line with predictions. By 
contrast, the percentage of tangential sentences, conceptual congruence errors, and filler sentences 
did not differ between the stroke group and controls (t(29) = .70, p > .05, d = .25; t(12) = 1.00, p > 
.05, d = .38; t(29) = 1.29, p > .05, d = .44, respectively). Bonferroni adjustments were applied to the 
four measures of global coherence (propositional repetitions, tangential sentences, conceptual 
incongruence and filler sentences).  
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Subgroup analysis confirmed a significant effect of group on local coherence errors, F(2, 
15) = 5.75, p < .05, ηp2 = .43, and global coherence errors, c2 (2, N = 18) = 7.24, p < .05. T-tests 
revealed that the RHS and LHS groups produced more local coherence errors than controls (RH: 
t(10) = 3.48, p < .01, d = 1.89; LH: t(11) = 2.72, p < .05, d = 1.47). Only the RHS group made 
significantly more global coherence errors than controls (RH: U = 3.00, p < .05; LH: U = 7.00, p > 
.05). The ANOVA for propositional repetitions was not significant following Bonferroni correction, 
c2 (2, N = 18) = 8.59, p > .01; however, the LHS made significantly more propositional repetitions 
than the controls, t(11) = 4.44, p < .01, d = 2.41.  
 
Table 2c.  Coherence measures of connected speech: means and standard deviations for all, left and 
right hemisphere stroke and healthy controls. 
 Group 
 
 
Controls  Stroke 
 
 
N = 19 
 
All 
N = 18 
 
Left 
N = 6 
 
Right 
N = 8 
Measure M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Total number of utterances 277.0 45.1  257.8 64.9  216.5 61.5  297.0 55.4 
Local coherence errors (%) 4.3 6.4  16.6** 12.4  17.1* 10.3  22.6** 12.1 
Global coherence errors (%) 4.1 4.9  12.5* 10.1  7.7 3.3  14.0* 9.4 
Tangential sentences (%) 0.2 0.7  0.4 0.9  0.0 0.0  1.0 1.3 
Conceptual incongruence 
(%) 
0.0 0.0 
 
0.2 0.7 
 
0.0 0.0 
 
0.5 1.1 
Propositional repetitions (%) 2.1 2.3  7.3** 4.6  6.3** 2.7  8.8 7.1 
Filler sentences (%) 1.8 3.7  4.7 8.5  1.4 1.6  3.8 4.8 
Note. N = 18 for controls, N = 13 for stroke group, N = 5 for right stroke group. Significant 
difference from controls following Bonferroni correction, * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001. NB: 
For subgroup comparisons (i.e. left and right stroke vs. controls), a closely matched smaller control 
group was used (N = 8; see methods). 
 
  49 
 
Figure 2c. Means (expressed as a percentage of total utterances) for all measures of coherence in 
connected speech, for stroke patients and healthy controls. Significant difference from controls 
following Bonferroni correction, * p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Associations between Connected Speech and Attention and Executive Functions 
Attention and executive functions. A summary of scores for attention and executive 
function tasks is presented in Table 2a. All attention task analyses were Bonferroni corrected for 
two variables: sustained and selective attention. There was no difference between the stroke and 
control groups on the Elevator Counting task (sustained attention), t(23) = 2.28, p > .01, d = 0.75). 
Notably, 10 of 18 stroke patients performed below the clinical cut off for the Elevator Counting test, 
in contrast to only 3 of 21 controls; therefore, we included this measure in the correlation analyses 
that follow. Stroke patients performed significantly worse than healthy controls on the Elevator 
Counting with Distraction task (selective attention), t(37) = 2.38, p < .05, d = 0.76. Although the 
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subgroup ANOVA was not significant, F(2, 19) = 4.06, p > .01, ηp2 = .30, t-tests revealed that the 
RHS group performed significantly worse than controls on this task, t(14) = 2.53, p < .05, d = 1.27.  
The stroke group as a whole performed significantly below the control group on the Hayling 
Sentence Completion Test Overall Scaled Score (SS), t(36) = 3.33, p < .01, d = 1.09, Suppression 
RT SS, t(36) = 3.03, p < .01, d = 0.99, and Suppression Error SS, t(36) = 3.03, p < .01, d = 0.98, 
though there was no significant difference between the stroke and control groups on the Initiation 
RT SS, t(36) = 2.39, p > .01, d = 0.75. All Hayling comparisons were Bonferroni corrected for four 
variables. There was no main effect of group for Hayling Sentence Completion Test scores at the 
subgroup level (Overall SS: F(2, 18) = 1.70, p > .05, ηp2 = .16; Suppression RT SS: F(2, 18) = 1.01, 
p > .05, ηp2 = .10; Suppression Error SS: F(2, 18) = 1.55, p > .05, ηp2 = .15; Initiation RT SS: F(2, 
18) = 5.05, p > .01, ηp2 = .36). Only the Overall and Suppression Error scaled scores were used in 
the correlational analyses, as suppression errors were of particular interest, given the potential role 
of the supervisory attention/executive processes of inhibition and ‘monitoring’ (e.g. Hornberger & 
Bertoux, 2015).  
Cohesion. Neither sustained nor selective attention was significantly correlated with any 
measures of cohesion in the whole stroke group (all p > .05). However, performance on the Elevator 
Counting with Distraction task (selective attention) was positively associated with complete use of 
conjunctions in the RHS group, rho = .90, p < .05. The Elevator Counting task (sustained attention) 
was not significantly correlated with any measure of cohesion for the whole stroke group or RHS 
group (all p > .05). 
Cohesion was not significantly associated with either of the Hayling measures in the whole 
stroke or LHS groups. However, in the RHS group, better Hayling Overall performance and fewer 
suppression errors were both associated with greater use of correct conjunctions, rho = .90, p < .05, 
and rho = .98, p < .01. Furthermore, better Hayling Overall performance was related to higher use 
of complete reference ties, rho = .90, p < .05. 
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Coherence. For the whole stroke group, performance on the Elevator Counting task 
(sustained attention) and the Elevator Counting with Distraction task (selective attention) was 
significantly negatively correlated with propositional repetitions, rho = -.69, p < .01, and rho = -.65, 
p < .05, respectively. Furthermore, better performance on the Elevator Counting with Distraction 
task (selective attention) was associated with fewer global coherence errors, rho = -.62, p < .05. In 
the RHS group, poorer performance on the Elevator Counting task (sustained attention) was 
associated with increased propositional repetitions, indicating that increased sustained attention is 
associated with fewer propositional repetitions, rho = -.98, p < .01.  
In the whole stroke group, better performance on the Hayling Sentence Completion Test 
(Overall Scaled Score) was correlated with fewer errors of global coherence and propositional 
repetitions, rho = -.76, p < .01, and rho = -.77, p < .01, respectively. Furthermore, increased 
Hayling suppression errors was associated with a higher number of global coherence errors and 
propositional repetitions, rho = -.62, p < .05, and rho = -.57, p = <.05. In the LHS group, better 
Hayling Overall performance was again associated with lower global coherence errors and 
propositional repetitions, rho = -.94, p < .01 and rho = -.88, p < .05. In the RHS group, poorer 
Hayling Overall performance and increased suppression errors were associated with a higher 
number of propositional repetitions, rho = -1.0, p < .001 and rho = -.98, p < .01. In the context of 
small patient numbers, we are cautious about these findings; however, they are strongly suggestive 
of an association between coherent, cohesive connected speech and attention/executive functions 
that warrants further investigation. 
Discussion 
This is the first known study to use a detailed multi-level analysis of connected speech to 
examine cohesion and coherence in a heterogeneous non-aphasic stroke population, with the goal of 
elucidating the role of attention and executive functions during the formulation of a message.  The 
stroke patients, who had relatively mild cognitive deficits, were well matched to healthy controls. 
Although the stroke group performed below controls on tests of naming and word comprehension, 
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closer inspection revealed that only one right hemisphere stroke patient was clinically impaired 
based on normative data (i.e., < 5th percentile cut-off) in both nominal and word comprehension 
skills. This may indicate crossed aphasia, which occurs when language centres are not localised to 
the left hemisphere in right-handed individuals; thus a right hemisphere stroke may result in 
symptoms of aphasia (Heilman & Valenstein, 2003). Although spontaneous speech as elicited from 
complex scene description (Cookie Theft Scene) was significantly reduced in stroke patients 
compared to controls, it is worth noting that this productivity reduction is mild and not indicative of 
non-fluent aphasia. Our stroke group produced more than double the words per minute of patients 
with non-fluent aphasia (Berndt et al., 2000), and four times that of patients with dynamic aphasia 
(see Robinson et al., 2015a).  Thus, apart from a mild reduction in the productivity of spontaneous 
speech, core language abilities were largely preserved and cannot entirely account for connected 
speech impairments. With regard to the cognitive baseline, while the stroke group as a whole did 
not perform worse than the control group on the Advanced Progressive Matrices, the RHS group 
did perform below controls. Additionally the LHS group performed below controls on phonemic 
word fluency. The Matrices and phonemic word fluency tasks tend to draw on processes associated 
with the frontal lobes (Duncan, Burgess & Emslie, 1995; Henry & Crawford, 2004).  
For the first time, we have demonstrated impairments in the conceptual processes of 
cohesion and coherence in mild stroke. As expected, stroke patients performed significantly below 
controls on measures of cohesion and coherence in connected speech, and this was particularly 
apparent for the right stroke group. Moreover, performance of the stroke group on the selective 
attention task (Elevator Counting with Distraction) was significantly impaired relative to controls, 
and subgroup analysis revealed that the RHS group performed significantly below controls. 
Notably, inspection of the raw scores revealed that the RHS group had largely impaired selective 
attention relative to the LHS group, as five of the eight RHS patients performed below the 5th 
percentile on this task, while only one LHS patient did. Our analyses did not show a significant 
difference between the stroke and control groups on our sustained attention task (Elevator 
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Counting); however, this task has a low ceiling and therefore lacks sensitivity. In the TEA manual, 
Robertson et al. (1994) highlight that ‘even a single error (on this task) may very likely be 
significant, and two errors is very definitely indicative of a problem of sustained attention’ (p. 15). 
Raw scores showed that 10 of the 18 stroke patients made one or more error. Importantly, no LHS 
patient made more than one error, but impaired RHS patients made an average of two errors, 
indicating greater sustained attention impairments in the RHS group. This is consistent with 
previous studies in stroke (e.g., Hyndman & Ashburn, 2003; Jokinen et al., 2006; Nys et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, the stroke group performed significantly below controls on all Hayling Sentence 
Completion Test scaled scores, except for the Initiation RT section. Despite small numbers, our 
results are strongly suggestive of a relationship between attention/executive functioning and 
coherent speech.  
Connected Speech in Stroke 
Cohesion. Overall, stroke patients used fewer complete cohesive ties and made more 
cohesive errors, and were particularly impaired in use of reference, compared to controls. Reference 
ties direct the listener to the identity of the subject/object to which they refer (Halliday & Hasan, 
1976). In narrative production, a speaker is often required to discriminate between characters in a 
story using personal pronouns. Indeed, inspection of the error types revealed that personal pronouns 
(e.g., he, she, they) were the most common type of reference attempted and erroneously used by 
stroke patients. Stroke patients also showed impaired use of conjunctions. Inspection of the errors 
revealed that the majority were due to excessive use of the conjunctive ‘and’. Sherratt and Bryan 
(2012) suggest the principal use of ‘and’ is as a ‘continuant or placeholder...or may also indicate 
that the speaker had difficulty in providing a conjunction to reflect the relationship between the 
propositions, thus rendering the relationship unclear’ (p. 19) (see Appendix B).  
Both RHS patients and LHS made more conjunction errors and more cohesive errors overall 
than controls, consistent with previous studies (e.g., RHS - Marini et al., 2005; LHS - Marini et al., 
2007). However, inspection of the means suggests a trend towards a greater cohesion impairment in 
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RHS patients, as they made notably more reference, conjunctive and cohesive errors relative to LHS 
patients, and used fewer cohesive ties and correct conjunctions (see Table 2b). Unfortunately, a 
primary limitation of the current study was small numbers and heterogeneous groups, which 
precludes unequivocal conclusions about laterality. 
Coherence. As predicted, stroke patients were impaired in global coherence, suggesting 
deficits in the ability to adequately maintain the topic of narrative speech. Notably, stroke patients 
produced a large number of propositional repetitions, suggesting that their global coherence deficit 
may be underpinned by a more generalised tendency to insert repetitive comments into their 
narratives, highlighting difficulties in producing novel conceptual information (see also Law et al., 
2015). Perhaps of relevance here is that increased propositional repetitions and tangential sentences 
in connected speech were related to poorer word comprehension skills (Language Baseline: 
Synonym Test). The synonym task taps semantic knowledge; therefore, repetitive or tangential 
speech may indicate a paucity of ideas, the formulation of which draws on semantic knowledge, or 
poor semantic control during the selection of an idea from multiple semantically-related activations 
(for a similar view see Noonan, Jefferies, Corbett & Lambon Ralph, 2010). Increased propositional 
repetitions may also represent difficulties with attention and suppression of unwanted or previously 
primed responses (e.g., Cohen & Dehaene, 1998; Goldstein, 1939; Plaut & Shallice, 1993). Indeed, 
poorer performance on attention measures and increased Hayling suppression errors were correlated 
with the number of propositional repetitions in the stroke group. Propositional repetitions have been 
suggested to reflect a strategy to cope with word finding difficulties (Christiansen, 1995; Davis et 
al., 1997; Marini, 2012). However, this is unlikely for our stroke patients as they showed relatively 
mild nominal impairments and nominal skills were not correlated with the number of propositional 
repetitions. Although only the LHS group made significantly more propositional repetitions than 
controls, close inspection of the data reveals that three patients from the LHS group and three from 
the RHS group were impaired and performed more than two standard deviations above the mean of 
the control group on this measure. 
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As predicted, stroke patients produced a higher number of local coherence errors than 
controls. Inspection of the errors suggests that impaired performance was largely due to missing or 
erroneous use of reference, as opposed to abrupt topic shifts. This is consistent with our finding that 
use of reference is impaired following stroke; it is likely that this contributes to impaired local 
coherence.  
RHS patients were impaired in local and global coherence, consistent with previous studies 
(e.g., Bartels-Tobin & Hinckley, 2005; Marini, 2012; Sheratt & Bryan, 2012). Interestingly, our 
repetitive utterance pattern of impairment was qualitatively different than that of Marini (2012), 
who found that patients with right hemisphere damage produced more tangential and conceptually 
incongruent, rather than repetitive, utterances. This led Marini (2012) to speculate that coherence 
impairments resulted from an inability to process relevant conceptual information. In contrast, our 
findings support Sherratt and Bryan (2012) who described a significant number of fluency and 
content disruptors (i.e., repeated words phrases or ideas/comments on the task, semantic 
perseveration) in the personal narratives of patients with right brain damage.  Sherratt and Bryan 
suggest that this might reflect an impairment in selecting relevant and appropriate information, at 
the level of selection and topicalisation of information, and that repetitive utterances might 
represent a strategy to provide more processing time while they prioritise information and select the 
syntactic structure for expression (Sherratt & Bryan, 2012). As previously reported, LHS patients 
were also impaired in local coherence (Bloom, Borod, Obler, Santschi-Haywood & Pick, 1996; 
Christiansen, 1995).  
Comparisons between patients with right and left hemisphere lesions showed cohesion and 
local and global coherence were mediated by bilateral networks. However, close inspection of the 
data reveals a possible right hemisphere laterality effect for coherence deficits. Only the RHS group 
made significantly more global coherence errors than controls, and made almost double the errors 
of the LHS group, and Table 2c shows that although both RHS and LHS groups are impaired in 
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local coherence relative to controls, the RHS group made more than five times the number of errors 
as controls, while the LHS group made only four times the errors of controls.  
Attention and Executive Function in Connected Speech 
Our findings provide preliminary evidence for the role of executive function, alongside two 
frontal attentional processes, in connected speech. The Hayling Sentence Completion Test yields an 
overall scaled score, which is derived from the three sub-scale scores (response initiation, response 
suppression and suppression errors). Therefore, the Hayling Overall Scaled Score reflects total 
performance and the executive mechanisms of initiation and inhibition. We found that Hayling 
Overall performance was associated with the production of coherent speech in the whole stroke, 
RHS and LHS groups. Our results are in line with recent conceptualisations of executive functions, 
which propose that they are diverse cognitive skills which integrate, organise, maintain and control 
behaviour through a system of attentional control processes that have the potential to affect all 
realms of cognitive processing including language (Stuss & Alexander, 2007). Coherence, at a 
global level, reflects the degree to which propositions are organised with respect to the overall goal 
of the speech; the production of coherent speech is a goal-directed behaviour requiring all elements 
of executive function. Attentional processes can be considered as a set of component processes that 
subserve executive function, and as our results suggest a link between executive function and 
coherent connected speech production, attentional processes may play a particular role.  
We found that decreased selective attention was related to the production of coherent speech 
(i.e. a higher number of propositional repetitions and global coherence errors) in stroke patients. 
The ability to selectively attend may be important for topic maintenance as the speaker must 
allocate their attention to a current focus in the face of competing alternatives. In this context, 
selective attention relies more heavily on goal-directed top-down selection processes, rather than a 
stimulus-driven bottom-up attention process (e.g., Corbetta & Shulman, 2002).  Furthermore, 
selective attention involves working memory processes (e.g., Baddeley, 1996a), which may be 
important for producing cohesive speech. In the RHS group, selective attention was associated with 
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the use of conjunctions. The speaker must be able to hold the previous utterance in mind, and select 
the appropriate cohesive device, in order to express the required relationship between utterances. 
Hence, selective attention may be recruited to help maintain meaning across sentences through the 
selection of conjunctions. In this context, we can speculate that selective attention may be an ‘on-
line’ stimulus-driven process that demands monitoring (a top-down process). Monitoring is one of 
Stuss and Alexander’s (2007) three supervisory attentional processes that underpin executive 
function, and is often attributed to the right lateral prefrontal cortex (Shallice et al., 2008a; Stuss, 
2011; Vallesi, 2012). Interestingly, the right stroke group performed well below the left stroke 
group on the selective attention test, and as previously noted, our results suggest a potentially 
greater cohesion impairment in RHS patients. If the production of cohesive speech requires 
selective attention as an ‘on-line’ process that demands monitoring, then right frontal function may 
play a critical role. Furthermore, two RHS patients produced the highest number of propositional 
repetitions. It is likely that monitoring plays a role here too, as avoiding propositional repetitions in 
speech relies on the ability to monitor output over time. 
 Recently, the right lateral frontal region was implicated in verbal response suppression on 
the Hayling Sentence Completion Test (Robinson et al., 2015b). Patients with focal right lateral 
lesions showed a high rate of suppression errors that was not attributed to faulty monitoring per se 
as these patients also failed to generate and/or implement a strategy. However, in a commentary on 
this study, Hornberger and Bertoux (2015) suggested that failing to monitor task goals in the 
Hayling test might result in a subsequent failure to implement and maintain a strategy across trials, 
leading to increased suppression errors. Thus, the possibility of monitoring as an attention process 
critical in language production is highlighted in patients with right frontal damage. In the current 
study, increased suppression errors on the Hayling task was related to more propositional repetitions 
(a coherence measure) and reduced use of correct conjunctions (a cohesion measure) in the RHS 
group. If, as Hornberger and Bertoux (2015) argue, a failure of monitoring is driving an increase in 
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suppression errors, it is possible that this same faulty monitoring mechanism might underpin these 
cohesion/coherence errors in the RHS patients.  
Finally, we found that sustained attention was also important for production of a coherent 
narrative in the whole stroke group and the RHS group. Connected speech production involves a 
temporal component where ideas are conveyed over time, requiring attention to be sustained on 
both the discourse focus, and the ongoing monitoring/ evaluation of the state of communicative 
context (Alexander, 2006; Levelt, 1999; Sherratt & Bryan, 2012). The production of coherence 
errors, particularly propositional repetitions, may be interpreted as lapses in sustained attention to 
the discourse focus over time, which is manifested as repetitive content. Furthermore, the 
production of propositional repetitions may be interpreted as reflecting a deficit in the fluent 
sequencing of novel thoughts (Robinson et. al., 2006). Recent evidence from two patients (MC, 
WAL) with dynamic aphasia suggests that the ability to generate novel thoughts, and the ability to 
sequence these thoughts, comprise two distinct components of this conceptual preparation 
mechanism (Robinson, 2013; Robinson et al., 2015a). In order to convey ideas over time, the 
speaker must be able to sequence, or order, their thoughts. Deficits in fluent sequencing may be 
evidenced by perseverative responses (Robinson, 2013), or, as in the current study, propositional 
repetitions in connected speech.  However, as previously noted, reduced sensitivity of the Elevator 
Counting task in capturing sustained attention deficits may have masked significant effects. Future 
studies could include alternative tasks that are more sensitive to sustained attention deficits, such as 
the Lottery task from the TEA (Robertson et al., 1996). 
As attention is a finite resource, we can speculate that the production of cohesive and 
coherent speech requires a balance of top-down and bottom-up processes, and that an imbalance 
may manifest as deficits in coherence or cohesion. Broadly, executive function and attention 
correlated with some but not all connected speech measures. Thus, these preliminary results should 
be considered cautiously. We also note that correlational analyses may indicate the strength and 
direction of a relationship, but not causation.     
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Implications 
The coherence and cohesion impairments evident in stroke patients’ connected speech can 
be interpreted as a deficit in message formulation mechanisms. Our results hint at a key role of 
attention/executive functions, lending particular support to the theoretical notion that sustained 
attention or discourse focus, and the ability to allocate attention to a current focus (selective 
attention), are important for the formulation of a message (Levelt, 1999, p. 90). Sustained and 
selective attention, as well as Hayling suppression errors, were associated with an increase in 
repetitive speech and reduced global coherence. This suggests that reductions in attention, and 
impairments in executive mechanisms such as inhibition, may mediate these difficulties following 
stroke, even when overall cognitive deficits were mild (as detailed in Law et. al., 2015).  
Our findings also have implications for the literature on dynamic aphasia, which has hinted 
at the role of attention and executive function in propositional language impairments (e.g., Bormann 
et al., 2008; Robinson, 2013; Robinson et al., 2006, 2015a). Specifically, impaired ability to 
produce fluent propositional speech has been interpreted as a deficit in focussing or selectively 
attending to a current message to be expressed (patient KAS - Robinson et al., 2006) and 
perseverative speech was suggested to reflect a fluent sequencing deficit, as distinct from a novel 
thought generation deficit per se (patient MC - Robinson, 2013), with a pure novel thought 
generation deficit comparable to an energization deficit (patient WAL – Robinson et al., 2015a). In 
our stroke group (without dynamic aphasia), reductions in selective attention were significantly 
correlated with propositional repetitions. These results provide preliminary evidence that impaired 
attention and supervisory executive processes may be important cognitive mechanisms underlying 
propositional language deficits, though it is likely that other attentional control processes (e.g., 
energization, task setting, and attentional switching) play a role as well.  
The current study underscores the importance of focussed cognitive and language 
assessments in ascertaining the source of difficulty in connected speech. This may eventually 
inform treatment planning and evaluation. Although connected speech assessments employing this 
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approach are time consuming, they would permit treatment to be focussed on the specific deficits, 
obviating the need for time and resources to be spent on remediating preserved aspects (Sherratt & 
Bryan, 2012). This would allow treatment approaches to be tailored; for example, a top-down 
approach that stimulates cognitive functions, such as attention, could be used to treat cohesion and 
coherence impairments (Rogalski et al., 2010). Identification of the most efficient avenue of 
treatment for specific deficits is needed, for example, whether to target the actual discourse deficits 
(e.g., cohesion/coherence) or potential underlying factors (e.g., attention/memory) (Coelho, 2005). 
For instance, Novakovic-Agopian et al. (2011) detail a goals training intervention program with 
acquired brain injury patients. This program places particular focus on attention training alongside 
Goal Management Training, mindfulness and problem solving, with the objective of linking 
attentional regulation to goal-attainment behaviour. The authors discuss attentional control as a 
‘“gateway” function that could influence the efficiency and effectiveness of other executive 
functions’ (p.2). Patients improved on various neuropsychological measures of complex attention 
and executive functions. It is still a leap to expect attention training to smoothly transition to the 
treatment of discourse deficits, but when connected speech is considered as another goal-directed 
behaviour, the possibility of attention training forming part of language rehabilitation programs 
seems feasible for the future.  
General Conclusion 
The ability to produce connected speech is fundamental to daily communicative functioning, 
and involves important conceptual processes, such as the ability to organise ideas into a cohesive 
and coherent representation. Our results are the first to indicate that impairments in cohesion and 
coherence can occur following stroke, without the presence of prominent aphasia. Furthermore, our 
study highlights the role of executive functions and attention in connected speech.  
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Chapter 3: Energization and Spoken Language Production: 
Evidence from Progressive Supranuclear Palsy  
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Preamble 
The work presented in this chapter is currently under review for publication in 
Neuropsychologia. As this chapter was prepared as an independent manuscript, some parts of the 
introduction may repeat information already presented in previous chapters.  
Abstract 
Energization is the process of initiating and sustaining a response over time. It has been 
described as one of three key ‘supervisory’ attentional control processes associated with the frontal 
lobes. Attentional mechanisms, such as energization, are critical for a range of cognitive functions, 
such as spontaneous speech and other higher-order tasks. We aimed to investigate the process of 
energization in a case series of patients with progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP). Patients with a 
diagnosis of PSP (N = 5) and healthy older adults N = 30) were assessed on a standard 
neuropsychological battery, including executive tasks and standard attention, memory and language 
tests. Energization was investigated using word fluency tasks, samples of spontaneous speech and 
an experimental button-pressing concentration task. Response rates for the word fluency, 
spontaneous speech and concentration tasks were separated into time periods, in order to compare 
response rates at different points across the tasks (e.g., first 15 seconds vs. last 45 seconds in a 60 
second task). Four PSP patients showed a clear response pattern indicative of a decrease in 
energization, and in some cases fluctuations in sustained attention and response initiation over time. 
Healthy controls remained consistent in their responding over time. Understanding how these 
underlying processes are impaired in PSP can ultimately inform intervention and management 
strategies, and has theoretical implications for models of spoken language production. 
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Introduction 
Energization is the attentional process of initiating and sustaining a response over time 
(Stuss et al., 2005; Stuss & Alexander, 2007; Stuss, 2011). Energization is necessary for the 
activation of responses in the absence of external input, and is a key attentional process associated 
with the frontal lobes (Shallice et al., 2008a; Stuss, 2011). 
The Anterior Attentional System 
The prefrontal cortex has traditionally been ascribed a set of ‘supervisory’ or ‘executive’ 
functions. Executive functions are defined as a suite of domain-general capacities or control 
mechanisms that allow for complex, higher-order cognition by organising cognitive subprocesses, 
enabling an individual to engage in independent, goal-directed behaviour (Lezak et al., 2012; Stuss 
& Levine, 2002). Although impairments to a range of executive functions are commonly reported 
following frontal lobe damage, there remains some debate regarding the processes associated with 
the frontal lobes. There is growing evidence against the notion of a unified central executive 
system, and in favour of a more diverse set of component functions that act together to allow for 
complex executive or cognitive control (e.g., Logie, 2016; Stuss, 2011).  
Just over 20 years ago, Stuss, Shallice, Alexander and Picton (1995) sought to define a set of 
cognitive processes associated with the frontal lobes, with attention as their basis. Attention was 
chosen as the ‘root’ of this approach due to its omnipresence across theories of frontal and 
executive functions (e.g., Baddeley, 1996b; Miyake et al., 2000; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Posner 
& Peterson, 1990). Stuss et al. (1995) opted for a lesion study approach, reviewing all studies 
published up to that point that included patients with focal frontal lesions. The authors argued that 
the ‘anterior’ attentional tasks on which patients with frontal lobe lesions were impaired could be 
captured by seven basic task types: sustaining attention, concentrating attention, sharing attention, 
suppressing attention, switching attention, preparing attention and setting attention. However, 
acknowledging that tasks do not necessarily map directly onto cognitive processes, Stuss and 
Alexander (2007) provided evidence for a triad of anatomically and functionally discrete but related 
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frontal ‘supervisory’ attentional processes: energization, task setting and monitoring. Standing in 
contrast to the notion of a ‘central executive’ system, these domain-general component processes 
were argued to subserve executive functions via attentional control.  
Energization 
Energization is the attentional process that underpins the initiation and sustaining of a 
response over time, in the absence of external cues. This system of internal energization allows us 
to maintain concentration on a particular task, and is required to initiate executive or ‘supervisory’ 
operations (Shallice & Cipolotti, 2018). If the process of energization is defective, task performance 
will be slow and possibly falter over time. The importance of internally generated responses is 
pertinent here, as energization is not necessarily required for responses that are directly elicited 
from salient external cues (Robinson et al., 2015a). It can be conceptualised as a component process 
of sustained attention, which is the ability to focus on and maintain attention for prolonged periods 
of time (Robertson et al., 1996), although monitoring also plays a crucial role in sustained attention 
(MacPherson et al., 2010). Shallice et al. (2008a) commented that the energization system may be 
akin to the ‘cognitive effort’ system proposed by Hockey (1993).  
Energization impairments have been associated with lesions of the bilateral superior medial 
frontal lobes (e.g., Alexander et al., 2005; Picton, Stuss, Shallice, Alexander & Gillingham, 2006; 
Picton et al., 2007; Shallice et al., 2008a; Shallice et al., 2008b; Stuss et al., 2005), although there is 
some evidence for an increased contribution of the right hemisphere (Stuss & Alexander, 2007). 
These studies exclusively include patients with focal prefrontal lesions. The process of energization 
has been discussed in relation to slowed reaction times on various attention tasks, including but not 
limited to task switching (Shallice et al., 2008b), response inhibition (Picton et al., 2007), and 
sustained attention (Shallice et al., 2008a). However, Stuss and Alexander (2007) describe how a 
task of concentrating attention, reported by Alexander et al. (2005), most plainly illustrates 
energization deficits. This task, which is now included in the Rotman-Baycrest Battery to 
Investigate Attention (RoBBIA: Concentrate task), is a simple serial five-choice task. It requires 
  65 
high levels of concentration, as respondents are required to switch off lamps when they illuminate, 
as quickly as possible, continuously for several minutes. Alexander et al. (2005) reported that 
patients with damage to the superior medial area, including the anterior cingulate gyrus, the 
supplementary motor area and the presupplementary motor area, showed significant slowing in their 
reaction times compared to other frontal groups and controls. This slowing was evident from the 
beginning of the task across all 500 trials and thus not attributable to fatigue. We opted to use this 
task in the current study due to the clarity with which it demonstrates energization deficits.  
In the neuropsychological literature, energization deficits have been linked to performance 
on fluency tasks. Word fluency is the most common of these tasks, and is a standard 
neuropsychological test of executive function. In a word fluency task, the subject is asked to say 
aloud as many words in one minute that either begin with a particular letter of the alphabet (e.g., S: 
phonemic fluency) or belong to a category (e.g., animals: semantic fluency). In word fluency tasks, 
energization is required in order to continue responding across the one minute time frame, as the 
cue is only given once at the beginning. Stuss and Alexander (2007) reported that on a phonemic 
fluency task, only the patients with superior medial frontal lesions produced more words in the first 
15 seconds than the last 45 seconds. The authors interpreted the steep decline in responding as an 
energization deficit, as the patients appeared to lack the ability to maintain performance over time, 
which requires the internal generation of responses in the absence of external cues (Stuss & 
Alexander, 2007). Similarly, Robinson et al. (2012) investigated the performance of patients with 
focal frontal lobe damage on eight verbal and nonverbal fluency tasks. They found that patients 
with superior medial damage were the only frontal subgroup to be reduced across all fluency tasks, 
relative to controls (Robinson et al., 2012). The authors concluded that this was consistent with an 
energization deficit, and that the superior medial region therefore plays a critical role. 
Spontaneous Speech and Frontal Attentional Processes 
Alexander (2006) argued that producing complex language is no different to any other 
complex, goal-directed behaviour requiring the elements of executive function, including key 
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frontal attentional processes. Therefore, disorders of propositional language (i.e., voluntary, 
spontaneous speech that includes a novel idea) can be thought of as executive or attentional 
impairments. The role of Stuss and Alexander’s (2007) frontal attentional processes of energization, 
task setting and monitoring are clear in the production of narrative speech. For example, the speaker 
must determine the information that is relevant and appropriate with regard to the context and 
overall goal (task setting), initiate a verbal response while sustaining attention to the overall topic 
and their intention (energization), and continuously monitor whether the content of their speech 
remains relevant and appropriate (monitoring). If we consider propositional language production as 
a complex goal directed behaviour requiring executive functions, and attentional processes as a set 
of component processes that subserve executive function, then, alongside other attentional 
processes, energization must play a role at the early preverbal stage.  
The notion that attention or executive functions play a role in propositional language 
production is not new. Indeed, Levelt (1989; 1999) discussed that preverbal cognitive processes 
allow the speaker to sustain attention to a ‘discourse focus’, and allocate attention to a specific 
‘current focus’ of a message to be expressed. This idea was echoed by Sherratt and Bryan (2012) 
when they suggest that selecting and topicalising a message to be expressed requires the speaker to 
sustain attention to the conceptual structure, select the necessary information, and simultaneously 
inhibit irrelevant information. Studies employing picture-naming paradigms have demonstrated that 
executive control processes are recruited when selecting amongst semantically-related 
representations (Thompson-Schill et al., 1998; Schnur et al., 2005; 2006; 2009; Jefferies et al., 
2007; 2008). Recently, Barker, Young and Robinson (2017 / Chapter 2) demonstrated a link 
between executive and attentional impairments and the coherence and cohesion of connected speech 
in stroke patients without aphasia, providing preliminary evidence for the role of non-language 
processes in speech production. This comprises just a sample of the work that has investigated the 
role of attentional processes in speech production; it is clear that this is a recurrent theme in the 
literature.  
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Energization in Dynamic Aphasia 
Recently, Robinson et al. (2015a) reported the case of WAL, who presented with frontal 
dynamic aphasia in the context of progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP). Frontal dynamic aphasia is 
a language output disorder characterised by a profound reduction in spontaneous speech, despite 
well-preserved nominal or core language functions such as naming, reading, repetition and 
comprehension. Cases of dynamic aphasia have allowed the elucidation of three preverbal 
mechanisms critical for successful spontaneous speech production, namely 1) high-level selection 
from amongst competing propositions, 2) the generation of novel ideas, and 3) the fluent 
sequencing of novel thoughts. The case of WAL is pertinent because it was the first documented 
case where the paucity of spontaneous speech was attributed to an isolated deficit in the generation 
of novel ideas, without a concurrent impairment in sequencing. The authors highlight the similarity 
between the process of idea generation and energization; thus, energization was systematically 
investigated in a patient with dynamic aphasia for the first time. The authors reported that WAL’s 
impairment in idea generation, which encompassed both verbal and non-verbal domains, resembled 
the energization deficits of frontal patients. This striking reduction of novel ideas was evident in his 
performance on verbal and non-verbal fluency tasks. However, a comparison of his performance in 
the short first initial response time period and the longer last time period (e.g., for 60 second word 
fluency, first 15 seconds was compared to last 45 seconds) revealed that he produced a higher 
number of items in the first time period. Indeed, across all eight verbal and non-verbal fluency 
tasks, more than 85% of all items generated were produced in the shorter initial response period, 
indicating that he was unable to sustain responding over time in the absence of an external cue. This 
reflects the pattern reported by Stuss and Alexander (2007) for word fluency in superior medial 
frontal lesions, which was interpreted as an energization impairment. Therefore, WAL’s markedly 
reduced spontaneous speech output was attributed to an energization deficit. In the study of WAL, 
Robinson et al. (2015a) also emphasise that although the superior medial frontal lobes have been 
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specifically implicated in energization, it is likely that this region is affected in PSP either due to 
generalised bilateral frontal atrophy or via frontostriatal connections. 
It has been suggested that there is evidence for two distinct subtypes of dynamic aphasia. 
The first is language-based and tends to arise following unilateral left inferior frontal lesions, while 
the second is domain-general, appearing to affect the generation of multiple ideas, and involves 
bilateral frontal and/or subcortical areas (Robinson et al. 2006). The few cases of dynamic aphasia 
reported in the context of PSP are more consistent with the second, less documented subtype (e.g., 
Patients 2 & 3 - Esmonde et al., 1996; KAS – Robinson et al. 2006), although until the 
aforementioned recent case of WAL, the process of energization had not been explicitly 
investigated. However, there are several other cases of dynamic aphasia that fit this second subtype; 
these patients also have bilateral and subcortical involvement. Such cases include those reported by 
Gold et al. (1997; CO), Snowden et al. (1996; KC), Bormann et al. (2008; HK), and Cox and 
Heilman (2011). In these cases consistent with the second dynamic aphasia subtype, the authors 
generally report a reduction of verbal and in some cases nonverbal fluency alongside diminished 
spontaneous speech output. The quandary in the dynamic aphasia literature regarding why these 
patients appear to ‘run out of ideas’ after they initially produce appropriate responses, which is 
apparent in any task where multiple ideas are required such as fluency or narrative discourse 
production, may be explained by a deficiency in the process of energization (Robinson et al., 
2015a). The stimulus elicits an initial response, but continued responding cannot be maintained over 
time in the absence of a further stimulus or cue.  
The Current Study 
PSP is an atypical parkinsonian degenerative disorder, in which patients typically present 
with a hallmark supranuclear vertical gaze palsy, alongside akinetic rigidity and balance problems, 
with a tendency for backwards falls. It is rare, with prevalence estimated at approximately 5-7 per 
100 000 (Schrag et al., 1999). Even in the earliest reports of PSP, cognitive dysfunction was noted, 
particularly executive dysfunction in the form of verbal fluency, cognitive flexibility and impulse 
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control (e.g., Esmonde et al., 1996). With the progression of the disorder, impairments in language 
production are common; for example, patients begin to show deficits consistent with progressive 
nonfluent aphasia or apraxia of speech (Rohrer et al., 2010).  
The basal ganglia and dopaminergic circuits have been implicated in a range of cognitive 
functions. Indeed, a deficit in dopaminergic activity and frontostriatal dysfunction (i.e., the 
associative frontostriatal loop) is argued to underlie the executive impairments (e.g., attention 
shifting, planning, divided attention) commonly observed in Parkinson’s disease (Obeso et al., 
2014).  Notably, these executive tasks are more impaired when attentional control is internal, rather 
than when elicited by external cues (Levy & Dubois, 2006). Similar to Parkinson’s disease, there is 
a prominent basal ganglia pathology in PSP, with some evidence that the reduction in basal ganglia 
activity is even more pronounced in PSP (e.g., Burciu et al., 2015). Levy and Dubois (2006) discuss 
‘auto-activation’ deficits, which are difficulties in activating or self-initiating thoughts and actions, 
following lesions to the basal ganglia. They suggest that dysfunction of the basal ganglia results in 
failed activation of the frontal lobes, particularly when the behaviour is internally driven. This 
account emphasises self-initiation and internally-driven activation, which is strikingly similar to the 
notion of energization. Moreover, this account resembles that of Cox and Heilman (2011), who 
proposed that the dynamic aphasia in a patient with a left thalamic lesion was due to a failure of 
lexico-semantic self-activation. Levy and Dubois (2006) further highlight that auto-activation 
impairments that occur following basal ganglia lesions bear resemblance to the deficits observed 
following direct lesions to the dorsal-medial (i.e., superior medial) prefrontal cortex. As 
aforementioned, the superior medial frontal regions have been previously implicated in the process 
of energization (e.g., Alexander et al., 2005; Robinson et al., 2012). We would expect the superior 
medial frontal regions to be impacted in PSP, due to basal ganglia dysfunction and faulty 
dopaminergic circuits connecting these areas (Alexander, DeLong & Strick, 1986; Obeso et al., 
2014).   
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Given the cognitive profile of PSP, alongside the basal ganglia pathology and disturbances 
in frontostriatal connections, the current study aims to investigate the attentional process of 
energization in a case series of patients with PSP. Secondly, building on the recent case of WAL, 
whose severely reduced spontaneous speech output was attributed to an energization deficit, we aim 
to explore the process of energization in spontaneous speech output in patients with PSP. For this 
purpose, we will be using word fluency tasks, the Concentrate task from the RoBBIA, and 
spontaneous speech samples. We predict that the performance of healthy controls will remain stable 
over time in all tasks, reflecting consistent energization. However, we expect that PSP patients will 
be unable to maintain the same consistency as controls; rather, responding will become slower and 
more variable over time, reflecting an energization deficit. 
Method 
Participants 
Five patients with a primary diagnosis of probable PSP (Litvan et al., 2013; Respondek et 
al., 2013) by consultant neurologist and movement disorder specialists were recruited from the 
Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital in Queensland, Australia. Thirty healthy controls, with no 
history of a neurological or psychiatric disorder, were recruited from the community. The control 
group comprised 14 males and 16 females. Healthy controls were age-matched to the PSP patients 
(Mean age = 68.3 years, range 60 – 81 years), and all patients and controls were native English 
speakers. PSP patients and controls did not significantly differ in their number of years of 
education, p > .05. This study was approved by the Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital and the 
University of Queensland Human Research Ethics Committees. 
PSP patient details 
Case 1: RNZ, a 73-year-old right-handed male, was a retired small business owner, with 12 
years of formal education and no history of a learning disorder. At the time of testing, RNZ had 
been retired for 16 years, but had been actively engaged in the share market since. Five years prior 
to testing a right-hand tremor was observed, and some behavioural and personality changes had 
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been noted over the previous 12 months. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain revealed a 
loss of the normal convex upper contour of the midbrain, with a reduction in size (midbrain/pons 
ratio reduced by ~50%) (see Figure 3a). Neurological examination resulted in a diagnosis of 
clinically-developed PSP, but with no related eye movement abnormality. RNZ’s spontaneous 
speech was effortful and mildly hypophonic, although syntax was normal. RNZ lived independently 
with his wife.  
Case 2: PW, a 67-year-old right-handed female, left school at 14 years of age, and practiced 
as a nurse until her mid-twenties. She developed gait disturbance from her mid 50s progressing to 
shuffling, propulsion ultimately resulting in falls. Neurological examination revealed mild 
dysarthria, predominantly vertical supranuclear gaze palsy, a reduced blink rate, some trunk and 
upper limb rigidity and mild bradykinesia with ataxic gait. Her clinical features and inconsistent 
response to dopaminergic therapy suggested probable PSP-Parkinsonism. MRI of the brain revealed 
mild deep-white matter hyperintensities, suggestive of chronic small vessel ischaemia without 
brainstem atrophy.  Her speech was hypophonic and effortful, with normal syntax. PW lived alone, 
mostly independently.  
Case 3: RC, a 79-year-old right-handed female, had completed 10 years of formal 
education, leaving school at 16 years of age. Her former occupation was in data input (including as 
a professional typist). Her past medical history was unremarkable. In her mid-late 70s, she 
developed a gradual onset of generalised bradykinesia, with early falls. Her husband had noted 
slowing in her typing skills and delayed initiation of conversation. She exhibited reduced blinking 
and facial hypomimia, with a ‘serpentine stare’ and frontalis overactivity. There were slow saccades 
and a partial ophthalmoplegia. She had bradykinesia for finger tapping, without decrement. MRI of 
the brain showed frontoparietal and midbrain atrophy. Her symptoms were consistent with probable 
PSP-Parkinsonism. 
Case 4: BL, a 61-year-old right-handed female, had approximately 17 years of formal 
education and was a former nurse. She had retired two years prior. She had a four-year history of 
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memory problems, emotional lability, irritability and micrographia, and two years of stuttering, soft 
speech, slow gait and increasing falls backward. Examination revealed hypophonic palilalic speech, 
slow vertical saccadic eye movements, neck and trunk rigidity, and rapid small-amplitude repetitive 
hand and foot movements with mildly ataxic gait. Symptoms of restless legs improved with 
dopaminergic therapy but her other features did not. MRI of the brain revealed no significant 
abnormalities, but her clinical features suggested PSP.   
Case 5: KN, a 70-year-old right-handed male, was a former draftsman who left school at the 
age of 14 years. He developed stuttering rapid speech nine years previously, micrographia one year 
later then unsteady gait six months previously with gradually increasing falls. He had not improved 
on dopaminergic treatment. Neurological examination documented severe somewhat alternating 
blepharospasm, convergence failure and vertical greater than horizontal ophthalmoplegia. He had 
hypophonic and palilalic speech disturbance with moderate rigidity in his arms and limbs, and rapid 
but small amplitude repetitive hand movements. He was slow to stand, tending to fall backwards 
with marked impairment of postural reflexes and ataxic gait. His original diagnosis of Parkinson’s 
disease was revised to PSP.  An MRI of the brain revealed mild generalised cerebral atrophy 
without significant changes in the brainstem.   
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a)                 b) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c)                  d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3a. RNZ’s T1-weighted MRI showing areas typically implicated in PSP. Axial slices show 
generalised bilateral frontal cortical atrophy (Panel a) including the superior frontal regions (Panel 
b). Selective atrophy of the midbrain tegmentum is visible in the midsagittal slice, where the 
‘hummingbird sign’ is evident (Panel c) and the ‘Mickey Mouse sign’ is clear in the axial slice 
(Panel d). 
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Procedure 
Cognitive and language baseline. All baseline and experimental tasks were completed 
across three or four sessions, which were all completed within a contemporaneous period. The 
following standard neuropsychological tests were administered to assess baseline cognitive 
functions: Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM; Raven, 1976) as a measure of non-
verbal general intelligence; the National Adult Reading Test (NART-R; Nelson & Willison, 1991) 
as an estimate of pre-morbid or crystallised intelligence; Digit Span Forwards and Backwards 
(WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1997) to assess auditory-verbal attention and working memory; and the Test 
of Everyday Attention (TEA; Robertson et al., 1996) gave a measure of attention, with the Elevator 
Counting, Elevator Counting with Distraction and Telephone Search Dual Task Decrement subtests 
assessing sustained, selective and divided attention, respectively. Visuospatial perception was 
assessed using the Incomplete Letters subtest from the Visual Object and Space Perception Battery 
(VOSP; Warrington & James, 1991). Executive functions were assessed using the Hayling Sentence 
Completion Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) and the Stroop test (Trenerry et al., 1989). The 
language baseline included the Synonym Test of single word comprehension (Warrington, 
McKenna & Orpwood, 1998), sentence repetition (3-6 words in length; McCarthy & Warrington, 
1984) and the Graded Naming Test (McKenna & Warrington, 1980) as a measure of naming ability. 
Energization investigation.  
Word fluency. Fluency tasks have been previously reported to capture energization deficits, 
as they require sustained activation over time in the absence of input (Robinson et al., 2015a). All 
participants completed phonemic (letter) and semantic (category) word fluency tasks for one minute 
each. Phonemic fluency required the generation of as many words as possible beginning with the 
letter S, that were not proper nouns or numbers, and in the semantic fluency task participants were 
asked to name as many animals as possible. The total number of correct responses was counted; 
errors were scored as either repetitions or inappropriate responses. Word fluency data were always 
collected at the first visit.  
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Spontaneous speech tasks. In order to produce connected speech, energization is required 
for the speaker to initiate a verbal response while sustaining attention to the topic and 
communicative intention over time. Two tasks designed to elicit connected speech were 
administered: a picture-elicited narrative and a self-generated narrative task. The pictorial scene was 
the Beach Scene from the Queen Square Screening Test for Cognitive Deficits (QSSTCD; 
Warrington, 1989), which is a complex picture in which a variety of actions are taking place. 
Participants were asked to ‘describe what is happening in this picture’ for one minute. In the self-
generated narrative task, participants were asked to talk about their favourite holiday, also for one 
minute. For both tasks, they were instructed to use complete sentences if possible, and begin 
speaking immediately. Spontaneous speech tasks were always administered at the first visit.  
All speech samples were recorded on an Olympus WS-813 digital voice recorder and 
transcribed in English orthography. Transcriptions included all words, sounds and repeats, and 
contractions were counted as two words (e.g., don’t = do not). Non-words (e.g., ‘umm’ ‘ahh’), 
habitual starters (e.g., ‘okay’ ‘let’s see’), questions directed at the examiner (e.g., ‘is that enough?’), 
comments on the task (e.g., ‘this is hard’) and words subsequently repaired (e.g. direct repetitions) 
were not counted in the total number of words.  
RoBBIA Concentrate. The Concentrate task from the RoBBIA (Stuss & Alexander, 2007) 
is designed to tap energization, as it requires high levels of concentration and continuous 
responding with minimal external input. It is a serial five-choice reaction time task, carried out on a 
Serial Response Box (Psychology Software Tools Inc.) and run with E-Prime 2.0 software. The 
Response Box was used to reduce the variable debounce period that arises from keyboard-based 
tasks. The Response Box was connected to a Dell Latitude E6230 laptop via the serial port, and was 
placed on a table in front of the participant at a comfortable distance. The Response Box is fitted 
with five small circular lamps, aligned horizontally at a distance of 0.5 cm between lamps, with a 
square button one cm in front of each lamp. One at a time, each lamp illuminates, and the correct 
response is to switch the lamp off by pressing the corresponding button. When a lamp is switched 
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off, a new lamp becomes illuminated after a delay of 200 msec and so forth. Participants were 
instructed to respond as quickly as possible. The lamps illuminated in a random order, but the same 
lamp was never illuminated twice consecutively. Although participants were instructed to minimise 
errors, the pressing of any button would cause the illuminated lamp to switch off, and therefore they 
were asked not to correct their mistakes. A practice block of 20 trials preceded the main task, which 
comprised 500 trials. Breaks were not permitted, although the task could be terminated early if 
required.  
Statistical Analyses 
Patients’ scores on baseline tests were compared to normative data and clinical cut-offs. For 
the energization tasks, performance of each of the patients was compared to the mean of the healthy 
control group using a modified t-test (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002). Bonferroni corrections were 
applied where appropriate.  
Results 
Cognitive and Language Baseline 
A summary of all cognitive and language baseline scores is presented in Table 3a. Optimal 
level of premorbid functioning, based on National Adult Reading Test-R performance, was 
estimated to be in the high average (RNZ, RC, BL) or average (PW, KN) range. Current intellectual 
functioning (Advanced Progressive Matrices) was broadly consistent with this for two PSP patients 
(BL and KN); however, mild underfunction was evident for RNZ and two patients performed 
poorly reflecting moderate intellectual decline (PW and RC), possibly reflecting their longer disease 
duration.  
Performance on tests of executive function (Stroop task, Hayling Test) revealed some 
impairments in both response inhibition and initiation, consistent with the pattern often observed in 
PSP. Impaired inhibition of automatic responses on the Stroop test was evident for all PSP patients 
except BL (RNZ, RC, PW; KN did not complete this task). Verbal suppression on the Hayling 
Sentence Completion Test, revealed significantly prolonged response latencies for two patients 
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(RNZ and PW) and mildly slowed response times for RC and BL (KN was average). In terms of 
Hayling suppression errors, RNZ and PW were similarly impaired and BL was poor. By contrast, 
RC and KN performed in the moderate average and high average ranges, respectively. The Hayling 
verbal initiation response times were less affected than suppression scores as RNZ was poor, RC 
was low average and the other three PSP patients obtained average scores (PW, BL, KN).  
Auditory-verbal attention and working memory performance (Digit Span) was relatively 
intact (Average: RNZ, BL, KN; Low Average: PW, RC). Although three PSP patients performed 
within normal limits on tasks of sustained attention (Elevator Counting) and selective auditory 
attention (Elevator Counting with Distraction) (PW, BL, KN), two PSP patients obtained abnormal 
scores (RNZ, RC: NB: RNZ was unable to complete the selective auditory attention task). On an 
additional divided attention task given to three PSP patients (Telephone Search Dual Task 
Decrement), BL performed in the average range although both RNZ and PW were moderately 
impaired. All PSP patients had normal visuospatial perception (Incomplete Letters).  
 Naming (Graded Naming Test) and single word comprehension (Synonym Test) abilities 
were within the normal range for three PSP patients (RNZ, BL, KN) and moderately reduced for 
RC, albeit above the clinical 5th percentile cut-off. One patient (PW) was moderately impaired for 
naming but single word comprehension was low average. Sentence repetition was unremarkable 
apart from KN’s performance that was mildly impaired.  
 Overall, the PSP patients showed variability in their cognitive profiles that were 
predominantly characterised by some degree of executive and attention difficulties on a background 
of average/high average estimated premorbid abilities. Current intellectual abilities ranged from 
being intact for three PSP patients to moderately impaired for the other two, and language skills 
were broadly preserved.  
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Table 3a. Summary of demographic information, and cognitive and language baseline scores for the 
healthy control group and PSP patients. 
 Healthy 
Controls 
Mean (SD) 
N = 30 
RNZ PW RC BL KN 
Age (years) 68.3 (5.5) 73 67 79 61 70 
Sex a 13M: 16F M F F F M 
Handedness a 26R: 3L R R R R R 
Education (years) 16.0 (5.2) 12 8 10 17 9 
Cognitive baseline       
Premorbid Ability  
(NART-derived FSIQ) 
116 (6.3) 116 97** 110 112 95** 
APM /12 8.5 (2.1) 5 3* 2** 10 7 
Stroop (C-W) 2 min 97.2 (15.2) 42** 57** 13*** 88 nt 
Hayling Sentence Completion 
Test 
      Initiation (RT) SS 
      Suppression (RT) SS 
      Suppression Error SS 
      Overall SS 
 
 
5.7 (0.7) 
5.5 (1.4) 
5.1 (2.6) 
5.1 (1.5) 
 
 
3*** 
1** 
1 
1* 
 
 
6 
1** 
2 
1* 
 
 
4* 
4 
5 
4 
 
 
6 
4 
3 
4 
 
 
6 
6 
7 
6 
Digit Span 
     Forwards 
     Backwards 
     Total 
 
11.5 (1.9) 
8.1 (2.7) 
19.6 (3.8) 
 
10 
5 
15 
 
7* 
4 
11* 
 
7* 
4 
11* 
 
10 
5 
15 
 
8 
6 
14 
Test of Everyday Attention 
     Elevator Counting /7 
Elevator Counting with 
Distraction /10 
     Dual task decrement 
 
6.7 (0.6) 
 
8.8 (2.0) 
1.1 (1.6) 
 
6 
 
nt 
7.8*** 
 
7 
 
6 
7.6** 
 
5** 
 
2** 
nt 
 
7 
 
10 
0.3 
 
7 
 
9 
nt 
Incomplete Letters 18.9 (1.0) 20 20 19 20 20 
Language baseline       
Graded Naming Test /30 21.9 (3.8) 20 14 14 17 21 
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Sentence Repetition /10 9.9 (0.2) 10 10 10 10 7*** 
Synonym test 
      Abstract /25 
      Concrete /25 
      Total /50 
 
23.8 (1.7) 
22.9 (1.4) 
46.7 (2.6) 
 
22 
23 
45 
 
16*** 
21 
37*** 
 
15*** 
15*** 
30*** 
 
20* 
22 
42 
 
18** 
19* 
37*** 
Note. NART FSIQ = National Adult Reading Test Predicted Full Scale IQ; SS = Scaled Score; 
Hayling Overall SS Range 1-10, Initiation SS Range 1-7, Suppression / Suppression Error SS 
Range 1-8, 6 = Average. a Control group scores for sex and handedness represent ratio (not mean) 
scores. nt = not tested. Compared to healthy control group using modified t-test (Crawford & 
Garthwaite, 2002), *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Bold = clinically impaired (<5th percentile). 
 
Energization Investigation 
Fluency tasks. On the phonemic fluency task, none of the PSP patients generated 
significantly fewer items overall than controls in 60 seconds, although on the semantic fluency task 
two PSP patients’ totals (RC, KN) were significantly lower than controls (p = .011 and .030, 
respectively). In order to best capture the process of energization, the total items generated on each 
of the word fluency tasks in 60 seconds was divided into the number generated in the first 15 
seconds and the last 45 seconds. Previously, patients with energization deficits were found to 
generate a greatly reduced proportion of items in the last 45 seconds, compared to the first 15. Thus, 
ratios were calculated so that the number of words produced in the last 45 seconds was expressed as 
a proportion of the total in 60 seconds (see Table 3b).  
On the phonemic word fluency task, the ratios of the five PSP patients did not significantly 
differ from healthy controls. However, on the semantic word fluency task, RNZ, PW and RC all 
produced a significantly lower proportion of items in the last 45 seconds (p = .015, .008 and <.001, 
respectively). Indeed, RNZ, PW and RC all produced fewer items in the last 45 seconds than the 
first 15 seconds (first 15 vs. last 45; RNZ: 8 vs. 5; PW: 7 vs. 4; RC: 5 vs. 2); notably, all except one 
of the 30 controls showed the opposite pattern, generating a higher number of items in the last 45 
seconds than the first 15 seconds. BL and KN did not show the same pattern as the other PSP 
patients on the semantic fluency task. However, close inspection of the raw data revealed that BL 
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produced eight items in the first 30 seconds and only three items in the second half minute, and KN 
also generated eight items in the first 30 seconds and only two items after that. BL and KN both had 
stutters that impaired their initiation of speech, so it is possible that the number of items produced in 
the first 15 seconds was reduced due to the stutter delaying initiation, and therefore the ratio did not 
capture the energization decline. The fact that they both produced eight items in the first half 
minute, compared with two or three in the second half, hints at a pattern of decline indicative of an 
energization deficit.  
Spontaneous speech tasks.  
Picture description. In order to best capture the process of energization, the total number of 
narrative words produced in 60 seconds was divided into the first 15 and the last 45 seconds. To 
account for the PSP patients producing less speech overall than healthy controls, ratios were 
calculated, so that the number of words produced in the last 45 seconds were expressed as a 
proportion of the total words (Last 45/Total). Four of the PSP patients (RNZ, PW, RC, KN) 
produced a significantly lower proportion of speech in the last 45 seconds than controls (RNZ, PW, 
RC p < .001; KN p < .01). However, similar to the fluency tasks, BL did not differ significantly 
from controls in the proportion of speech produced in the last 45 seconds7. 
Interestingly, when the 60 second samples were split into 15 second blocks, and the raw 
number of words produced in each block was compared to healthy controls, PW and RC did not 
produce significantly fewer words than controls in the first 15 seconds (0-15s) and the final 15 
seconds (45-60s); however, both produced significantly fewer words from 15 seconds to 45 
seconds. This resembles a ‘trough’ in energization, which may be indicative of fluctuations over 
time. RNZ’s decline in speech over the 60 seconds was less steep than PW and RC; comparison 
with healthy controls revealed that he did not produce significantly fewer words from zero to 30 
seconds, but was reduced from 30 to 60 seconds (see Figure 3b Panel a). KN’s pattern was 
qualitatively similar to that of RNZ, although KN was more severely reduced in speech output. Of 
                                                
7 RNZ, PW, RC and BL showed the same individual patterns in the spontaneous speech samples elicited by the Cookie 
Theft scene (Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Examination 3rd Ed; Goodglass, Kaplan & Barresi, 2000); however, this was 
not included in the Results as the control group did not complete this task. 
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34 words produced by KN over 60 seconds, 28 words were produced in the first 30 seconds and 
only six after that.  
Self-generated narrative. As was done for the picture description speech samples, the 
number of narrative words produced in the last 45 seconds for the ‘favourite holiday’ task was 
calculated, and expressed as a proportion of the total words. PW and KN showed the same pattern 
as in the picture description task, whereby they produced a significantly lower proportion of speech 
last 45 seconds, compared to controls (p < .001 and p = .007, respectively). However, RNZ and RC 
did not show the same last 45 proportional difference in this task (all p > .05). Again, BL did not 
differ significantly from controls on any measure of speech quantity. 
When the total number of words produced was split into 15 second blocks, comparison with 
healthy controls revealed that PW did not produce significantly fewer words in the first 15 seconds, 
but did in the other three blocks (p = .005, .012, .001, respectively). RNZ produced significantly 
fewer words than controls in the final 15 seconds only (p = .008); a decline similar to his 
performance on the picture description task, but occurring later. RC produced fewer words only in 
the time period between 30 and 45 seconds (p = .015), which again demonstrates that energization 
‘trough’ observed in the picture description task (see Figure 3b Panel b). KN produced fewer words 
across all four time periods, but demonstrated an energization pattern similar to the picture 
description task, as 100% of his words were produced in the first 30 seconds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  82 
Table 3b. Energization tasks: number of words generated in the phonemic and semantic fluency 
tasks and the spontaneous speech tasks in 60 seconds.  
 Healthy 
Controls 
Mean (SD) 
RNZ PW RC BL KN WAL 
Phonemic fluency (S) 
      Total 
      Prop. in last 45s 
 
16.0 (6.3) 
0.63 (0.10) 
 
9 
0.67 
 
6 
0.50 
 
9 
0.56 
 
9 
0.56 
 
7 
0.43 
 
1* 
0.00*** 
Semantic fluency 
(Animals) 
      Total 
      Prop. in last 45s 
 
 
22.4 (5.6) 
0.59 (0.08) 
 
 
13 
0.39* 
 
 
11 
0.36** 
 
 
7* 
0.29*** 
 
 
11 
0.55 
 
 
10 
0.50 
 
 
4** 
0.25*** 
Picture Description 
(Beach Scene) 
      15s 
      30s 
      45s 
      60s 
      Prop. in last 45s 
 
 
44.5 (8.1) 
39.6 (7.7) 
40.4 (9.8) 
33.7 (10.9) 
0.72 (0.04) 
 
 
35 
28 
14* 
0** 
0.55*** 
 
 
40 
4*** 
5** 
12 
0.34*** 
 
 
31 
11** 
16* 
10 
0.54*** 
 
 
46 
51 
32 
42 
0.73 
 
 
15** 
13** 
6** 
0** 
0.56** 
 
 
10** 
5*** 
2** 
1* 
0.44*** 
Narrative (Holiday) 
      15s 
      30s 
      45s 
      60s 
      Prop. in last 45s 
 
38.0 (9.4) 
37.9 (8.9) 
37.3 (9.6) 
41.4 (10.2) 
0.75 (0.04) 
 
30 
32 
25 
9** 
0.69 
 
31 
7** 
9* 
0** 
0.34*** 
 
28 
28 
10* 
23 
0.69 
 
35 
27 
19 
49 
0.73 
 
11* 
18* 
0** 
0*** 
0.62** 
 
nt 
Note. Compared to healthy controls using modified t-test (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002). Healthy 
control group N = 30. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. nt = not tested. WAL’s Picture Description 
data included for comparison purposes, see Robinson et al., 2015a.  
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Figure 3b. Figure showing speech rate across 60 seconds for healthy controls and PSP patients on 
the picture description ‘Beach Scene’ (Panel a) and the self-generated narrative ‘favourite holiday’ 
(Panel b) spontaneous speech tasks. Grey shaded area denotes 95% confidence interval. 
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Concentrate task. Overall, patients RNZ, PW and RC had slower mean response times 
(RT) than healthy controls (p < .001, .016, < .001, respectively). BL was not significantly slower 
than controls overall (p >.05). However, for the purpose of investigating the process of 
energization, the 500 trials were separated into ten blocks of 50 trials. All subsequent analyses for 
the Concentrate task were Bonferroni corrected for ten comparisons (0.05 / 10 = 0.005). Figure 3c 
shows the RTs across the task divided into ten blocks for each PSP patient and the mean of the 
healthy controls. For the purpose of clarity, each patient’s performance on the Concentrate task will 
be discussed individually. KN did not complete this task. 
RNZ: RNZ showed clear fluctuations across the task. In the first 100 trials (blocks 1 and 2) 
RNZ was not significantly slower than healthy controls (both p > .005); however, the mean RTs for 
blocks 3 and 4 were significantly slower (both p < .001). In block 5, RNZ did not differ from 
healthy controls (p > .005), but in blocks 6 and 7 his RTs were significantly slower again (both p < 
.001). In block 8 his RTs were again not significantly different to controls (p > .005), but he slowed 
down significantly in block 9 (p <.001). In the final 50 trials was no slower than controls (p >.005).  
PW: PW showed a pattern identical to that of RNZ in the first half of the task. In the first 
two blocks (first 100 trials) her mean RTs were not significantly different from that of controls 
(both p > .005). Like RNZ, in blocks 3 and 4 PW was significantly slower than controls (both p < 
.001). By block 5, her mean RT was no slower than controls again (p > .005). However, unlike 
RNZ, PW maintained performance that was not significantly different from controls across the 
second half of the task (blocks 6 to 10).   
RC: RC was markedly slower than healthy controls and other PSP patients from the 
beginning of the task (see Figure 3c Panel b). Indeed, her mean RTs were slower than controls 
across all ten blocks, all p <.001. However, inspection of the raw RTs revealed that she managed to 
maintain a consistent rate of responding for the first two blocks (first 100 trials), and then her 
performance slowed markedly over the next two blocks (blocks 3 and 4). This is the same trajectory 
shown by RNZ and PW. Interestingly, she showed slightly faster RTs at block 5, which is the same 
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point that RNZ and PW returned to their initial rate of responding. However, RC never returned to 
her baseline rate of responding, and required the early termination of the task after block six. RC 
required the early termination of the task due to increasing difficulty with vision, as she began to 
experience double vision approximately 60% of the way through. 
 BL: The mean RTs for BL did not differ significantly from controls in any of the ten blocks 
(all p > .005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3c. Figure showing mean response times (RTs) for PSP patients and healthy control group 
across blocks of 50 trials on the RoBBIA Concentrate task. Grey shaded area denotes 95% 
confidence interval. 
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Discussion 
This is the first study to investigate the specific attentional process of energization in a series 
of patients with PSP, using an experimental task specifically designed to measure this process. 
Although energization has been explored in a single case with PSP who also presented with 
dynamic aphasia (WAL - Robinson et al., 2015a), there has been no systematic investigation in 
patients with PSP. Four of the five patients reported in the current study showed evidence of an 
energization impairment, similar to that of WAL, although not as severe. BL did not show the same 
energization pattern, as her performance did not differ from controls across any of the energization 
tasks. It is important to note that she was younger than the other PSP patients and had only recently 
retired; she had a more recent diagnosis and was at a relatively early stage in the disease process. 
Although her cognitive profile did show evidence of some mild impairments consistent with that 
observed in PSP, such as executive difficulties, her overall level of cognitive functioning was high 
(see Table 3a). 
In the neuropsychological literature, word fluency tasks are most commonly used to 
demonstrate energization deficits (Robinson et al., 2015a; Stuss & Alexander, 2007). On the 
semantic word fluency task, three of the PSP patients (RNZ, PW, RC) generated fewer items in the 
last 45 seconds than the first 15 seconds. This is the exact pattern demonstrated by WAL (Robinson 
et al., 2015a) and patients with superior medial frontal lesions (Stuss & Alexander, 2007); in both 
these cases the authors have interpreted this as an energization deficit. Given the similarity with the 
current patients, this is the most likely explanation for the performance of RNZ, PW and RC on the 
semantic fluency task.  
In the current study, none of the PSP patients significantly differed from controls on the 
total number of items generated on the phonemic fluency task, nor the proportion of items generated 
in the last 45 seconds. This is dissimilar to the pattern of WAL. However, previous research has 
identified that phonemic fluency tasks place greater demands on specific selection mechanisms, and 
that the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) is critical for selection (Robinson et al., 2010; Robinson et 
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al., 2012). Reports of dynamic aphasia in PSP indicate that the selection mechanisms hosted by the 
LIFG generally remain intact (e.g., Robinson et al., 2006).  
The PSP patients included in the current study did not meet the criteria for dynamic aphasia. 
Although RNZ, PW, RC and KN did have reduced spontaneous speech output, on the whole the 
reduction was not profound enough to be considered dynamic aphasia. The interesting pattern noted 
in the spontaneous speech of RNZ, PW and RC, which was apparent in both the picture description 
and the self-generated narrative tasks, was that they did not differ significantly from controls in the 
first 15 seconds of speech output. Therefore, even though overall RNZ, PW and RC produced 
between 47 and 96 words per minute, which is reduced compared to the control group’s average of 
150 words per minute, their speech rate in the first 15 seconds was not significantly reduced. KN 
showed a similar pattern although he was more severely reduced in speech output overall; 82% of 
his speech on the picture description task was produced in the first 30 seconds and 100% of his self-
generated narrative speech was produced in the first 30 seconds. We propose that the decline in the 
speech rate of RNZ, PW, RC and KN over the 60 seconds reflects an energization decrease. 
Connected speech production requires the internal generation of multiple ideas; energization is a 
critical process here as it is necessary to activate or initiate operations when external inputs are 
minimal (Shallice & Cipolotti, 2018). Indeed, it was the paucity in the generation of novel ideas that 
was purported to explain WAL’s dynamic aphasia (Robinson et al., 2015a).  
It is worth mentioning that the PSP patients generally performed better on the self-generated 
narrative ‘favourite holiday’ task than the picture description task. RNZ’s sharp decline in speech 
rate did not occur until the last 15 seconds in the ‘favourite holiday’ task, and RC maintained a 
higher speech rate throughout. This may seem counter-intuitive, as the picture scene provides visual 
cues that may assist the generation of ideas, which are not available in the self-generated narrative 
task (Law et al., 2015). However, despite the cues that the picture provides, the picture description 
task places high demands on selection and sequencing mechanisms, which might contribute to the 
speech rate decline (Law et al., 2015). Furthermore, the nature of the ‘favourite holiday’ task might 
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provide more intrinsic motivation, which may boost energization and result in a higher speech rate 
(Robinson et al., 2006).  
An interesting pattern that may resemble a process of ‘re-energization’ was noted in the 
performance of some PSP patients. For example, after the initial decrease, the spontaneous speech 
output of PW and RC did not appear to decline further on the picture description task (see also RC 
on the ‘best holiday’ task). Likewise, inspection of the raw Concentrate task data suggested an 
improvement in energization after the initial decrease for RNZ and PW. These findings lead us to 
speculate that although they may not be able to maintain consistent energization over long periods, 
some PSP patients may show a capacity for ‘re-energization’. This has not been documented in 
patients with superior medial lesions; however, it is possible that energization deficit may present 
slightly differently in PSP due to the different underlying neuropathology. Focal lesions of the 
superior medial frontal region appear to produce a consistent energization reduction; however, in 
PSP, we wouldn’t expect lesions of the superior medial regions per se; rather, the superior medial 
areas may be implicated via frontostriatal connections, stemming from a dysfunction of the basal 
ganglia (Obeso et al., 2014). Therefore, it is possible that disturbances of the basal ganglia - 
prefrontal cortex circuits underpin the observed energization fluctuations, and this faulty ‘circuitry’ 
may produce a somewhat different pattern of energization compared to when the critical area is 
lesioned. 
On the whole, our results bear a striking resemblance to energization findings in superior 
medial frontal patients reported by Picton et al. (2006) and Shallice et al. (2008a). On a task that 
required subjects to tap at the same time as an auditory stimulus at a 1.5 second rate, Picton et al. 
(2006) found that patients with superior medial frontal lesions were the only patient group to 
perform worse in the second block of 50 trials. Other patient groups and controls actually improved 
in the second block. Shallice et al. (2008a) reported a similar effect in a task requiring counting 
trains of tones; superior medial patients did not perform worse on longer trains compared to shorter 
trains until the second block, when performance markedly deteriorated.  
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Finally, it is important to distinguish energization from general arousal. Stuss and Alexander 
(2007) reported that there was no correlation or interaction between slowness and reported 
sleepiness or motivation level. In the current study it is possible that fatigue played a role; however, 
with fatigue we would expect a steady decline in performance. Rather, the fluctuations observed 
over time, demonstrated most clearly in the Concentrate task but also in some spontaneous speech 
tasks, are more parsimoniously explained by energization. With regard to apathy, we briefly 
discussed the likeness between ‘auto-activation deficits’ (Levy & Dubois, 2006) and impairments of 
energization. However, it will be critical for future research to investigate the relationship between 
other manifestations of apathy (e.g., cognitive, emotional) and the process of energization in the 
context of PSP, particularly as apathy is a known consequence of disruptions to the basal ganglia – 
prefrontal cortex circuits (Levy & Dubois, 2006). 
Overall, our results suggest that PSP patients show a pattern of energization that is similar to 
the previously reported dynamic aphasia case of WAL (Robinson et al., 2015a) and patients with 
superior medial frontal lesions (Stuss & Alexander, 2007; Picton et al., 2006; Shallice et al., 2008a). 
This has implications for theoretical models of spoken language production. Quantity measures of 
spontaneous speech revealed an initially normal speech rate, which then reduced over time for three 
patients. All PSP patients had preserved core language functions. This suggests a role for attentional 
processes, such as energization, in the preverbal stage of ‘conceptual preparation’ or message 
formulation for spoken language production. It is during this preverbal stage that novel ideas are 
generated, allowing for successful production of a narrative. Importantly, our results also have 
clinical implications. The pattern of energization observed in the current four PSP patients is 
evident before speech output becomes so reduced that the criteria for dynamic aphasia is met. 
Perhaps attentional training programs could be beneficial in the early stages of the disease to 
maintain these abilities; preserved attention skills may have benefits that carry over into the spoken 
language domain. Ideally, future research should continue investigating high-level attentional 
process in PSP and other degenerative disorders, at different points in the course of the disease.  
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Chapter 4. The Role of Distraction and Emotion in 
Propositional Language Production 
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Preamble 
This chapter is divided into two independent investigations employing the same novel 
experimental paradigm. The group of patients with PSP reported in Study 2 includes four patients 
from Chapter 3 (RNZ, PW, RC and BL).  
Abstract 
Propositional language is spoken language that is spontaneous, voluntary, and includes the 
generation of a novel idea. The production of propositional language is dependent on broader 
cognition; however, experimental studies investigating the interplay between language and 
cognition are scarce. Two aspects of cognition that have been postulated to influence propositional 
language are attention and emotion. We devised a novel experimental picture description task to 
investigate the role of attention and emotion in propositional language production. This task 
required the verbal description of an emotional (positive / negative) picture, while ignoring a related 
or unrelated emotion word distractor. In Study 1, the Propositional Language Task was completed 
by a convenience sample of adults with no neurological history (N = 93). The results revealed that 
participants were significantly slower to initiate spoken language in response to negative, as 
opposed to positive, emotional pictures. There was no effect of distractor word type on the initiation 
of spoken language. Study 2 included four patients with progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP) and 
matched healthy controls (N = 26). Prolonged response latencies to negative pictures were found in 
the healthy control group, thus replicating the primary finding of Study 1. An additional detailed 
content analysis was conducted to investigate the influence of the distractor words on propositional 
language output. PSP patients were unable to avoid the use of the distractor words in their language 
output, despite being instructed to do so. Interestingly, when distractor words were unrelated to the 
picture, healthy controls incorporated the concept activated by the distractor word into their 
language output. Whether at a blatant level, as observed in PSP patients, or at a subtle level as in the 
healthy control group, interference from distractor words suggests a failure of attentional control 
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processes. Overall, these studies demonstrate that emotion and attention influence propositional 
language, and, specifically, the formulation of a message to be expressed. 
Introduction 
Propositional language is the primary method by which thoughts or novel ideas are 
communicated. A proposition is the smallest idea unit (Mozeiko et al., 2010), and propositions are 
linked together to convey meaning. A key aspect of propositional language is that it includes the 
generation of a novel idea, which separates it from the core spoken language skills of naming, 
reading and repeating. It is the essence of everyday communication, allowing us to share ideas and 
tell stories (Alexander, 2006).  
Before propositional language (i.e., novel, voluntary, spontaneous speech) is overtly 
produced, an ‘idea’ or ‘message’ is formulated for expression. This occurs preverbally, and 
represents the earliest of three stages of spoken language production (e.g., Levelt, 1989; 1993; 
1999; Sherratt, 2007). Critically, this stage of message formulation represents the interface between 
broader cognition and language. Propositional language can be conceptualised as a ‘goal-directed’ 
activity that requires the focus and shift of attention, and therefore attention will be a key aspect of 
cognition addressed in the current study. Emotion is known to be a key modulator of attention 
(Yiend, 2010), and will be considered in the current chapter as such.  
The Role of Attention in Spoken Language 
The process of formulating a message involves the generation of novel ideas or thoughts that 
must be selected, sequenced and organised in a meaningful way (Greene, 2006). When this is 
disrupted, impairments in propositional language (i.e., novel, voluntary spontaneous speech) result. 
Frontal dynamic aphasia is a language output disorder characterised by severely reduced 
propositional language in the context of well-preserved core language skills (i.e., naming, reading, 
repetition and comprehension) (Luria & Tsvetkova, 1968). Investigations of patients presenting 
with frontal dynamic aphasia have elucidated three key mechanisms of message formulation: 1) the 
selection of a proposition from amongst competitors, 2) the generation of novel ideas, and 3) the 
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fluent sequencing of novel ideas (Robinson et al., 1998; 2005; 2006; 2013; 2015a). It has been 
suggested that these mechanisms rely on attentional processes; for example, Robinson et al. (2006) 
highlighted that the fluent sequencing of novel thoughts requires attentional focus on a message to 
be expressed alongside attentional shifting to new messages. Recently, the generation of novel ideas 
has been linked to the frontal attentional process of energization (Robinson et al., 2015a). In 
addition, there is evidence to suggest an association between language and attention deficits in 
individuals with aphasia, although the degree to which attention and language are linked is still 
debated (e.g., Murray, 2012; Villard & Kiran, 2017).  
Despite the knowledge gained from clinical investigations, the cognitive and attentional 
processes associated with message formulation remain under-studied in healthy individuals. This is 
partly because different attentional processes operate in synchrony and in parallel, and are therefore 
difficult to separate with regard to language production. The challenge of this work is compounded 
by the plethora of cognitive models of attention (e.g., Broadbent, 1957; Corbetta & Schulman, 
2002; Duncan, 2006; Kane & Engle, 2002, Pashler, 1984, Posner & Peterson, 1990; Sohlberg & 
Mateer, 2001; Stuss et al., 2005). In the current study we have opted to frame attention in line with 
Stuss et al. (2005, 2007); that is, as a set of component processes associated with the frontal lobes, 
which are argued to subserve goal-directed behaviour. Goal-directed behaviour requires the 
allocation of attention resources and the constant adjustment or modulation of attention in line with 
the goal. 
Alexander (2006) put forward the idea that complex language production can be 
conceptualised as a goal-directed activity. In particular, he suggested that the frontal attentional 
processes required for successful propositional language are energization (i.e., initiating and 
sustaining a response; see also Barker et al., under review / Chapter 3) and those related to 
‘executive functions’ or ‘executive control’ (task setting and monitoring: Stuss, 2011; see also 
Posner & Peterson, 1990, and Kane & Engle, 2002 for an ‘executive control’ component of 
attention). Others have also theorised a role for attention in propositional language production. For 
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example, in his model of spoken language production Levelt (1999) posited that the preverbal stage 
involves a general sustained attentional focus, as well as a specific current focus on a message to be 
expressed. Likewise, Sohlberg and Mateer (1989) argued that processes related to attention are 
involved in complex language production. It is clear that the notion of attentional involvement in 
propositional language production is not novel; however, experimental studies are sparse.  
Attention and single word retrieval. One approach to understanding the mechanisms of 
spoken language in healthy adults is via analysis of response latencies and speech errors. A body of 
work employing the Picture-Word Interference (PWI) paradigm has demonstrated that semantic 
distractors can influence naming performance. The typical PWI experiment involves presenting a 
picture and a distractor stimulus (e.g., a spoken or written word) in close temporal proximity, with 
the instruction to name the picture as quickly as possible while ignoring the word. Response 
latencies and errors are calculated. A robust semantic interference effect has been established, such 
that naming latencies are longer and errors more frequent when distractor words are closely 
semantically related to the picture (e.g., Damian & Martin, 1999; Caramazza & Costa, 2000; 
Hantsch, Jescheniak, & Mädebach, 2012; Navarrete & Mahon, 2012). For example, for a picture of 
a cat, the distractor word ‘mouse’ as opposed to ‘tree’ would be associated with longer response 
latencies and increased errors. This effect has been commonly interpreted to reflect a disturbance in 
selection processes at the lexical level (e.g., Levelt et al., 1999). Conversely, a semantic 
facilitation effect occurs when the goal is to categorise at the superordinate level; for example, 
for a picture of a cat the correct response would be ‘animal’, and in this case the distractor 
word ‘mouse’ would be associated with a shorter response latency (Kuipers & La Heij, 2008; 
2012). Some have argued that semantic facilitation occurs at the conceptual level (e.g., Bloem, 
van den Boogaard & La Heij, 2004; Kuipers & La Heij, 2012). Notably, a study using a PWI 
paradigm with emotional stimuli demonstrated a semantic facilitation effect; that is, individuals 
were faster to categorise pictures as positive or negative when accompanied by a congruent 
emotional distractor word (Liu et al., 2010). It has been suggested that emotional information is 
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stored within the semantic system (DeHouwer & Hermans, 1994). The role of emotion in the 
current study will be discussed in the following section.  
Along similar lines, a body of work by Thompson-Schill et al. (1998), Schnur et al. 
(2005; 2006; 2009) and Jefferies et al. (2006; 2007; 2008) suggests that the left prefrontal 
cortex hosts a mechanism that aids in selecting from among semantically-related competitors 
during word retrieval. Critically, this work discusses the selection mechanism as one of 
‘executive control’, which assists with selection by directing retrieval when there are many 
semantically-related competitors simultaneously activated. This executive control mechanism 
can be conceptualised in terms of attentional control or selective attention, which is executive in 
nature and requires the focus to be narrowed to what is relevant in the context of competing stimuli. 
However, there are key differences between speech production at the single word and sentence 
levels, and it is, as yet, unknown whether the semantic interference and facilitation effects 
remain when the goal is to produce propositional language. 
Attention and propositional language. Research employing the ‘taboo words paradigm’ 
has demonstrated that semantic interference influences spontaneous speech (i.e., propositional 
language) output (e.g., Grande et al., 2012; Meffert et al., 2011). In the taboo task, participants are 
asked to describe aloud a pictorial scene while avoiding the use of a number of ‘taboo words’, 
which are closely semantically related to key elements of the picture (Meffert et al., 2011). 
Participants produced a higher number of speech errors (e.g., hesitations, repairs) when instructed to 
avoid the use of the taboo words (Grande et al., 2012; Meffert et al., 2011). A similar task 
developed in a recent study by Robinson, Hollingsworth and Ceslis (in prep.) sought to extend these 
findings, by including taboo words (i.e., ‘distractors’) that were thematically associated, as well as 
concretely semantically related, to the picture8. The Robinson et al. (in prep.) experimental task ran 
as follows: a picture was displayed, 2.5 seconds later a distractor word was delivered, and two 
seconds after that a tone sounded as the cue to begin speaking. Participants were instructed to 
                                                
8 For example, a picture of a boy and girl ice-skating would have the concrete-semantic distractor word ‘ice’, a 
thematically associated word ‘fun’ and the unrelated neutral word ‘hammer’ (Robinson et al., in prep.). 
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generate two complete, meaningful sentences that did not include the distractor word for each 
picture. Analysis of response latencies (i.e., time between tone cue and initiation of spoken 
language) and errors (i.e., premature responses, extended pauses, speech repairs and the use of the 
to-be-ignored distractor word) revealed that participants were slower to initiate speech and 
produced a higher number of errors when a concrete-semantic distractor word was presented, 
mirroring the semantic interference effect in the PWI and taboo paradigm literature. Interestingly, 
fewer errors were made when a thematically associated distractor word was presented, compared to 
both concrete-semantic and unrelated neutral distractors. This mirrors the semantic facilitation 
effect thought to operate at the conceptual level. 
Robinson et al. (in prep.) speculated that processes related to selective attention or 
‘executive control’ processes were driving the effects. Models of attention stipulate that the degree 
to which a stimulus captures attention is in proportion to the goals of the task (e.g., Corbetta & 
Schulman, 2002; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). The concrete-semantic distractor words were most 
strongly related to the semantic representations activated when viewing the picture; therefore, given 
that the task goal was to talk about the picture, these words may have attracted attention to a greater 
degree than thematically-associated or neutral words. Prolonged response latencies suggest that it 
was difficult to either suppress the use of a word that had been activated, or shift attention away 
from the distraction, to refocus or select another aspect of the picture to discuss. Conversely, 
reduced errors in the thematically-associated distractor condition suggests that words with looser 
semantic associations may serve as facilitators, or prompt concept generation without requiring the 
overt shift of attention from away from the concrete semantic activations. This study provides 
preliminary evidence that distractors inserted during message formulation (i.e., before linguistic 
formulation and overt speech) influence message formulation for sentence-level language 
production, and that attentional processes are likely involved. 
This paradigm bears resemblance to the task developed by Nozari, Arnold and Thompson-
Schill (2014), which aimed to elicit propositional language using a structured experimental 
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paradigm. Participants were asked to produce four to six sentences that described the movements of 
geometric shapes. Nozari et al. (2014) created an error scoring system that allowed certain aspects 
of sentence production to be identified. Error types included: 1) errors of perseveration, which 
reflect a failure to inhibit or suppress recently uttered words, 2) ‘premature commitment’ errors, 
which occur when the participant begins producing sentences before enough information is 
available, indicating a failure of internal monitoring processes to inhibit speech until enough 
information is available. Nozari et al. (2014) demonstrated that anodal tDCS over the left prefrontal 
cortex was associated with a significant reduction of ‘premature commitment’ errors and marginal 
reduction of perseverative errors. If, as the authors suggest, these errors represent failures of internal 
monitoring and inhibition, this study provides evidence that attentional processes (i.e., monitoring, 
executive control) are involved in sentence production in healthy adults. 
Neither the Robinson et al. (in prep.) study nor the Nozari et al. (2014) study analysed 
variations in the content of the stimuli. It is possible that if certain stimuli attract attention to a 
greater degree than others, sentence output would be affected. Within the literature relating to 
attention in the visual perceptual domain, emotion has been revealed as a powerful factor that 
influences attention.  
Emotion and Attention in Spoken Language 
Emotion and language are intuitively linked. Over 100 years ago Hughlings Jackson wrote 
that ‘defect of [expressive speech] depends on the conditions under which it is carried out. A patient 
who is unable to produce words voluntarily… [may be able to] produce whole sentences if he is in a 
state of emotional excitement’ (cited in Luria, 1970, p. 17). Furthermore, it is consistently 
documented that emotional stimuli influence attentional processes: emotion can be considered as a 
form of highly salient information (see Yiend 2010 for a review). It is generally accepted that 
emotional information places greater demands on informational processing and attentional 
resources (Yiend, 2010). In addition, there is evidence that emotional faces attract attention to a 
greater degree than neutral stimuli (e.g., Fox et al., 2000; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Öhman et 
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al., 2001; Savage, Becker & Lipp, 2015; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). However, there remains a level 
of debate surrounding whether emotional stimuli capture attention per se (e.g., Pratto & John, 
1991), or whether the effects observed instead reflect ‘attentional holding’ or a failure to disengage 
from the stimulus (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles & Dutton, 2001).   
Importantly, not all emotional stimuli are equal in the degree to which they attract attention. 
There is a pervasive phenomenon that lies at the interface of emotion and attention known as the 
‘negativity bias’ or ‘negativity effect’. This refers to the notion that negative information is higher 
in salience, demands greater attention and elicits more rapid, prominent and potent responses than 
positive information of the same intensity (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer & Vohs, 2001). The salience of negative information has been demonstrated across the 
domains of learning, memory, and impression formation (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Baumeister et 
al., 2001). Moreover, there exists a solid base of experimental behavioural evidence, employing 
manual button-pressing tasks, eye-tracking, ERP and brain imaging, in support of this effect (e.g., 
Bartholow, Fabiani, Gratton & Bettencourt, 2001; Carretié, Mercado, Tapia & Hinojosa, 2001; 
Hansen & Hansen, 1988; Ito, Larsen, Smith & Cacioppo, 1998; Jung et al., 2006; Öhman et al, 
2001). Mechanisms of evolutionary advantage are hypothesised to underlie the negativity bias, 
namely that the consequences of ignoring, ‘missing’ or reacting slowly to dangerous or threatening 
events far outweigh the repercussions of the same actions in response to neutral or positive events 
(Carretié et al., 2001). While intuitive that the negativity bias would exist to draw attention to 
biologically threatening stimuli (e.g., snakes), it is also established that the negativity bias extends 
to social stimuli, particularly angry faces (Hansen & Hansen, 1988).  
Current Studies 1 & 2 
The current studies take the cognitive-affective relationship into the domain of propositional 
language. Taken together, the literature suggests that the interaction between attention and emotion 
influences language production. If attention plays a key role during the preverbal formulation of a 
spoken message, it follows that factors that modulate or influence attention, such as emotion, would 
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also be relevant for message formulation. Moreover, given that propositional language is largely 
socially motivated and emotional information is highly relevant to social communication, it is likely 
that emotional material would be a salient source of information to be integrated. The interaction 
between emotion and attention is yet to be considered in terms of the role it may play in the 
production of propositional language.  
It is crucial to emphasise here that the allocation of attention to an emotional stimulus is 
largely automatic, occurring within 100 milliseconds (Smith et al., 2003). In contrast, propositional 
language production is deliberate, and takes into account a vast array of factors such as social and 
cultural contexts, politeness, communicative partner, self-presentation and top-down directed goals. 
This adds a level of complexity to the study of the attention-emotion relationship when it is 
considered in the domain of language. We aim to explore how spoken language output is influenced 
by the emotional content of stimuli, and, in line with the negativity bias, predict that attentional 
resources will be differentially allocated to positive and negative pictures. Specifically, we expect 
that the presence of negative picture stimuli will facilitate the production of propositional language.  
To investigate this, we employ an adapted version of the Propositional Language Task 
developed in the Robinson et al. (in prep.) study that includes emotional pictures rather than simple 
line drawings of neutral content. We also include social rather than biological (e.g., snakes) 
emotional stimuli, because social emotional stimuli are intrinsically linked with language given the 
mutual basis for communication. In line with the Robinson et al. (in prep.) method, and to further 
investigate the role of attention, emotional ‘to-be-ignored’ distractor words are inserted before the 
cue to begin speaking. The distractor words are either congruent (i.e. related) or incongruent (i.e. 
unrelated) to the emotion of the picture, at the theme or concept level (e.g., ‘joy’) rather than 
concrete semantic level (e.g., ‘smile’). Based on Robinson et al.’s (in prep.) finding that language 
was produced more quickly when a thematically-associated distractor word was inserted, we expect 
that the presence of a congruent distractor word will facilitate propositional language.  
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This project is divided into two studies, in which two broadly different aspects of the 
Propositional Language Task are analysed. Study 1 investigates the preverbal role of attention-
emotion relationship in propositional language production in a convenience sample of adults from 
the general population, and Study 2 investigates this idea from a clinical neuropsychological 
perspective, whereby a group of patients with progressive supranuclear palsy (PSP) is compared to 
a healthy older control group.  
STUDY 1 
Emotion and Attention in the Propositional Language of Healthy Adults  
Study 1 investigates how the relationship between attention and emotion influences 
propositional language production in healthy adults. Robinson et al. (in prep.) demonstrated that 
when an idea is inserted during message formulation, propositional language output is affected in 
terms of initiation time and errors, and PWI evidence shows a semantic facilitation effect (i.e., 
shorter response latencies and fewer errors) when congruent emotional distractor words are 
presented during a picture categorisation task (Liu et al., 2010). In line with this research, the effects 
of distractor words and emotional stimuli on propositional language are measured in terms of 
response latencies and errors in the current study. 
Propositional Language Measures: Response Latencies and Premature Commitments  
Study 1 includes two primary measures: response latencies and premature commitment 
errors. Response latencies are measured via time taken to initiate speech after the cue to begin 
talking; this taps the process of initiation. Errors are measured in terms of ‘premature 
commitments’, which occur when speech is initiated too soon. This error type has been suggested to 
reflect a failure of inhibition due to insufficient internal monitoring (Nozari et al., 2014). Initiation 
and inhibition are two ‘executive’ functions associated with the frontal lobes and therefore reliant 
on frontal attentional processes; successful propositional language production requires the initiation 
of speech and the simultaneous inhibition of unwanted or irrelevant ideas.  
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Hypotheses. In line with the negativity bias, we predict that participants will be faster to 
initiate speech in response to negative pictures. Furthermore, based on the findings that 
thematically-associated distractor words facilitate spoken language production (Robinson et al., in 
prep), and that emotion words are categorised faster in the presence of congruent distractors (Liu et 
al., 2010), we expect that participants will be faster to initiate speech when a congruent distractor 
word is presented. However, we expect the facilitatory effect of the distractor word to be attenuated 
for negative pictures, as negative visual stimuli are known to capture and hold attention (Baumeister 
et al., 2001).  In addition, we predict increased premature commitment errors in response to 
negative stimuli. Negative stimuli are thought to place greater demands on finite attentional 
resources, and inhibition requires the executive control of attention (Stuss et al., 2005). Therefore 
we expect that additional attentional processing demanded by negative stimuli will lead to increased 
inhibition failures. Similarly, we expect increased premature commitment errors on incongruent 
trials, because the incongruence of the distractor words would place additional demands on 
attention, leading to failures of inhibition. Finally, we predict that the increased errors on 
incongruent trials will be greater for negative as opposed to positive pictures, due to the increased 
attentional demands of negative visual stimuli.  
The Role of Other Factors  
The relationship between attention and emotion is known to be influenced by several 
factors. For example, there is evidence to suggest that the cognitive-affective relationship changes 
with age, such that the negativity bias is attenuated if not eliminated in older individuals (Wood & 
Kisley, 2006; although see Leclerc & Kensinger, 2008 for an alternative conclusion). Although a 
full examination of the effect of age on the relationship between attention and emotion in 
propositional language is beyond the scope of this paper, there is evidence that both attention (e.g., 
Zanto & Gazzaley, 2014) and propositional language (e.g., Kemper, Herman & Liu, 2004) show 
age-related changes. Thus, age is included as a covariate in our analyses. There is also evidence to 
suggest that the negativity bias is influenced by anxiety and depression (e.g., Armstrong & Olatunji, 
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2012; Bar-Haim et al., 2007), as well as empathy (Chikovani, Babuadze, Iashvili, Gvalia, & 
Surguladze, 2015). Thus, we include measures of self-reported anxiety, depression and empathy, as 
well as theory of mind, alongside the attention and executive function baseline tasks in the current 
study. The baseline tasks, which tap various aspects of cognition, are included in exploratory 
analyses with the aim of providing preliminary insight into any factors that may be driving the 
Propositional Language Task effects. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample included 93 adults (42 M, 51 F) aged between 18 and 61 years (M = 32.1 years), 
with no history of neurological or psychiatric disorder. All participants were native English 
speakers, and were recruited via word-of-mouth, the University of Queensland’s School of 
Psychology research participation scheme, and community groups.  
An additional 20 participants were recruited via word-of-mouth to participate in a pilot study 
for the purpose of Propositional Language Task development.  This sample comprised 14 females 
and six males, aged between 18 and 60 years (M = 29.4 years). All pilot participants were native 
English speakers. This study was approved by the University of Queensland Human Research Ethics 
Committee. 
Procedure 
All baseline and experimental tasks were completed across one or two testing sessions, 
which spanned no longer than three months. Participants were tested individually, one-on-one with 
the experimenter, for two to three hours per session. Short breaks were taken if required. 
Neuropsychological Cognitive and Language Baseline. The primary purpose of the 
cognitive and language baseline was to characterise the sample and ensure that any effects of the 
Propositional Language Task were not due to impaired baseline cognitive or language skills. The 
cognitive baseline tests were also administered to be used in exploratory analyses, for the purpose 
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of investigating whether specific cognitive skills could be implicated in any effects observed on the 
Propositional Language Task.  
Cognitive baseline. The Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM; Raven, 1976) was 
administered as a measure of non-verbal general or fluid intelligence, and the National Adult 
Reading Test (NART-R; Nelson & Willison, 1991) gave an estimate of crystallised intelligence. 
Three subtests from the Test of Everyday Attention (TEA; Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway & Nimmo-
Smith, 1996) were used to assess baseline attention skills; Elevator Counting for auditory sustained 
attention, Elevator Counting with Distraction for auditory selective attention and Telephone Search 
Dual Task Decrement for divided attention. The Hayling Sentence Completion Test (Burgess & 
Shallice, 1997) and word fluency tasks (Phonemic: ‘S’; Semantic: ‘Animals’; Benton, 1968) were 
included as verbal measures of frontal ‘executive’ functions, namely initiation, suppression / 
inhibition and idea generation. Theory of mind was assessed using the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001). The Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980; 1983) provided a measure of self-reported empathy. A 
questionnaire measuring self-reported symptoms of depression and anxiety (HADS; Snaith & 
Zigmond, 1994) was administered to ascertain mood symptoms. 
Language baseline. The language baseline included measures of naming (Graded Naming 
Test; McKenna & Warrington, 1980), single word comprehension (Synonym Test: Warrington, 
McKenna & Orpwood, 1998) and sentence repetition (3-6 words in length; McCarthy & 
Warrington, 1984).  
Propositional Language Task. Figure 4a displays the sequence of the Propositional 
Language Task. Each trial began with a fixation cross for 250ms. The picture was then presented, 
and it remained on the screen until the end of the trial (i.e., until the participant had finished 
speaking). 2500ms after the onset of the picture, a distractor word was presented in English 
orthography above the picture, accompanied by a recording of the spoken word. The written word 
remained on screen until the end of the trial. 2500ms after the onset of the written word, a tone was 
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presented at 720Hz as a cue for the participant to begin speaking. After the participant finished 
speaking, the experimenter pressed the space bar to signify the end of the trial and move on to the 
subsequent trial. The participant was asked to produce two sentences in response to each picture, as 
this is the minimum amount of spoken language required to meet the criteria for ‘connected 
speech’. 
The Propositional Language Task was preceded by the following written and verbal 
instructions: ‘In a moment you will see a picture. Have a look at this picture and think of two 
sentences to say about the picture. While you’re thinking, you will hear and see a distractor word. 
Please make sure this word is NOT included in your sentences. After you hear the word, you will 
hear a tone sound. The tone is your cue to begin speaking. It is important to remain quiet until you 
hear the tone.’ Additional verbal clarification was given as required. 
The task included two practice items. Any errors occurring during the practice items were 
corrected, and after that no correction was given.  After the practice items, the rules were reiterated 
on the screen and verbally. The task was run on a Dell Latitude E6230 laptop computer, using 
MATLAB. Speech was recorded on an Olympus WS-813 digital voice recorder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4a. The sequence of the Propositional Language Task. IAPS picture #2395 is displayed. 
 
Selection of picture stimuli. The pictures included in the Propositional Language Task were 
selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008). 
The IAPS set includes over 1000 pictures that have been rated for valence (pleasant-unpleasant or 
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positive-negative), arousal (low-high) and dominance (weak-powerful). For the purpose of the 
current study, only valence and arousal will be considered, as they are the two primary dimensions 
that account for variance in emotional assessments (Osgood, Suci & Tanenbaum, 1957). A total of 
40 pictures were selected for the Propositional Language Task, comprising 20 picture pairs of 
opposite valence: each pair included one positive (pleasant) and one negative (unpleasant) picture. 
Each pair was matched on the content of the pictures, namely: 1) number of people visible, and 2) 
whether a clear external catalyst (e.g., contextual cue) was visible for the emotion portrayed in the 
picture. The pictures were selected to be simple in their depictions; in each picture only one action 
is occurring. Positive and negative picture stimuli were of equal strength of valence (rated on a 9-
point scale [1 = extremely negative/unpleasant, 9 = extremely positive/pleasant]: positive pictures 
M(SD) = 7.3(0.4) and negative pictures M(SD) = 2.6(0.7). 
Distractor word selection. Distractor words were selected based on pilot testing. Pilot group 
participants were tested individually one-on-one, and were shown the 42 selected IAPS pictures (40 
pictures as per sets of matched pictures and two practice items) one at a time in a Microsoft 
PowerPoint presentation. Firstly, participants were asked to write down three to five words that 
related to the emotion of the picture. The IAPS pictures were then presented for a second time, and 
participants categorised each picture into an emotion category (i.e., happiness, sadness, fear, anger, 
surprise or disgust, pride, embarrassment or ‘none’).  
All words generated for each picture by each pilot participant were collated. Each word was 
first evaluated by three independent raters, who assigned it an emotion category label. Raters 
decided whether a word was a synonym for one of eight emotion labels (happy, angry, scared, 
surprised, disgusted, proud, or embarrassed). Words for which the judges did not agree on the 
category label were categorised as ‘other’. The frequency of each category label for each picture 
was summed, and expressed as a proportion of the total words generated. For example, there were 
62 words in total generated for picture #2395, and 27 of these words fell into the ‘happy’ category. 
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Thus, the proportion of happy words generated for picture #2395 was 27/62, or 0.44. Next, the 
number of times each IAPS picture was categorised into each emotion was counted.  
The final dominant emotion for each picture was selected based on the emotion words 
generated by the pilot participants. The categorisation data was used in the event of a ‘tie-breaker’, 
in the rare case that an equal number of words were generated from two emotion categories. The 
final emotion categories included two positive emotions: happiness and tenderness/love, and three 
negative emotions: sadness, fear and anger. The additional category of ‘tenderness/love’ was 
assigned to three pictures, because the raters agreed that the generated emotion words reflected this 
emotional dimension more than any other. An emotion word that matched the dominant emotion of 
the picture was selected from the pilot words as the ‘congruent’ word. For the incongruent 
condition, a word was paired with a picture of the opposite valence, based on Affective Norms for 
English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 2010) valence ratings. For example, positive emotion 
words from the categories happiness or tenderness/love were paired with pictures depicting sadness, 
fear or anger, and vice versa. Therefore, for each picture a congruent and an incongruent distractor 
word was selected. This enabled the creation of two versions of the task; each version included the 
same set of 40 pictures, half with congruent distractors and half with incongruent distractors to 
create four task conditions (see Table 4a). The picture-word pairings were switched between 
versions so that if a picture was matched with a congruent word in one version it was matched with 
an incongruent word in the other version. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
versions.   
Congruent and incongruent distractors were matched for their degree of congruency in 
valence ratings across positive and negative sets. Congruent picture/word pairings differed in 
valence by less than one point for both positive and negative sets (positive M = 0.6; negative M = 
0.8), indicating that the pictures and words were similar in valence. By contrast, incongruent 
picture/word pairings differed in valence by approximately five points for both positive and 
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negative sets (positive M = 5.3; negative M = 5.1), indicating strong differences in valence between 
the pictures and words. 
Measures. Response latencies and premature commitment errors were the two primary 
measures of propositional language in the current study. Response latencies (RL) were defined as 
the time between the cue to begin speaking (tone) and the first word uttered. Note that this did not 
included nonwords or sounds (e.g., ‘um’, ‘ahh’, laughing) that occurred before the initiation of 
speech. RLs were calculated by measuring the latency in milliseconds between peak amplitudes 
produced by the tone and the first word in the audio signal for each trial, using the program 
Audacity (www.audacityteam.org). Trials in which the participant initiated speech before the tone 
were excluded from initiation analyses. Mean RLs for each task condition were calculated, and this 
measure was considered to tap initiation of speech.  
Secondly, ‘premature commitment’ (PC) errors were summed for each task condition. If 
speech was initiated prior to the tone sounding, the trial was recorded as a PC error. PC errors gave 
a measure of inhibition of speech. 
 
Table 4a. Propositional Language Task conditions. 
 Distractor Word Congruent Distractor Word Incongruent 
Picture Positive Positive Congruent 
(e.g., picture of smiling ladies 
with distractor word ‘joyful’) 
Positive Incongruent 
(e.g., picture of smiling ladies 
with distractor word ‘sorrow’) 
Picture Negative Negative Congruent  
(e.g., picture of crying ladies 
with distractor word ‘sorrow’) 
Negative Incongruent 
(e.g., picture of crying ladies 
with distractor word ‘joyful’) 
Note. There were 40 pictures in total, 10 in each condition.  
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Results 
Cognitive and Language Baseline 
 Table 4b displays means, standard deviations and ranges for scores on cognitive and 
language baseline tests. The current sample was within the average range on measures of 
crystallised intelligence (National Adult Reading Test-R) and fluid intelligence (Advanced 
Progressive Matrices). However, there was greater variation in other cognitive skills. Sustained 
attention scores were largely intact, although selective attention and divided attention scores ranged 
from ‘impaired’ to ‘superior’. Means for sustained, selective and divided attention were within the 
average range (Robertson et al., 1996) (Test of Everyday Attention). Word fluency, which is a 
standard measure of frontal ‘executive’ functioning, also varied; total words generated in response 
to letter and category cues ranged from ‘poor’ to ‘excellent’. However, the mean of the sample was 
in line with previously reported norms (Spreen & Strauss, 1998). Likewise, scaled scores on the 
Hayling test, which taps frontal ‘executive’ functions of initiation and inhibition, varied from 
‘impaired’ to ‘good’, although the mean scaled scores for initiation time, suppression time and 
suppression errors were close to the ‘average’ scaled score of 6. Theory of mind was largely within 
the average range (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) (Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test). Self-reported 
anxiety and depression scores ranged from ‘normal’ to ‘severe’ (anxiety) or ‘moderate’ (depression) 
(Snaith & Zigmond, 1994) (Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale). The sample showed a large 
range of scores on the self-reported empathy scale (Interpersonal Reactivity Index). In terms of core 
language skills, naming (Graded Naming Test) and single word comprehension (Synonym Test) 
were mostly intact, and sentence repetition was flawless.  
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Table 4b. Means, standard deviations and ranges for cognitive and language baseline tests for Study 
1 participants. 
Baseline Test M (SD) Range 
Intellectual Functioning 
          Crystallised intelligence (NART) 
          Fluid intelligence (APM / 12) 
 
107.3 (8.1) 
9.6 (1.8) 
 
89 – 127  
5 – 12  
Attention (TEA) 
        Sustained attention (EC /7) 
        Selective attention (ECwD /10) 
        Divided attention (Dual-task) 
 
6.9 (0.3) 
8.7 (2.0) 
1.0 (1.9) 
 
6 – 7  
2 – 10  
-0.7 – 10.0 
Frontal ‘executive’ functions 
         Hayling Sentence Completion Test 
                Hayling Initiation RT SS 
                Hayling Suppression RT SS 
                Hayling Supp. Error SS 
        Word Fluency 
              Phonemic (S) 
              Semantic (Animals) 
 
 
5.9 (0.7) 
6.0 (0.6) 
6.1 (1.8) 
 
17.5 (4.8) 
25.9 (5.5) 
 
 
3 – 7 
4 – 8 
1 – 8 
 
7 – 28 
15 – 39  
Theory of Mind (RMET /36) 27.7 (3.4) 18 – 34 
Empathy (IRI) 63.6 (11.8) 29 – 84 
HADS – Anxiety (max. 21) 
HADS – Depression (max. 21) 
7.3 (3.8) 
3.3 (2.6) 
0 – 19 
0 – 12  
Naming (GNT /30) 18.6 (3.9) 10 – 29 
Word Comprehension (Synonyms /50) 39.5 (5.4) 29 – 49 
Sentence Repetition (/10) 10.0 (0.0) 10 – 10  
Note. NART = National Adult Reading Test Predicted Full Scale IQ; APM = Advanced Progressive 
Matrices; TEA = Test of Everyday Attention; EC = Elevator Counting subtest; ECwD = Elevator 
Counting with Distraction subtest; SS = Scaled Score; Hayling Initiation SS Range 1-7, 
Suppression / Suppression Error SS Range 1-8, 6 = Average; RMET = Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes Test; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; 
GNT = Graded Naming Test. a Control group scores for sex and handedness represent ratio (not 
mean) scores. nt = not tested. N = 93. 
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Propositional Language Task 
To investigate the influence of picture valence and distractor word type on propositional 
language, 2 (picture valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (distractor word: congruent vs. incongruent) 
repeated measures ANCOVAs were conducted on the RL and PC error data. In both ANCOVAs, 
age was included in the model as a covariate. For analyses in which assumptions of sphericity were 
violated, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied.  
A small number of individuals performed below the clinical cut off (<5th percentile) for the 
Haying Test Suppression Error score (N = 9), Elevator Counting with Distraction (N = 2) and Dual 
Task Decrement (N = 6). As the purpose of the neuropsychological baseline was to rule out any 
deficits that may influence performance on the Propositional Language Task, all analyses were re-
run with these individuals excluded from the sample. No results changed from those reported in the 
following sections. 
Response latencies (initiation of speech). RLs differed significantly between positive and 
negative pictures, as there was a main effect of picture valence F(1, 91) = 10.35, p = .002, ηp2 = 
.102. However, the direction of the effect was opposite to what was predicted (positive pictures: 
M(SD) = 1.79(0.74); negative pictures: M(SD) = 2.17(1.15)). There was no main effect of distractor 
word type, F(1, 91) = 1.24, p = .269, ηp2 = .013 (congruent: M(SD) = 1.98(0.87); incongruent: 
M(SD) = 1.99(1.01)). This suggests that initiation of speech was not influenced by level of semantic 
relatedness between the picture and distractor word. Furthermore, there was no significant 
interaction between picture emotion and distractor word, indicating that the effect of picture 
emotion did not differ depending on distractor word type, F(1, 91) = 1.95, p = .166, ηp2 = .021. 
Finally, there was no significant effect of age, F(1, 91) = 0.17, p = .683, ηp2 = .002.  
Premature commitments (inhibition of speech). Analyses of PC errors showed no 
significant main effects of picture valence, F(1, 91) = 3.38, p = .069, ηp2 = .036 (positive pictures: 
M(SD) = 0.83(1.24); negative pictures: M(SD) = 0.71(1.23)) nor distractor word type, F(1, 91) = 
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0.54, p = .465, ηp2 = .006 (congruent: M(SD) = 0.79(1.23); incongruent: M(SD) = 0.75(1.24)). 
Likewise, there was no significant two-way interaction between picture valence and distractor word 
type, F(1, 91) = 0.32, p = .573, ηp2 = .003. This suggests that premature commitment errors did not 
differ between conditions on the Propositional Language Task. However, a significant effect of age 
was found, F(1, 92) = 7.44, p  = .008, ηp2 = .076, suggesting that older adults made a higher 
number of PC errors than younger adults.  
Role of Broader Cognition: Exploratory Analyses. 
The purpose of the exploratory analyses was to investigate whether specific aspects of 
broader cognition could be linked to the Propositional Language Task effects. The results revealed a 
significant effect of picture valence on RLs, but not distractor word type, such that participants were 
slower to initiate speech in response to negative pictures. Thus, only picture valence and RL data 
were considered in the following exploratory analyses, to address the contribution of broader 
cognition to this ‘picture valence effect’. The aspects of cognition that were considered to 
potentially contribute to the picture valence effect included attention, theory of mind, frontal 
‘executive’ functions, self-reported empathy, and symptoms of anxiety and depression. 
Neuropsychological baseline test scores provided these measures.  
For these analyses, ‘picture valence difference scores’ were calculated for each participant 
by subtracting the mean RL for positive pictures from the mean RL for negative pictures. The 
difference scores provided a measure of the size of the ‘picture valence effect’ for each participant; 
difference scores above zero indicated that RLs were slower to negative pictures, and scores below 
zero indicated slower responses to positive pictures, with larger absolute numbers providing a 
measure of the size of the difference. Difference scores ranged from -0.48 to 5.28. Pearson’s 
correlations were run between the difference scores and cognitive baseline test scores. There were 
no significant associations between difference scores and self-reported anxiety or depression, theory 
of mind, executive functions, or selective, sustained or divided attention, all ps > .05. There was a 
significant negative correlation between self-reported empathy and difference scores, r = -.29, p = 
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.034, suggesting that the slower the RLs to negative as compared with positive pictures, the lower 
self-reported empathy scores. However, this correlation did not remain significant after Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons.  
Picture-level analyses. It is well established that valence and arousal of emotional stimuli 
are correlated, such that negative stimuli are generally higher in arousal (e.g., Bradley & Lang, 
2010). It is also intuitively possible that arousal may be driving the effect of picture valence in the 
current results; if a negative stimulus is highly arousing, individuals may be slower to initiate 
speech because of increased demands on attentional capacity.  Thus, picture-level analyses were run 
to ensure that arousal was not driving the picture valence effect on RLs.  
The mean RL across all participants was calculated for each picture. A Pearson’s bivariate 
correlation revealed that the mean RL significantly correlated with picture valence (as rated in the 
IAPS technical manual: Lang et al., 2008), such that the greater in negativity the IAPS picture 
rating, the longer the RL, r = -.725, p < .001. Partial correlations were then run between IAPS 
picture valence and mean RL, controlling for IAPS picture arousal. The correlation between mean 
RL and IAPS picture valence remained significant after controlling for arousal, r = -.630, p < .001. 
This suggests that arousal was not driving the effect of picture valence (i.e., negativity/positivity) on 
initiation of speech.  
Finally, angry faces have featured strongly in the literature on the negativity bias, with 
studies showing that angry faces specifically attract a great degree of attention (e.g., Hansen & 
Hansen, 1988; Öhman et al., 2001). Therefore, it may be that pictures depicting anger are driving 
the picture valence effect. The Propositional Language Task pictures had previously been assigned 
an emotion category, based on the pilot data. Emotion categories included happiness and tenderness 
(positive) and anger, sadness and fear (negative). A one-way ANOVA was conducted to assess 
whether mean RL differed significantly between the three negative emotion categories; however, 
the effect of emotion was not significant, F(2, 17) = 0.85, p = .445. This suggests that it is the 
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negativity/positivity of the pictures which is the critical factor driving the effect, rather than a 
specific emotion category.  
Study 1 Summary 
In summary, Study 1 demonstrated that participants were slower to initiate speech in 
response to negative pictures, compared to positive pictures. This ‘picture valence effect’ was not 
associated with anxiety, depression, theory of mind, executive functions or attention. However, 
there appeared to be a small role of self-reported empathy, such that higher empathy was associated 
with a faster response times to negative compared with positive pictures (r = -.29), but this did not 
survive Bonferroni correction. The role of empathy should be explored further in future research.  
Picture-level analyses revealed that the effect of picture valence on RLs was not driven by 
picture arousal or specific emotion categories (e.g., anger). There was no significant effect of 
distractor word type on speech initiation time, and the data did not suggest an effect of age. PC 
errors did not differ between Propositional Language Task conditions; however, PC errors tended to 
increase with age.  
STUDY 2 
Attention, Emotion and Propositional Language in Progressive Supranuclear Palsy 
As discussed in the Introduction, frontal dynamic aphasia is a language output disorder 
characterised by a severe reduction of propositional language in the context of preserved core 
language functions. Based on several case studies, two distinct subtypes of dynamic aphasia have 
emerged. The first subtype is characterised by a selection deficit, whereby the ability to select a 
proposition is impaired when there are many competing alternatives activated rather than when a 
single dominant response option is available (Robinson et al., 1998; 2005). This selection deficit is 
language-specific and associated with unilateral focal damage to the left inferior frontal gyrus 
(Robinson et al., 2010). The second subtype of dynamic aphasia is less documented, and associated 
with bilateral frontal and/or subcortical areas. This subtype is domain-general, and appears to affect 
the generation and/or sequencing of multiple ideas, while selection processes remain intact 
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(Bormann et al., 2008; Esmonde et al., 1996; Gold et al., 1997; Robinson et al., 2006; 2013; 2015a; 
Snowden et al., 1996). 
Case profiles consistent with the second subtype of dynamic aphasia have been documented 
in patients with PSP (Esmonde et al., 1996; Robinson et al., 2006; 2015a). PSP is an atypical 
Parkinsonian neurodegenerative disorder, which often involves midbrain and bilateral frontal 
cortical atrophy (Rittman & Rowe, 2012). Recent work by Barker et al. (under review / Chapter 3) 
investigated spontaneous speech in patients with PSP, in a case series of patients without dynamic 
aphasia. This group of patients allows for a unique insight into mechanisms of propositional 
language production; core language skills remain intact but there is a reduction in spontaneous 
speech output that is not yet severe enough to be considered dynamic aphasia. This provides a 
nuanced insight into message formulation, as subtlety might be lost in patients with dynamic 
aphasia due to the more severe impairment.  
The broad aim of Study 2 is to explore the role of emotion and attention in the propositional 
language of patients with PSP and healthy older adults. The method of Study 1 is replicated, to 
investigate whether the same effects of picture valence on propositional speech are evident in 
healthy older adults and patients with PSP. In addition, the content of spoken language has been 
highlighted as a point of interest in patient populations; for example, it has been demonstrated that 
the cohesion and coherence of speech is affected in stroke patients without aphasia (see Barker et 
al., 2017 / Chapter 2). For this reason, Study 2 involves an extensive and finer-grained analysis of 
the speech content, in order to explore the effects of distractor words in detail. Content is analysed 
in two different ways: 1) the interference of the distractor word via ‘blatant’ and ‘subtle’ errors, and 
2) the effect of the distractor word on the valence of the speech itself. Finally, the level of emotion 
conveyed in the sentences produced is analysed to investigate whether the amount of emotional 
content relates to the difference in response latencies between negative and positive pictures, the 
valence of the picture itself or the presence of unrelated emotional distractors, and whether 
emotional content differs between healthy controls and PSP patients.  
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Interference: Blatant and Subtle Errors.  
One of the key instructions in the Propositional Language Task is to exclude the distractor 
word from the sentences produced. Therefore, when the to-be-ignored distractor word is used in the 
sentences, a blatant ‘word use error’ occurs. ‘Blatant’ errors can occur regardless of whether the 
distractor word is congruent or incongruent with the emotion of the picture (see Table 4c), and 
indicate that the distraction has attracted attention and the individual is unable to redirect attention 
to another aspect of the picture to discuss. Blatant word use errors are virtually non-existent in 
younger adults but more common in older adults (Robinson et al., in prep.). For example, in Study 
1, 93 participants aged 18-61 each participated in 40 trials, meaning there were 3270 trials in which 
an error could have been made. Only 5 blatant ‘word use errors’ were made across all participants. 
Attention and frontal ‘executive’ functions are known to decline with age (e.g., Mahoney, 
Verghese, Goldin, Lipton & Holtzer, 2010), and PSP is often associated with marked attention and 
executive deficits (e.g., Esmonde et al., 1996). Therefore, a comparison between PSP patients and 
healthy older adults will provide valuable insight into the attentional failures that result in blatant 
word use errors, highlighting a link between attention and language, and distinguishing healthy 
from pathological ageing.  
However, the interference of the distractor word may not always manifest as blatant word 
use errors. In incongruent trials, when the distractor word does not match the emotion of the picture, 
interference may occur at a more subtle level. ‘Subtle’ interference errors occur when the emotion 
of the incongruent distractor word is evident in either the content of the sentence, or when a 
synonym is selected and a function word (e.g., ‘not’) is included that makes the clause negative 
(e.g., the person is not sad; see Table 4c)9. This error type can only occur during incongruent trials; 
if the distractor word is congruent with the picture it is logical that the emotion of the distractor 
word would be included in the sentences produced according to task rules. Study 2 aims to 
                                                
9 Note that subtle interference errors are not errors per se, as they do not break task rules, but are classified as such for 
the current analysis to allow an investigation of distractor word interference on sentence content on multiple levels. 
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investigate whether distractor words influence propositional language, by measuring blatant and 
subtle interference errors in the content of the sentences produced.  
The concept of ‘blatant’ and ‘subtle’ errors stands in line with work on the Hayling Sentence 
Completion Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). Robinson et al. (2015b) investigated Hayling errors in 
patients with focal lesions to the frontal lobes. The Hayling test suppression section (Part 2) requires 
the generation of an unrelated or unconnected word in response to a sentence stem (e.g., The 
captain wanted to stay with the sinking… ‘apple’). Blatant errors occur when the response is a 
natural completion of the sentence (e.g., ‘ship’ for the example above), whereas subtle errors are 
semantically related to the sentence (e.g., ‘ocean’ for the example above). Robinson et al. (2015b) 
reported that all frontal patients produced higher numbers of blatant suppression errors than 
controls. In contrast, an investigation of healthy adults by Gibson, Barker, Martin and Robinson 
(under review) demonstrated that healthy older adults produced a higher number of subtle than 
blatant suppression errors. Like the Hayling test, the task in the current study requires the 
suppression of a word that has been activated. In PSP frontal cortical damage is generalised and 
bilateral; therefore, in line with Robinson et al.’s (2015b) findings, we expect that PSP patients will 
produce a greater number of blatant suppression errors than healthy controls.  
Interference: Valence of Speech  
The analysis of blatant and subtle interference errors provides insight into how the concepts 
directly associated with the distractor word, or even the distractor word itself, are integrated into the 
speech output. However, there is a possibility that the effects of incongruent distractor words occur 
even more subtly. These effects may be evident in the valence (i.e. positivity/negativity) of the 
speech produced: that is, whether the inclusion of a greater number of positive or negative words in 
participants’ sentences is influenced by the presence of an incongruent (emotionally unrelated) 
distractor.  
We predict that the presence of a distractor word will influence the overall valence of the 
sentences produced, such that speech relating to the positivity or negativity of the picture will be 
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attenuated by the presence of an incongruent distractor. Specifically, we hypothesise that 
participants will produce less positive speech in response to positive pictures when there is an 
incongruent (i.e. negative) distractor word present, and less negative speech in response to negative 
pictures when there is a positive distractor word.  
Emotional Content 
 The final aspect of the content analysis in the current study is to investigate the level of 
emotion conveyed in the sentences. Study 1 revealed a picture valence effect, such that participants 
were slower to initiate speech in response to negative pictures. Individual differences in this valence 
effect did not appear to be driven by attentional or executive skills. The aim of the emotional 
content analysis is to investigate whether the picture valence effect relates to the amount of emotion 
being conveyed in the sentences. It is predicted that individuals who convey greater emotion in their 
language output will show longer response latencies to negative pictures. There is a general 
preference for the use of positive words in spoken language production (e.g., Boucher & Osgood, 
1969; Jing-Schmidt, 2007), and therefore using negative emotion words to describe the picture, as 
opposed to not referencing the emotion (e.g., describing the background instead) may elicit slower 
responses to negative pictures. 
The emotion content analysis is also included for the purpose of investigating whether the 
level of emotion conveyed in propositional language is affected by picture valence and distractor 
word type. Research on the negativity bias indicates that emotional responses to negative stimuli are 
more prominent or ‘potent’ (Rozin & Royzman, 2001); thus, we expect that a higher level of 
emotional content will be included in the language output in response to negative pictures. With 
regard to distractor words, we predict that congruent words will encourage the discussion of 
emotion in response to the picture, resulting in a higher level of emotional content. 
Finally, there is some evidence that patients with PSP have difficulties with social cognition 
and emotion recognition (e.g., Ghosh et al., 2012). Therefore, it is possible that patients with PSP 
will convey less emotion in their language output compared to healthy controls.  
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Method 
Participants 
Four patients with a primary diagnosis of probable PSP (Litvan et al., 2013; Respondek et 
al., 2013) by a consultant neurologist or movement disorder specialist were included in Study 2 
(patient initials: RNZ, PW, RC, BL). These patients were recruited from the Royal Brisbane and 
Women’s Hospital in Queensland, Australia. The individual patient details are reported elsewhere 
(Barker et al., under review / Chapter 3).  A healthy older control group, age-matched to the PSP 
patients, was recruited from the community. The healthy older sample comprised 26 older adults 
(11 M, 15 F) aged between 62 and 81 years. This study was approved by the Royal Brisbane and 
Women’s Hospital and the University of Queensland Human Research Ethics Committees. 
Procedure 
The healthy older adult group completed all neuropsychological baseline and experimental 
tasks across one or two sessions, and the patients with PSP completed all tasks across three or four 
sessions within a contemporaneous time period. Each session was between two and four hours in 
length, and breaks were taken as required. All participants were tested individually.  
 Cognitive and language baseline. The cognitive and language neuropsychological tests 
were administered to establish baseline levels of cognitive and language functioning in patients with 
PSP and healthy controls. The following baseline tests were included: the Advanced Progressive 
Matrices (Raven, 1976) assessed fluid intelligence and the National Adult Reading Test (Revised; 
Nelson & Willison, 1991) provided an estimate of crystallised intelligence (healthy controls) or 
premorbid IQ (patients). Subtests from the Test of Everyday Attention (Robertson et al., 1996) 
measured sustained, selective and divided attention. The Hayling test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) 
and phonemic and semantic word fluency (Benton, 1968) were included as measures of frontal 
‘executive’ functions. The IRI (Davis, 1983) and Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Snaith & 
Zigmond, 1994) questionnaires measured self-reported empathy and symptoms of anxiety and 
depression. The language baseline assessed naming (Graded Naming Test; McKenna & 
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Warrington, 1980), single word comprehension (Synonym Test: Warrington et al., 1998) and 
sentence repetition (3-6 words in length; McCarthy & Warrington, 1984).  
 Propositional Language Task. The Propositional Language task was administered as per 
Study 1. Speech samples were recorded on an Olympus WS-813 digital voice recorder and 
transcribed in English orthography. All words, nonwords and repeats were transcribed. RLs and PC 
errors were calculated and recorded consistent with the method from Study 1. 
Interference errors. The interference error scoring system is detailed and examples are 
provided in Table 4c. The transcription of each trial was manually inspected. If the distractor word 
was present on any trial, that trial was marked as a blatant (Cat A) error. Only incongruent trials 
were inspected for subtle (Cat B) errors, as subtle errors cannot occur on congruent trials. If the 
sentences produced included a synonym for the incongruent distractor word, that trial was scored as 
a subtle lexical (Cat B1) error. If the subject or content of the sentences was judged to reflect the 
emotion of the incongruent distractor word, the trial was scored as a subtle conceptual (Cat B2) 
error. Judgments were made by an independent rater who was blind to participant group. This 
blatant and subtle error scoring system reflects that of the Hayling Sentence Completion Test 
(Burgess & Shallice, 1996). Similar to Burgess and Shallice (1996) and Robinson et al. (2015b), a 
global error score was calculated (Category A errors = 3 points, Category B errors = 1 point). 
Finally, percentages of each error type were calculated in order to compare the PSP patients to the 
control group (i.e., Category A errors / Total trials x 100; Category B errors / Total incongruent 
trials x 100). 
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Table 4c. Interference error types and examples. 
   Example 
 Error Type Description Trial Type Picture 
Stimulus 
Distractor 
Word 
Response 
A Blatant The distractor 
word is used in 
the sentences. 
Congruent   
 
 
 
 
Incongruent  
Picture of 
couple on 
wedding 
day 
 
Picture of 
man 
threatening 
woman with 
gun 
‘happy’ 
 
 
 
 
‘happy’ 
‘These two 
people look 
happy.’ 
 
 
‘These people 
do not look 
happy at all.’ 
B1 Subtle 
(lexical) 
A synonym for 
the distractor 
word is used in 
the sentences. 
Incongruent  Picture of 
man 
threatening 
woman with 
gun 
‘happy’ ‘These people 
do not look 
very joyful.’ 
B2 Subtle 
(conceptual) 
The emotion of 
the distractor 
word is evident 
in the sentence 
concept. 
Incongruent  Picture of 
man 
threatening 
woman with 
gun 
‘happy’ ‘This woman 
enjoys 
playing silly 
games with 
her husband.’ 
 
 
Valence of speech. Each word in the two sentences produced was compared to the ANEW 
(Bradley & Lang, 2010) and AFINN (Nielsen, 2011) databases, and ascribed a valence score. Both 
the ANEW and AFINN databases constitute repositories of words that have been rated on affective 
dimensions. While the ANEW database includes a larger repository of words, the AFINN includes a 
broader range of words; therefore, we have incorporated both databases in the scoring system to 
maximise the words coded from participants’ sentences. Valence scores within each database were 
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divided by the maximum valence (ANEW = 9, AFINN = 5) and mean centred to zero, in order to 
make the databases comparable. If a word was present in both databases, the average of the two 
database ratings was taken. Each trial was then ascribed a score, calculated by summing the valence 
scores for each word produced for that trial. Similarly, each Propositional Language Task condition 
was given an overall score, by summing all the trial scores within that condition.  
Emotional content. In order to assess the level of emotion conveyed in response to each 
picture, every trial was assigned an ‘emotion level’ score. Sentences were judged by an independent 
rater as to the level of emotion present, based on whether any emotion words were included. 
Emotion level scores reflected the number of times any emotion was referenced in the sentences: 0 
= not at all, 1 = once, and 2 = twice or more. The scoring was capped at two to control for the 
differences in the amount of speech produced by participants.  
Results 
Cognitive and Language Baseline 
 Cognitive and language baseline scores for healthy controls and patients with PSP are 
summarised in Table 4d. With regard to the PSP patients: estimated premorbid IQ was in the high 
average (RNZ, RC, BL) or average (PW) range. Scores on the Advanced Progressive Matrix task 
revealed a mild (RNZ) to moderate (PW, RC) reduction in intellectual functioning. Sustained and 
selective auditory attention was intact for PW and BL, although abnormal for RNZ and RC (note: 
RNZ was unable to complete selective attention task) (Test of Everyday Attention). RNZ and PW 
were also moderately impaired on the divided attention task; BL was average. Consistent with 
known cognitive deficits in PSP (e.g., Esmonde et al., 1996), executive functions were reduced. 
Verbal initiation on the Hayling test was average for PW and BL, but reduced for RNZ and RC. 
Significantly slowed response times on the Hayling suppression section were evident for RNZ and 
PW; RC and BL showed a mild slowing. In terms of Hayling suppression errors, RNZ and PW were 
impaired, BL was poor, and RC was average. Phonemic and semantic word fluency was reduced in 
all four patients. Naming skills were within normal limits for RNZ and BL, but reduced in PW and 
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RC (Graded Naming Test). Single word comprehension was largely within the average (RNZ, BL) 
to low average (PW) range, although RC was moderately impaired (Synonym Test). Sentence 
repetition was flawless for all four patients. PW reported mild symptoms of anxiety, and RNZ and 
RC reported mild symptoms of depression (Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale). Individual 
scores on the IRI were comparable to the mean of the control group.  
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Table 4d. Summary of demographic information, and cognitive and language baseline scores for the 
healthy control group and patients with PSP. 
 Healthy Controls  
M (SD) 
N = 26 
RNZ PW RC BL 
Age (years) 68.7 (5.0) 73 67 79 61 
Sex a 11M: 15F M F F F 
Handedness a 23R: 3L R R R R 
Education (years) 16.3 (5.3) 12 8 10 17 
NART-derived FSIQ 116.5 (5.7) 116 97** 110 112 
APM /12 8.4 (2.1) 5 3* 2** 10 
TEA (Attention) 
     Elevator Counting /7 
Elevator Counting with 
Distraction /10 
     Dual task decrement 
 
6.7 (0.6) 
 
8.7 (2.0) 
1.2 (1.6) 
 
6 
 
nt 
7.8*** 
 
7 
 
6 
7.6*** 
 
5** 
 
2** 
nt 
 
7 
 
10 
0.3 
Hayling Test 
      Initiation (RT) SS 
      Suppression (RT) SS 
      Suppression Error SS 
 
5.8 (0.4) 
5.3 (1.5) 
4.6 (2.7) 
 
3*** 
1** 
1 
 
6 
1** 
2 
 
4* 
4 
5 
 
6 
4 
3 
Phonemic Word Fluency 
Semantic Word Fluency 
15.7 (6.4) 
21.5 (5.4) 
9 
13 
6 
11 
9 
7* 
9 
11 
IRI 63.2 (10.5) 63 69 nt 64 
HADS - Anxiety 
HADS - Depression 
5.9 (3.4) 
2.5 (2.4) 
3 
9** 
9 
4 
7 
8* 
4 
7 
Graded Naming Test /30 21.3 (3.4) 20 14 14 17 
Sentence Repetition /10 9.9 (0.2) 10 10 10 10 
Synonym test /50 46.5 (2.6) 45 37*** 30*** 42 
Note. NART FSIQ = National Adult Reading Test Predicted Full Scale IQ; APM = Advanced 
Progressive Matrices, TEA = Test of Everyday Attention; HADS = Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index. SS = Scaled Score; Hayling Initiation SS 
Range 1-7, Suppression / Suppression Error SS Range 1-8, 6 = Average. RT = Response Time.        
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a Control group scores for sex and handedness represent ratio (not mean) scores. nt = not tested. 
Compared to healthy control group using modified t-test (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002), *p < .05; 
**p < .01; ***p < .001. Bold = clinically impaired (<5th percentile). 
 
 
Propositional Language Task 
Picture Valence Effect. As per Study 1, a 2 (picture valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 
(distractor word: congruent vs. incongruent) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the RL 
and PC error data for the healthy older control group. Consistent with Study 1, the results revealed a 
significant main effect of picture valence on RLs, F(1, 25) = 8.96, p = .006, ηp2 = 0.26 (positive 
pictures: M(SD) = 2.17(1.20); negative pictures: M(SD) = 2.69(1.99)). Also in line with Study 1, 
there was no significant main effect of distractor word type, F(1, 25) = 0.16, p = .692, ηp2 = 0.01 
(congruent: M(SD) = 2.45(1.72); negative pictures: M(SD) = 2.41(1.47), and no significant picture 
valence by distractor word type interaction, F(1, 25) = 0.31, p = .585, ηp2 = 0.01.  
In contrast to Study 1, there was a main effect of picture valence on PC errors in the healthy 
older sample, F(1, 25) = 7.02, p = .014, ηp2 = 0.22 (positive pictures: M(SD) = 1.85(1.97); negative 
pictures: M(SD) = 1.21(1.34)). There was no significant main effect of distractor word type on PC 
errors, F(1, 25) = 0.47, p = .538, ηp2 = 0.02 (congruent: M(SD) = 1.60(1.72); negative pictures: 
M(SD) = 1.46(1.59), nor was there a significant interaction, F(1, 25) = 0.01, p = .929, ηp2 = 0.00. 
Healthy adults vs. PSP patients. Due to the small patient sample size, the current study 
adopted a case series approach. Therefore, individual patients with PSP were compared to the 
healthy control group using a modified t-test (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002).  
In order to compare the ‘picture valence effect’ between patients with PSP and controls, 
picture valence difference scores were calculated using the RL PC error data for the control group 
and PSP patients individually. Again, as per Study 1, means for positive pictures were subtracted 
from the means of negative pictures, to give a measure of the ‘valence effect’ of the picture stimuli. 
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Modified t-test (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002) analyses revealed that none of the PSP patients’ 
difference scores differed significantly from the control group, all p >.05. However, close 
inspection of the difference scores showed that 23 of the 26 healthy controls obtained RL difference 
scores above zero (indicating that negative pictures elicited slower RLs than positive pictures), 
whereas three of the four PSP patients showed the opposite pattern: their difference scores were 
below zero (RNZ, PW and BL). Difference scores below zero indicate slower RLs in response to 
positive pictures. Thus, although there is no statistical evidence to suggest that PSP patients 
performed differently to controls, the fact that three PSP patients obtained difference scores above 
zero suggests that further research in larger samples is necessary. Similarly, the same three PSP 
patients (RNZ, PW and BL) produced a higher raw number of PC errors in response to negative 
pictures than positive pictures, which is the opposite pattern to controls. This should also be 
followed up with further research in larger samples. 
Interference Errors. Table 4e displays percentages of error types for the healthy control 
group and patients with PSP. The Global Error scores of RNZ, PW and RC were significantly 
higher than controls, t(25) = 8.26, p <.001, t(25) = 6.18, p <.001 and t(25) = 8.85, p <.001, 
respectively. BL did not differ significantly from controls in her Global Error score, t(25) = 0.55, p 
=.588. 
Blatant (Cat A) errors occurred on 1.1% of trials in the healthy control group, on average. 
RNZ, PW and RC made a significantly greater number of blatant (Cat A) errors than controls, t(25) 
= 7.79, p <.001, t(25) = 9.18, p <.001 and t(25) = 13.37, p <.001, respectively. Strikingly, blatant 
(Cat A) errors occurred on 15-25% of trials for RNZ, PW and RC, whereas the maximum for 
healthy controls was 7%.  BL did not make a significantly higher number of blatant errors than 
controls, t(25) = 0.81, p = .428.  
Subtle lexical (Cat B1) errors were also rare in the control group, occurring for 1.8% of 
incongruent trials, on average. RNZ made subtle lexical (Cat B1) errors on 65% of incongruent 
trials, which was significantly and vastly higher than controls, t(25) = 16.66, p <.001. PW and BL 
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also made a significantly higher number of subtle lexical (Cat B1) errors than the control group, 
both t(25) = 2.18, p = .039. RC did not significantly differ from controls in the number of subtle 
lexical errors,, t(25) = 0.45, p =.652.  
There were no significant differences between healthy controls and PSP patients in terms of 
subtle conceptual (Cat B2) errors, all p >.05. However, interestingly, inspection of the mean 
percentages revealed that healthy controls made subtle conceptual (Cat B2) errors on 7.7% of 
incongruent trials, on average. Moreover, ten of the control participants made over 10% (up to 35%) 
subtle conceptual (Cat B2) errors. However, RNZ and BL made zero subtle conceptual (Cat B2) 
errors, and only 5% of PW’s incongruent trials included subtle conceptual errors. Only RC 
surpassed the mean of the control group. The raw scores suggest that subtle conceptual errors, as 
opposed to blatant errors, are the predominant error type of healthy controls, and that this is unlike 
the error pattern of PSP patients.  
 
Table 4e. Percentages of each error type and raw Global Error scores for healthy control group and 
individual patients with PSP. 
Error Type Healthy Controls 
M (SD) 
N = 26 
RNZ PW RC BL 
Category A 
(Blatant) 
1.1% (1.8) 15.0%*** 17.5%*** 25.0%*** 2.5% 
Category B1 
(Subtle lexical) 
1.7% (3.7) 65.0%*** 10.0%* 0.0% 10.0%* 
Category B2 
(Subtle 
conceptual) 
7.7% (10.6) 0.0% 5.0% 15.0% 0.0% 
Global Error 
Score  
(Max. = 120) 
3.2 (3.3) 31.0*** 24.0*** 33.0*** 5.0 
Note. * <.05; ** <.01; *** <.001; PSP patients compared to control group using modified t-test 
(Crawford & Garthwaite, 2002) 
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 Speech valence analysis. To investigate whether the distractor word was having an effect 
on the valence (i.e. positivity/negativity) of speech, within-subjects t-tests were conducted on the 
speech valence data separately for positive and negative pictures. There was no significant 
difference in speech valence between congruent and incongruent distractors for positive pictures, 
t(25) = 0.34, p = .738, d = 0.07. However, there was a trend in the negative pictures for speech 
valence to be higher in positivity when an incongruent distractor word was presented, t(25) = -1.89, 
p = .071, d = -0.38. Although not statistically significant, this suggests a tendency for speech in 
response to negative pictures to be more positive when a positive distractor word is present.    
Emotional Content.  A Pearson’s correlation was run in order to determine whether the 
picture valence effect on RLs, which was observed in Study 1 and replicated in an older sample in 
Study 2, was associated with the level of emotion conveyed in the sentences. However, the 
relationship was non-significant, r = 0.04, p = .843. This suggests that the picture valence effect is 
not influenced by the amount of emotional content in the speech. 
To determine whether the level of emotional content in speech differed between picture 
valence and distractor word type, a 2 (picture valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (distractor word: 
congruent vs. incongruent) within-subjects ANOVA was conducted. This revealed a significant 
main effect of picture valence, F(1, 25) = 11.05, p = .003, ηp2 = 0.32. As expected, post hoc 
analyses revealed that the emotional content of propositional language was higher in response to 
negative pictures in both congruent and incongruent conditions, p = .018 and .014, respectively. 
However, there was no main effect of distractor word type, F(1, 25) = 0.10, p = .757, ηp2 = 0.00, 
and no significant interaction, F(1, 25) = 0.05, p = .824, ηp2 = 0.00. 
Modified t-test comparisons of the emotional content level in the speech of individual PSP 
patients and the healthy control group also yielded non-significant results, all p >.05. This indicates 
that the level of emotional content in the propositional language of patients with PSP was not 
significantly different to controls. This finding is interesting in the context of the observations 
regarding the picture valence effect; patients with PSP incorporated the picture emotion into their 
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sentence concepts, but raw scores indicated that they generally did not show the same prolonged 
response latencies to negative pictures as healthy controls. Therefore it is unlikely that the reason 
for the lack of ‘picture valence effect’ in patients with PSP was because the picture emotion was not 
processed.  
Study 2 Summary 
Firstly, Study 2 replicated the main finding from Study 1 in an older sample: participants 
were slower to initiate speech in response to negative compared to positive pictures. Interestingly, 
patients with PSP demonstrated a somewhat different pattern of emotional bias in their 
propositional language output; three of the four PSP patients did not show prolonged response 
latencies to negative pictures, although this was not statistically supported. However, we did not 
find evidence that patients with PSP included emotional content in their speech to a lesser degree 
than healthy controls. We also found an effect of picture valence on premature commitment errors 
within the healthy older group, such that more errors were produced in response to positive pictures. 
Secondly, we investigated the role of the distractor word on propositional language output, and 
found that patients with PSP produced a significantly higher number of ‘blatant’ word use errors 
and ‘subtle lexical’ word use errors, compared to healthy older adults. Close inspection of the raw 
data suggested that healthy controls produced a higher number of ‘subtle conceptual’ errors than 
PSP patients, although this finding was not statistically supported. Finally, we demonstrated that 
greater emotional content was included in the propositional language produced in response 
negative, as opposed to positive, pictures.  
Discussion 
The current studies are the first to experimentally investigate the role of attention-emotion 
relationship in propositional language production in healthy adults and PSP. Taken together, the 
results of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that picture valence (i.e., positivity/negativity) has the strongest 
effect on response latencies, or the initiation of speech, while the distractor word influences the 
content of the sentences. The distractor word appears to have a greater effect on the responses of 
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patients with PSP, who produced a higher number of ‘blatant’ word use errors, compared to healthy 
older adults. 
The Effect of Picture Valence 
The finding that participants were significantly slower to initiate speech in response to 
negative than positive pictures was the primary finding of Study 1, and was subsequently replicated 
in Study 2 in an older sample. This finding was robust: over 90% of all healthy participants across 
both studies had a mean response latency for negative pictures that was slower than that of positive 
pictures. Moreover, the correlation between picture valence and response latency remained strong, 
even when picture arousal was controlled for. This demonstrates that it is the valence, or 
negativity/positivity of the stimuli that is interfering with the initiation of propositional language. In 
older adults, premature commitment errors were also influenced by picture valence, although 
contrary to hypotheses more errors were made in response to positive pictures. A trend in the same 
direction was evident in the younger healthy sample of Study 1.  
We interpret these findings as evidence that the well-established ‘negativity bias’ plays a 
role in the production of propositional language. However, the direction of the effect is opposite to 
that which was predicted. Existing research suggests that responses to negative stimuli are faster, 
but we found the opposite. Instead, our results echo those of Pratto and John (1991), who found that 
participants were slower to name the ink colour of undesirable trait words as opposed to desirable 
trait words (i.e., modified Stroop task). As did Pratto and John’s (1991) Stroop task, the 
Propositional Language Task required the individual to disengage from the emotional stimulus in 
order to produce a response. It is important to emphasise here that manual responses (e.g., button 
pressing) dominate the research that has reported faster responses to negative information. Unlike 
button-pressing, the production of propositional language is a complex goal-directed behaviour, 
which requires the allocation and adjustment of attention (Alexander, 2006). Attention is finite in 
capacity, and if attentional resources are demanded by a negative stimulus for information 
processing, there are fewer resources available to be allocated to other activities. Indeed, it has been 
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argued that negative events require more nuanced and sophisticated informational processing than 
do positive events (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). While positive events generally have one behavioural 
outcome (approach and engage), negative events can elicit various behaviours such as approaching 
and fighting (e.g., certain threats), or freezing, withdrawing or fleeing (e.g., dangerous situations) 
(Rozin & Royzman, 2001). This nuanced appraisal would draw on attentional resources, leaving 
fewer available for propositional language production. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
propositional language responses are slowed by the negativity bias. Prolonged response latencies 
may reflect increased time taken to reallocate or shift attention towards the goal (i.e., language 
production), or disengage from the stimulus in order to produce language. This stands in line with 
the trend observed in the speech valence analysis in Study 2: that incongruent distractor words 
influenced the valence of speech content in response to negative, but not positive, pictures. Perhaps 
when faced with a negative stimulus, and thus a lengthier and more complex appraisal, alongside 
the demanding task of producing spoken language, cognitive resources are pushed to their limit and 
the conceptualisation of a message is vulnerable to interference from other sources of information. 
The negativity bias is often framed within an evolutionary perspective, arguing that negative 
or threatening events can signal potential harm, and the faster the appraisal and action response, the 
higher the chance of avoiding harm (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001). While our findings appear to 
contradict the increased response speed to negative stimuli, we suggest that the current research 
actually complements existing theories. Indeed, although responses to negative pictures were 
slower, prolonged responses suggest increased informational processing, and analyses in Study 2 
revealed that language produced in response to negative pictures included a higher level of 
emotional content. This supports existing research demonstrating that responses to negative events 
are more ‘dominant’ or ‘potent’ (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). The evolutionary perspective may also 
explain the finding that premature commitment errors, which represent lapses in inhibition (Nozari 
et al., 2014), occurred more frequently in response to positive pictures. It is feasible that inhibition 
of propositional language is not necessary in positive emotional situations, as the primary 
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behavioural outcome is most often to approach and engage, so failures of inhibition would not 
necessarily carry a cost. However, an incorrect emotional appraisal and action in a threatening 
situation could have dire consequences.  
An alternative explanation for the current finding relates to the ‘Pollyanna principle’ or 
‘Pollyanna hypothesis’ (e.g., Boucher & Osgood, 1969; Osgood, May & Miron, 1975; Matlin & 
Stang, 1978). The Pollyanna principle describes a pervasive positivity bias in language, based on 
the seminal finding that humans use a higher number of evaluatively positive than negative words 
in communication (Boucher & Osgood, 1969). This phenomenon is now well documented, having 
been replicated and demonstrated in various aspects of language (e.g., Jing-Schmidt, 2007; Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001). Thus, the finding of the current Study 1 may reflect faster responses to positive 
pictures, rather than slower responses to negative pictures. If individuals have a preference for using 
positive words, it is possible that the positive pictures may facilitate propositional language 
production. To assist in disentangling the potential valence effects, future studies should include 
stimuli of neutral content alongside emotional stimuli. 
Healthy adults vs. PSP patients. In contrast to the healthy adults, inspection of the raw 
scores indicated that three of the four patients with PSP (RNZ, PW and BL) had faster mean 
response latencies to negative pictures. Although preliminary and not statistically supported, this 
observation suggests that patients with PSP may show different emotional biases to healthy older 
adults in language production. There is evidence that patients with PSP have impaired emotion 
recognition from facial expressions and vocalisations (Ghosh et al., 2009; Ghosh et al., 2012; 
Pontieri et al., 2012); this may affect their propositional language output and should prompt further 
research. Interestingly, the ‘emotion level’ content analysis in Study 2 indicated that sentences 
produced by patients with PSP conveyed a similar amount of emotional information as those of 
healthy older adults. This suggests that a lack of awareness of emotional information in the patients 
with PSP cannot account for the discrepant emotional biases. Rather, it appears that emotional 
information is being integrated in the language concept formation or idea generation of PSP 
  132 
patients, but that picture valence is not affecting speech initiation. There is evidence that recognition 
of negative emotions is impaired to a greater degree than positive emotions in PSP (Ghosh et al., 
2009); perhaps the increased allocation of attention to negative information for the purpose of 
processing and appraisal is reduced in PSP. Therefore, although emotional information is being 
conveyed in their language, the positive-negative difference in initiation and inhibition observed in 
healthy adults, which may reflect a largely automatic process of emotional appraisal, may not be 
occurring to the same degree in PSP. 
Implications. The effect of picture valence on propositional language has implications for 
theories of spoken language production. The preverbal stage of message formulation represents the 
interface between language and broader cognition, and it has been postulated that other aspects of 
cognition (e.g., attention, working memory, crystallised knowledge, executive functions) are 
involved in language production, but the role of the emotion-attention relationship has largely been 
ignored (Levelt, 1999; Sherratt, 2007).  
The effect of emotional valence (i.e., negativity/positivity) is evident in the initiation (RLs) 
and inhibition (PC errors) of propositional language in the current studies. Initiation reflects 
efficiency of the generation of novel ideas, which implicates the message formulation stage of 
language production. Inhibition errors, in terms of premature commitments, likely reflect a failure 
of internal monitoring of task rules (Nozari et al., 2014); the attentional process of ‘monitoring’ is 
interacting with the emotional content of the picture in the Propositional Language Task, during 
conceptualisation. This suggests that the interplay between emotion and attention is integral to the 
conceptualisation of a spoken message.  
The Effect of the Distractor Word 
There was no evidence of an effect of distractor word type on response latencies or 
premature commitment errors, which stands in contrast to the findings of Robinson et al. (in prep.) 
and PWI studies (e.g., Liu et al., 2010). There are several explanations for this null result. Firstly, 
there is some evidence that pictures are more powerful emotional stimuli than words (e.g., De 
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Houwer & Hermans, 1994; Larsen, Norris & Cacioppo, 2003). Therefore, the attention attracted by 
the emotional pictures (i.e., ‘bottom-up’ / automatic processing) may have overridden any effect of 
distractor word type, which would be related to ‘top-down’ or executive control processes 
(Robinson et al., in prep.). Secondly, although Liu et al. (2010) found that congruent emotional 
distractors elicited faster responses, their task was a picture categorisation task while the current 
study required the production of multiple sentences that did not include the word. It is possible that, 
by adding the additional elements of complex language production and the shift of attention away 
from the distractor word to a relevant alternative, any facilitation effects from the congruent 
distractor were negated. However, response latencies and premature commitment errors are coarse 
measures; there is greater complexity to propositional language production than the time taken to 
begin speaking. Instead, the results of Study 2 revealed that the distractor word influences the 
content of the sentences produced, demonstrating that these words indeed had an impact at the level 
of conceptualisation.  
Blatant errors. The most notable interference effect of the distractor word on the content of 
propositional language is found in ‘word use’ errors. Blatant word use errors (Category A) are 
exceptionally rare in healthy adults; however, as hypothesised, these errors were significantly more 
common in patients with PSP. Indeed, while most healthy older adults made zero blatant errors, 
three of the four PSP patients (RNZ, PW, RC) made between six and ten blatant errors across 40 
trials. BL made only one blatant error; however, she was earlier in her disease progression and the 
youngest of the four patients. These findings mirror the Hayling test performance of patients with 
frontal lesions (Robinson et al., 2015b). Blatant errors represent a failure of executive attentional 
control; specifically, we suggest that these errors occur when the attentional processes of ‘task 
setting’ and ‘monitoring’ are disrupted. Task setting and monitoring have been described as 
‘executive functions’ (Stuss, 2011), and task setting is the process required to establish a stimulus-
response relationship through trial and error learning (Stuss & Alexander, 2007). In the 
Propositional Language Task, participants were required to produce speech in response to a 
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stimulus, while simultaneously inhibiting the concept activated by the distractor. The occurrence of 
the to-be-ignored distractor in speech produced indicates that executive/attentional control 
mechanisms were not successful in redirecting attention to a suitable alternative; thus, an 
appropriate stimulus-response relationship was not set. Similarly, monitoring is the process of 
checking and adjusting behaviour over time, and successful monitoring ensures that behaviour 
remains relevant to the goal. Just as blatant interference errors may reflect a failure in setting the 
stimulus-response relationship, they may also occur when behaviour (i.e., language production) is 
not monitored sufficiently to remain in line with the goal and within task rules.  
In order to establish whether failures of task setting or monitoring underpinned the high 
number of blatant interference errors in patients with PSP, we inspected the spread of errors across 
the 40 Propositional Language Task trials. The occurrence of errors in the first 10 trials only would 
suggest that the process of task setting was interrupted. However, if errors persisted across the 
length of the task, then the process of monitoring over time would be implicated. In the current 
study, errors were produced throughout the task; errors were not more likely to occur early on. 
Therefore, we argue that lapses in the process of monitoring likely underlie blatant interference 
errors. However, the suggestion that monitoring plays a role does not preclude task setting as a 
critical process. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that task setting and monitoring are associated 
with the left and right lateral frontal cortices, respectively. In PSP, frontal cortical atrophy is 
bilateral; therefore we expect that failures of both task setting and monitoring would occur. Future 
research should focus on disentangling the roles of task setting and monitoring. For example, 
implementing a schedule of errorless learning, in order to establish a solid stimulus-response 
relationship, may allow the observation of ‘pure’ monitoring failures. 
Subtle lexical errors. Three of the four patients with PSP (RNZ, PW, BL) also made a 
significantly higher number of subtle lexical errors (Category B1) than healthy controls. Subtle 
lexical errors occurred on incongruent trials when the response included the sentence ‘[person] is 
not [distractor word synonym]’. Importantly, negated emotion descriptors never occurred on 
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congruent trials; that is, no participant produced the sentence ‘[person] is not [distractor antonym]’ 
(e.g., happy picture with happy distractor – ‘the lady is not sad’). This provides justification for 
interpreting subtle lexical errors as interference from the distractor word. Subtle lexical errors 
indicate some level of interference from the distractor word, but sufficient monitoring or attentional 
control to select a lexical alternative for the distractor. Interestingly, RC produced no subtle lexical 
errors, but the highest number of blatant errors. RC was the most progressed in the disease and the 
eldest of the four patients; her error pattern may reflect greater reductions of attentional control, 
such that she was unable to shift attention from the distractor to select a synonym for inclusion in 
her sentences. In this way, blatant and subtle lexical errors may be similar at the attentional 
interference level (i.e., failures of task setting and/or monitoring), but represent different degrees of 
severity. Blatant errors occur when attention is not sufficiently redirected from the distractor, and 
subtle lexical errors occur for the same reason but to a lesser degree, as a synonym is selected 
before the sentence is articulated.  
Subtle conceptual errors. Blatant and subtle lexical errors occurred on only 1-2% of trials 
for healthy older adults, but subtle conceptual errors (Category B2) were more frequent. Indeed, 
healthy older adults produced subtle conceptual errors on approximately 8% of trials. Despite not 
being statistically different from controls, inspection of the means revealed that three of the four 
PSP patients (RNZ, PW, BL) produced subtle conceptual errors on only 5% of or fewer trials. 
Furthermore, raw scores indicated that all PSP patients produced fewer subtle conceptual errors 
than either blatant or subtle lexical errors. Subtle conceptual errors reflect an integration of the 
distractor word into the ideas or concepts of the sentences. This may rely on the inference of 
abstract semantic relationships between emotions and situations, and there is evidence that abstract 
semantic knowledge is associated with the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Hoffman, Binney & Lambon 
Ralph, 2015). Prefrontal regions are commonly atrophied in PSP, which may explain why healthy 
controls appeared to produce more subtle conceptual errors than patients with PSP.  
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In developing the task, pictures were specifically chosen to be unambiguous in the emotion 
conveyed; any ambiguous pictures were removed during the pilot testing phase. Therefore, when 
the sentences included content that embodied the emotion of the incongruent distractor word, it is 
likely that this was due to the influence of the distractor. Subtle conceptual errors most commonly 
occurred in response to pictures of people crying; when a ‘happy’ distractor word was presented, 
the sentences often included an interpretation of the crying as in response to a joyful event. 
Importantly, the reverse never occurred; that is, no one interpreted the same crying pictures as 
‘happy’ when a congruent ‘sad’ distractor was presented, and in the pilot phase these pictures were 
invariably categorised as ‘sad’. This finding suggests that, even when part of the goal is to ignore 
the words, unrelated distractor words may interfere with propositional language production at a 
subtle conceptual or content level. The speech valence analysis from Study 2, which showed that 
spoken language in response to negative pictures was marginally greater in positivity when a 
positive distractor was present, provides evidence to corroborate this idea.  
The occurrence of subtle conceptual errors is also interesting from an emotion perception 
perspective. Traditionally dominant through the emotion literature is the idea that emotions are 
recognised from faces easily, consistently, automatically, and universally (e.g., Ekman & Cordaro, 
2011). However, recently this view has been challenged, and it has been argued that language 
informs and influences judgments of emotion (e.g., Barker, Bidstrup, Robinson & Nelson, under 
review; Fugate, 2013; Gendron, Lindquist, Barsalou & Barrett, 2012; Lindquist & Gendron, 2013). 
The existence of subtle conceptual errors suggests that other sources of information, in this case the 
distractor words, are integrated and inform the judgment of the emotion, which is reflected in 
language output.  
Implications. Studies of patients with dynamic aphasia argue that impairments of 
propositional language are underpinned by disruptions at the stage of conceptualisation or ‘message 
formulation’: the preverbal ‘idea’ stage of language production (e.g., Robinson et al., 1998; 2006). 
The mechanisms elucidated from these investigations include the generation of novel ideas, 
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sequencing of thoughts, and proposition selection, all of which occur during message formulation. 
Blatant and subtle lexical errors are reflective of a disruption at the conceptual level during novel 
idea generation. Attention is not redirected from the distractor word to an alternative, due to a fault 
in either task setting or monitoring; therefore, the concept activated by the distractor word is 
integrated into the message or ‘idea’ and appears as the word itself (blatant error) or a synonym 
(subtle lexical error) in the language output. The difference is that when a subtle lexical error 
occurs, attentional control processes have allowed for the selection of a synonym, avoiding the 
blatant word use. It is possible that the selection of the synonym occurs post conceptualisation, 
during the subsequent stage of linguistic formulation before articulation. Perhaps the process of 
monitoring plays a role not only during conceptualisation, but during linguistic formulation too 
(e.g., see Sherratt, 2007: top-down and bottom-up processing occur throughout the stages of 
discourse production).  
Subtle conceptual errors also occur as a result of interference from the distractor word 
during the generation of novel ideas at the stage of message formulation. However, for a subtle 
conceptual interference error to occur, the concept activated by the distractor must be abstracted and 
integrated with contextual and emotional cues to make inferences about the situation. This is a 
complex process of high-level integration. It is unlikely that a lapse in task setting or monitoring is 
causing this interference, as the response is appropriate for the stimulus and in line with task goals. 
It is possible that a less definable ‘metacognition’, the purpose of which is to integrate and 
coordinate the energization, emotional cues and executive functions required for goal-directed 
behaviour (Stuss, 2011), plays a key role here instead. This may explain why the raw scores 
suggested that there was more subtle conceptual interference from the distractor words in healthy 
older adults compared to patients with PSP. Rather than executive attentional failures causing 
‘concrete’ interference from the distractor, metacognitive processes enable the abstraction and 
integration of conflicting information to form a coherent story.  
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Overall, the occurrence of blatant and subtle interference errors provides evidence that the 
speaker’s attentional focus can be manipulated during conceptualisation. What the speaker is paying 
attention to, alongside the integration of contextual information, influences the content of 
propositional language. Although this was postulated by Levelt (1999), it has not been 
experimentally demonstrated until now.  
Conclusions and Future Directions 
The directions for future research in this area are myriad, as the role of emotion in 
propositional language is largely unexplored. Future research could incorporate a fuller range of 
emotion categories, or systematically vary other dimensions of affect (e.g., arousal and dominance), 
within the stimuli. This would help explain whether language is related to other behavioural 
responses that occur in response to particular emotional situations, for example fighting, fleeing, or 
approaching. Similarly, the Propositional Language task should be run with nonword distractors 
(e.g., tones), or indeed no distractors at all. This would clarify the role of the distractor words. 
Furthermore, although we have provided tentative evidence that patients with PSP do not show the 
same effects of emotion on propositional language, our clinical sample size was small. Further 
exploration of the emotion-language link in PSP and other neurological or psychiatric disorders 
with known abnormalities in emotional processing/regulation or social cognition may shed light on 
the relationship between emotion and language. This knowledge may also eventually inform 
therapies for patients with disorders of propositional language, by using emotion to elicit language.  
The current study aimed to elucidate the underlying attentional processes that may have 
been driving the picture valence effects using standard neuropsychological tests of attention. 
However, future research should consider including measures that are specifically designed to tap 
particular attentional processes, such as those from the Rottman-Baycrest Battery to Investigate 
Attention (RoBBIA; Stuss et al., 2005). Relating these isolated processes to the emotion-language 
relationship, and other aspects of language not considered in the current study (e.g., novelty, 
propositional density, speech quantity, cohesion, coherence), will enable a greater understanding of 
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the attention-emotion-language interface. Along similar lines, investigations that include patients 
with focal lesions to frontal areas known to be involved in task setting and monitoring (i.e., left and 
right lateral frontal regions, respectively) would highlight the frontal attentional processes 
associated with different interference error types. From a task perspective, other distractor types 
(e.g., emotional vocalisations - laughing, screaming; words of neutral valence; tones; visual 
distractors) could provide a nuanced and informative picture of how attention can be manipulated to 
influence language production via interference. The role of attention in language is gaining traction 
in certain clinical groups (e.g., individuals with aphasia, see Villard & Kiran, 2017). The current 
research provides corroborating evidence that the manipulation of attention influences propositional 
language, in healthy adults and PSP patients without aphasia, which suggests that even when 
aphasia is not present, attentional difficulties may produce subtle language problems.  
Taken together, the current studies provide evidence that broader cognitive processes related 
to attention and emotion influence propositional language production. It seems that cognition, 
emotion and language are exquisitely intertwined. Both studies demonstrated that regardless of 
whether the distractor word was congruent or incongruent with the emotion of the picture, the 
valence of picture stimuli influenced the time it took to initiate speech. This effect appeared to be 
stronger in healthy adults than patients with PSP, but this remains a subject for future research. 
Interference from the distractor words was demonstrated via a content analysis of the propositional 
language produced in Study 2. Interference implicates attentional control processes such as task 
setting and monitoring, and can occur on both blatant and subtle levels. Patients with PSP produced 
a higher number of interference errors that related directly to attentional failures, while interference 
in the healthy older adults was more abstract.  
Ultimately, without an understanding of the role of broader cognitive processes, our 
knowledge of propositional language production remains incomplete. The current studies begin to 
address this gap and demonstrate that attention, and its relationship with emotion, should be 
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considered with regard to propositional language production. Future models of spoken language 
production should take these factors into account.  
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Chapter 5. General Discussion 
  142 
The ability to produce fluent, novel spontaneous speech is a characteristically human skill, 
and is crucial for the successful communication of thoughts and ideas. The notion that propositional 
language production draws on broader cognitive processes has been repeatedly postulated across the 
fields of psychology, neuropsychology, philosophy and linguistics. However, experimental studies 
examining how specific cognitive processes influence propositional language production are rare. 
Thus, the central aim of this thesis was to investigate the interplay between cognition and language, 
in particular the role of attention and emotion, during the formulation of a message.  
Chapter 2 presented an investigation of the cohesion and coherence of connected speech in 
mild stroke patients and healthy controls. Cohesion and coherence reflect the degree to which 
utterances are linked with each other and the overall theme, and are directly associated with the 
preverbal stage of ‘message formulation’. The results revealed that the connected speech of stroke 
patients, particularly those with right hemisphere strokes, was significantly lower in cohesion and 
coherence than that of controls. Furthermore, better performance on sustained and selective 
attention tasks was broadly associated with more coherent speech. Likewise, better performance on 
the Hayling test of executive function was related to greater coherence of connected speech.  
Chapter 3 detailed a study of energization and spontaneous speech in a case series of 
patients with PSP. The frontal attentional process of energization, which represents the ability to 
initiate and sustain responding, was found to fluctuate over time in patients with PSP. One minute 
spontaneous speech samples of patients with PSP were characterised by an initial period of 
spontaneous speech comparable in quantity to that of the healthy control group, followed by a steep 
decrease in output. By contrast, healthy controls were able to sustain spontaneous speech output 
over time. This pattern was mirrored in a semantic word fluency task, which has been previously 
used to measure idea generation and is suggested to reflect energization (Stuss & Alexander, 2007; 
Robinson et al., 2015a). In the initial time period, the number of items generated by the patients 
with PSP was similar to that of the control group; however, most patients showed a subsequent 
decrease in responding. In an experimental concentration task, three of four patients with PSP 
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showed systematic fluctuations in response speed across 500 trials, which provided further evidence 
that the process of energization was compromised in the patients with PSP.  
In Chapter 4 the role of emotion as a modulator of attention was introduced. Using a novel 
experimental paradigm, we investigated the influence of emotional stimuli on propositional 
language production in the presence of distractor words. Analyses of time taken to initiate spoken 
language revealed that healthy adults were slower to produce propositional language in response to 
negative, as opposed to positive, emotional pictures. This ‘picture valence effect’ was robust, and 
occurred regardless of whether the distractor word was related or unrelated to the pictures. The 
second study in Chapter 4 extended this work to include patients with PSP and healthy older 
adults. Firstly, the ‘picture valence effect’ of Study 1 was replicated in an older healthy sample. 
Study 2 also included a detailed analysis of propositional language content, in which the influence 
of distractor words became evident. Three of the four patients with PSP produced blatant and subtle 
lexical interference errors, such that the to-be-ignored distractor words or synonyms were included 
in their language output. To the contrary, blatant and subtle lexical interference errors were rare in 
healthy adults. However, many healthy adults produced subtle conceptual interference effects: the 
concept activated by unrelated distractor words was incorporated into the theme of their sentences. 
Taken together, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have provided evidence to suggest that attention and emotion 
are key aspects of cognition that influence propositional language production.  
Factors Influencing Message Formulation 
Attention. Attention is a cognitive skill that is of particular interest in propositional 
language production. It is arguably one of the most fundamental cognitive processes, providing the 
scaffolding for the successful execution of any complex behaviour, including language production 
(Villard & Kiran, 2017). In the current thesis, we framed attention in line with the work of Stuss et 
al. (1995; 2005; Stuss & Alexander, 2007; Stuss, 2011). Stuss and Alexander’s (2007) triad of 
frontal attentional processes - energization, task setting and monitoring - have been suggested to 
subserve executive functions and complex goal-directed behaviour (Stuss, 2011). Specifically, 
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Alexander (2006) argued that these attentional processes are critical for the production of complex 
language. For example, energization is required for the speaker to establish a communicative 
intention and sustain focus on the goal, task setting allows the most relevant and appropriate 
information to be selected for expression, and monitoring ensures that the spoken language output is 
consistent with the overall goal.  
The results presented in the current thesis can be conceptualised within this framework, and 
we argue that particular frontal attentional processes are related to different aspects of propositional 
language production. In Chapter 3, we demonstrated that energization deficits in PSP were linked 
to an inability to maintain the production of spontaneous speech over time. On the whole, patients 
with PSP were unable to internally ‘energize’ to initiate and sustain their focus on the goal or 
‘message’, in the absence of salient external cues. Consequently, their speech rate decreased sharply 
after the first 15 seconds of narrative production. Recently, an impairment of energization was 
purported to underlie the paucity of spontaneous speech in the case of WAL, who presented with 
dynamic aphasia in the context of PSP (Robinson et al., 2015a). The results presented in Chapter 3 
complement the case of WAL, in demonstrating that energization is implicated in the ability to 
maintain propositional language output over time, even when dynamic aphasia is not present. This 
stands in line with Alexander’s (2006) argument that complex language production requires 
energization to ‘sustain (cognitive) activity to reach the goal’ (p. 236).   
By contrast, the Propositional Language Task employed in Chapter 4 did not place high 
demands on energization, as only a small amount of language output was required in response to 
each picture. In the Propositional Language Task each picture stimulus provided an initial prompt 
that was sufficient for the purpose of eliciting spoken language to meet quantity requirements; 
output did not have to be sustained over time. However, the occurrence of blatant interference 
errors in patients with PSP demonstrated lapses of monitoring. In propositional language 
production, the process of monitoring serves as a ‘checking system’, ensuring that language output 
aligns with the overall goal.  
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The role of monitoring was also evident in the connected speech of stroke patients in 
Chapter 2, particularly in measures of coherence. In Chapter 2, we reported that poorer 
performance on the Hayling test was related to decreased coherence of connected speech.  
Suppression errors on the Hayling Sentence Completion Test of executive function have been 
argued to reflect failures of monitoring, in that inconsistent monitoring of task goals results in a lack 
of appropriate strategy implementation and maintenance (Hornberger & Bertoux, 2015). When 
producing coherent speech, the process of monitoring is necessary for maintaining conceptual and 
thematic consistency over time. Furthermore, greater coherence deficits were found in the right 
hemisphere stroke group; this hints at a role of monitoring, as the right lateral prefrontal cortex has 
been consistently associated with this process (e.g., Stuss et al., 2005; Stuss & Alexander, 2007).  
Finally, monitoring may be involved in selective attention. Selective attention represents the 
ability to focus on a relevant source of input for processing when other competing sources are 
available (Smith & Jonides, 1999). When producing propositional language, selective attention 
supports the selection of relevant information for expression while inhibiting irrelevant ideas (Gold 
& Arbuckle, 1995). It is plausible that selective attention relies on monitoring to some degree, 
because in order to select the most appropriate information for expression, the speaker must be able 
to monitor what information has already been conveyed. Interference errors on the Propositional 
Language Task (Chapter 4) can similarly be considered as failures of selective attention. This error 
type was produced when the speaker was unable to narrow their attentional focus to the picture 
only, ignoring the competing source of information from the distractor word.  
Overall, the studies presented in this thesis provide insight into the differing roles of frontal 
attentional processes in the production of propositional language. Firstly, energization appears to be 
most strongly related to the quantity of spoken language produced. When the process of 
energization fails, the internal generation of novel ideas is affected, and language output reduces or 
ceases. By contrast, monitoring is associated with the quality of propositional language. Failures of 
monitoring were associated with interference errors in Chapter 4 Study 2. Likewise, monitoring 
  146 
appeared to be related to the coherence of speech in stroke patients (Chapter 2). Attentional 
interference and coherence of speech are reflected in the content or quality of the language output. 
Both interference errors and coherence errors are produced when the overarching goal is not 
monitored.  
Conspicuously absent from these conclusions is the role of task setting. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, failures of task setting are evidenced by errors in the initial time period of 
the task only, while errors across the duration of the task suggest lapses of monitoring. In our study, 
errors on the Propositional Language Task occurred throughout; therefore, we can be confident that 
monitoring is involved. However, we highlight that this does not preclude task setting as a critical 
process. Future research should focus on disentangling the separable roles of task setting and 
monitoring in propositional language production.  
The generation and sequencing of novel ideas. Investigations of patients with frontal 
dynamic aphasia provided much of the theoretical basis for the work included in this thesis. A core 
propositional language impairment in the context of intact core language skills means that dynamic 
aphasia straddles the border between language and cognition. The lack of spontaneous speech 
output cannot be attributed to an impairment of verbal language (as per typical forms of aphasia); 
rather, dynamic aphasia represents a failure of the broader cognitive processes that support 
propositional language production. The mechanisms of message formulation elucidated from 
investigations of patients with dynamic aphasia include language-specific propositional selection, 
and domain-general idea generation and fluent sequencing of novel ideas (Robinson et al., 1998; 
2005; 2006; 2013; 2015a). These mechanisms are associated with two discrete subtypes of dynamic 
aphasia. The first is language-specific, and is associated with a propositional selection impairment 
and damage to the left inferior frontal gyrus (Robinson et al., 1998; 2005). The second is domain-
general, is related to the production of multiple sentences involving the generation and sequencing 
of ideas, and implicates bilateral frontal and subcortical regions (Robinson et al., 2006). Due to the 
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inclusion of PSP patients, the current thesis is primarily concerned with the second subtype, and 
therefore the mechanisms of novel idea generation and their fluent sequencing.  
The mechanism of ‘novel idea generation’ has been suggested to reflect energization 
(Robinson et al., 2015a). Robinson et al. (2015a) used a series of verbal and nonverbal fluency tasks 
to measure the generation of ‘novel ideas’ in a patient with dynamic aphasia, and reported that idea 
generation decreased sharply after the initial response period. The authors argued that this provided 
an explanation for the patient’s severely reduced spontaneous speech output. Our results support the 
assertion that energization is associated with propositional language production, as the decline of 
spontaneous speech output over time in four of the five current patients with PSP reflected their 
pattern of performance on a semantic fluency task (Chapter 3). Our results demonstrate that novel 
idea generation can be impaired to varying degrees.  
By contrast, a deficit in the fluent sequencing of novel ideas is evidenced in perseverative 
speech (KAS: Robinson et al., 2006). Robinson et al. (2006) posited that the mechanism of ‘fluent 
sequencing’ requires attention to be focused on an initial message and then shifted to new messages 
for expression. We extend this to suggest a key role of monitoring in the fluent sequencing of 
ideas10. Propositional repetitions represent the perseveration of ideas, and in Chapter 2 we reported 
that this was the measure of coherence most consistently associated with poorer Hayling 
performance. As aforementioned, Hayling error scores have been linked to failures of monitoring 
(Hornberger & Bertoux, 2015). Therefore, it is possible that perseveration, and thus a deficit in 
fluent sequencing, can be linked to a failure of monitoring. Moreover, shifting attention to new 
ideas to be expressed, which Robinson et al. (2006) argued underlies successful fluent sequencing, 
would require the speaker to monitor what has already been said.  
Based on previous literature and the current findings, we speculate that energization, and 
therefore novel idea generation, represent perhaps the most fundamental process and mechanism of 
message formulation. Energization is the prerequisite process for the initiation of all complex 
                                                10	It is plausible that task setting would also be involved in the fluent sequencing of novel ideas; however, the current 
thesis results do not provide evidence for or against this. 
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cognitive operations (Stuss & Alexander, 2007). By contrast, the sequencing of ideas is 
predominantly ‘executive’ in nature and draws on the process of monitoring. Existing 
neuropsychological evidence has linked the medial prefrontal regions to energization, while the left 
and right lateral prefrontal cortices are associated with task setting and monitoring, respectively 
(Stuss & Alexander, 2007). Shallice and Cipolotti (2018) asserted that ‘the medial prefrontal cortex 
energizes supervisory system operations and the lateral prefrontal cortices implement them’ (p.174). 
Furthermore, the medial prefrontal cortex is evolutionarily less sophisticated than the lateral 
prefrontal regions (Koechlin, 2014; Uylings, Groenewegen & Kolb, 2003). Thus, we propose that 
some degree of ‘hierarchy’ may exist in the mechanisms of message formulation. Without the 
process of energization, novel ideas cannot be generated. There can be no monitoring and fluent 
sequencing if the system has not been energized and novel ideas not generated to begin with. In this 
way, we consider energization and novel idea generation as the primary ‘basis’ of message 
formulation, and task setting and monitoring operate to select, prioritise, and fluently sequence 
these ideas for expression. 
Emotion. Until now, how the relationship between emotion and attention influences 
message formulation has not been experimentally investigated. The development of the 
Propositional Language Task allowed the effect of emotional stimuli on spoken language 
production to be measured. We found that the initiation of propositional language production was 
slower in response to negative, as opposed to positive, pictures. It is well established that negative 
emotional information demands greater attention and elicits responses that are more potent than 
positive information; this is known as the ‘negativity bias’ (e.g., Rozin & Royzman, 2001; 
Baumeister et al., 2001). Prolonged response latencies are consistent with the notion that negative 
information draws attention, leaving fewer attentional resources available for complex language 
production. Thus, our results shed light on an issue of contention in the literature: whether response 
disruptions associated with negative emotional stimuli reflect the capture of attention per se, or 
whether they reflect a failure to disengage from the stimulus (e.g., Fox et al., 2001). When 
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propositional language production is the target behaviour, prolonged response latencies suggest that 
it is an issue of the latter. In order to allocate attention to the formulation of a message, the speaker 
must disengage to some degree from the emotional stimulus. Ultimately, the results presented in 
Chapter 4 constitute the first evidence that emotional valence of stimuli influences message 
formulation for propositional language production. 
Emotion can be considered as a factor that modulates attention, as is evident in the 
attentional ‘negativity bias’. Thus far, with regard to propositional language production, we have 
considered attention as a set of ‘supervisory’ or ‘top-down’ (i.e., voluntary, goal-directed) frontal 
attentional processes. However, it appears that negative emotion circumvents top-down attentional 
processing, instead drawing attention through ‘bottom-up’ (i.e., automatic, stimulus-driven) 
processes (Carretié, 2014). Attention is limited in capacity, and it is likely that a delicate balance 
and flexible interaction between top-down and bottom-up attentional processes (e.g., Vossel, Geng 
& Fink, 2014) is necessary for successful propositional language production. When potent negative 
emotional stimuli are the object of the speaker’s focus, bottom-up processes may override the top-
down systems required for message formulation. It is possible that the prolonged response latencies 
to negative pictures in Chapter 4 reflect a lapse in energization; the supervisory system was unable 
to be energized to initiate complex operations (i.e., language production) because attentional 
resources were unavailable.   
Progressive Supranuclear Palsy 
A case series of patients with PSP was the focus of Chapter 3 and Study 2 of Chapter 4. 
As aforementioned, two subtypes of dynamic aphasia exist. The second subtype of dynamic aphasia 
is rarer than the first, and to date only a handful of case studies exist (see Bormann et al., 2008; 
Gold et al., 1997; Esmonde et al., 1996; Robinson et al., 2006; 2013; 2015a; Snowden et al., 1996). 
Of these limited reports, the one pathology most commonly associated with this subtype is PSP. 
Although the spontaneous speech of most the patients with PSP in the current thesis was reduced, 
on the whole their reductions were not severe enough to be considered dynamic aphasia. Therefore, 
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the data from the PSP patients included in Chapters 3 and 4 provide a unique insight into the 
mechanisms underlying the production of propositional language, and the experimental 
investigations expand our understanding of the cognitive and language profile of PSP. 
Propositional language impairments in PSP are not well understood. Speech production 
problems are relatively common in PSP (e.g., apraxia of speech, dysarthria, progressive nonfluent 
aphasia: Williams & Lees, 2009), and as these become a primary source of concern, higher-level 
language problems may be masked. Our Chapter 3 analysis of the spontaneous speech of patients 
with PSP suggested that energization deficits were associated with a reduction of spoken language 
output. Similarly, failures of monitoring were suggested to underlie blatant interference errors in 
Study 2 in Chapter 4, and the propositional language of PSP patients was found to be vulnerable to 
sources of distraction. As the current patients were not as progressed in the disease as other patients 
with PSP and dynamic aphasia, our results suggest that energization and monitoring are perhaps 
two of the earliest aspects of cognition to be affected in PSP. While this is consistent with the well-
documented executive dysfunction in PSP (e.g., Bak et al., 2005; Kaat et al., 2007), the functions of 
energization and monitoring are important to consider with regard to propositional language 
production. Reduced social communication has been identified as a source of concern affecting the 
quality of life in patients with PSP (Schrag et al., 2003).  
Recently, several studies have investigated functional networks in patients with PSP using 
resting-state fMRI, and two key findings have emerged. Firstly, PSP appears to be characterised by 
abnormal connectivity within and between subcortical structures such as the thalamus, caudate and 
midbrain (Bharti et al., 2017; Rosskoph et al., 2017). Secondly, there is evidence that both 
increased and decreased connectivity within the default-mode network, particularly between the 
medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortex, is associated with PSP diagnoses (Gardner et al., 
2013, Whitwell et al., 2011). The interaction between these brain regions has been shown to 
correlate with global cognitive performance in patients with PSP (CERAD total score; Rosskoph et 
al., 2017). Although these findings are preliminary, they stand in line with the neuropsychological 
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profile of PSP; abnormal default-mode connectivity is directly linked with internal cognitive 
activity and ‘mental time travelling’ (Buckner et al., 2008), while subcortical regions are associated 
with apathy and arousal (Levy & Dubois, 2006). Overall, the imaging evidence suggests that 
individuals with PSP may struggle to sustain cognitive arousal and focus over time, particularly 
during tasks that require the internal generation of ideas. This is exactly what our Chapter 3 results 
demonstrated. The medial regions of the frontal lobes have been identified as necessary for 
energization in neuropsychological studies (Stuss et al., 2005), and they constitute bilateral nodes of 
the default-mode network, which is associated with internal cognitive activation (Buckner et al., 
2008). Moreover, the medial prefrontal cortex shows activation during propositional language 
production (Braun et al., 2001). This evidence converges to suggest that energization or ‘internal 
activation’, reliant on the medial prefrontal cortex, is critical for propositional language production 
and is compromised in PSP.  
Finally, the results of Study 2 Chapter 4 suggested that patients with PSP may not show the 
same effects of emotional stimuli on propositional language production as healthy controls. Raw 
scores indicated that three of the four patients did not show prolonged response latencies to negative 
pictures; however, this should be replicated in larger samples. There is some evidence of emotion 
recognition deficits in PSP (e.g., Ghosh et al., 2009; 2012); however, we found that patients with 
PSP conveyed a similar amount of emotion to healthy controls in their language output (Study 2 
Chapter 4). Future research should consider investigating whether patients with PSP show the 
same physiological responses to emotional stimuli as healthy controls. This would clarify the role of 
bottom-up attentional processes in language production (discussed above). If bottom-up attentional 
processes operate to delay the onset of spoken language in healthy adults when viewing negative 
stimuli, it is possible that patients with PSP would demonstrate a different pattern of physiological 
responses.  
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Implications 
Theoretical implications. Theoretical frameworks emphasise that prelinguistic 
conceptualisation, linguistic formulation and articulation are required for the production of spoken 
language. The preverbal conceptualisation or ‘message formulation’ stage represents the point at 
which ideas or thoughts are translated into preverbal plans, and is where specific cognitive 
processes become crucial for successful propositional language production. Therefore, our results 
relate to the stage of message formulation, and broader cognition can be considered as having an 
influence preverbally. The current work has demonstrated a clear role for energization and 
monitoring, as well as emotion, in message formulation. Although the linguistic and articulatory 
stages are generally well defined in models of spoken language production, there is minimal 
elaboration on the processes and functions required for successful conceptualisation. For example, 
our work suggests that in Sherratt’s (2007) model, the ‘input trigger’ does not necessarily take the 
form of an external stimulus (as Sherratt posits); rather, it may be internally generated via the 
process of energization. To our knowledge, no current model of spoken language production 
considers the role of emotion. A greater understanding of the interplay between language and 
cognition, in particular the roles of attention and emotion, will allow future theoretical frameworks 
to be more comprehensive and precise in their predictions.  
Practical implications. From a practical or therapy perspective, it is critical to consider 
spoken language impairments beyond core naming, reading and repetition skills. Focused 
assessments that include a cognitive component might help ascertain the source of the difficulty, 
and would be beneficial in informing treatment planning. For instance, specific attentional 
processes critical for successful spoken language production could be targeted separately in cases 
where the language profile suggested an underlying deficit of this type. Such training programs are 
beginning to emerge; for example, a pilot study of an attentional training program conducted by 
Novakovic-Agopian et al. (2011), designed to improve goal-directed behaviour, showed promising 
results in acquired brain injury patients. Although there is no evidence as yet to indicate that 
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attentional training translates to an improvement in spoken language production, our current 
understanding of the interaction between cognition and language suggests a need for this to be 
considered.  
The use of emotional stimuli in a therapeutic context for the treatment of language disorders 
is not commonplace. However, we have provided evidence that the emotional valence 
(negativity/positivity) of stimuli contributes to the process of message formulation, possibly 
because it modulates attention. Additional research is needed to establish whether certain emotion 
categories are particularly effective at eliciting propositional language, although our results suggest 
that speech is initiated more readily in response to positive pictures. Furthermore, the results of 
Chapter 3 hinted at a role of emotion in energization, although emotion was not systematically 
investigated. We found that, on the whole, patients with PSP produced a higher number of words 
when they were asked to describe their favourite holiday as opposed to a picture scene. It is possible 
that describing a favourite holiday would induce positive emotions and therefore provide intrinsic 
motivation for spoken language production. A similar finding was documented in patient KAS with 
dynamic aphasia; her speech was virtually abolished when asked to speak about a topic of the 
examiner’s choice, but reduced to a lesser degree when describing a favourite example of a topic 
(Robinson et al., 2006). Motivation may provide a boost in energization. The role of emotion and its 
association with motivation and energization also represents an important avenue for future 
research. 
Limitations 
 The conclusions drawn in this thesis are limited by the heterogeneity of the stroke and PSP 
patient groups. In Chapter 2, the nature of the unselected mild stroke population meant that 
heterogeneous cognitive deficits in key domains (i.e., language, attention, executive function) were 
present. Similarly, the patients with PSP in Chapters 3 and 4 were at different time points in their 
disease progression, resulting in heterogeneous cognitive profiles. Furthermore, we acknowledge 
that our current samples were small; small samples limit the nature of the statistical analyses that 
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can be performed and the power to find a true effect in the data. The small sample in Chapter 2 
precluded a finer-grained analysis of stroke patients with specific cognitive profiles and/or deficits; 
this type of analysis would be key in elucidating the precise relationships between different aspects 
of cognition and spoken language. Likewise, the small number of PSP patients meant that a case 
series methodology was the most appropriate approach, and although this method has strengths in 
documenting individual differences, it limits the generalisability of the results. We recommend that 
the work contained in this thesis be replicated in larger samples. Finally, the current thesis is based 
on cross-sectional investigations in patient groups. To gain a better understanding of relationship 
between cognition and spoken language, it would be important to sample performance 
longitudinally, noting potential patterns of improvement in the stroke group and degeneration in the 
PSP group.  
Future Directions 
The scope for future research in this area is vast. It is clear that the production of 
propositional language is highly complex. Not only are the cognitive processes involved in message 
formulation myriad, but there are many aspects of the spoken language itself to be considered in 
future research. In the current thesis we have investigated the maintenance of output quantity over 
time, and the initiation and inhibition of speech. Our analyses of content covered cohesion, 
coherence, level of emotion conveyed, speech valence, and interference from distractor words. 
However, there are many aspects of spoken language remaining. For example, within-sentence and 
between-sentence pauses, which relate to linguistic and conceptual levels of processing, 
respectively, should be considered in future studies. Measures of novelty also relate directly to 
message formulation, and would provide valuable insight into the mechanisms involved in 
propositional language production.  
With regard to the attention-language interface, perhaps the most critical and potentially 
fruitful future research venture would be to link specific attentional processes to particular aspects 
of spoken language. We have provided preliminary evidence that different frontal attentional 
  155 
processes relate to diverse measures of propositional language. However, the tasks used in this 
thesis were limited. Future research should consider employing a battery of sensitive, experimental 
attention tasks (e.g., go/no go, flanker, stop-signal tasks) in order to isolate the ways in which 
specific attentional processes influence propositional language production.  
It is important to highlight that our Chapter 4 results cannot distinguish between the role of 
emotion per se and the effects of emotional valence on attention (i.e., negativity bias) in message 
formulation. The results suggested that the interaction between attention and emotional valence 
(positivity/negativity) was the critical factor; however, we selected the picture stimuli based on 
valence and not on emotion categories. Negative pictures were dominated by anger and fear 
contexts, which are both emotions that invoke avoidance behaviours, while positive pictures 
represented happiness and tenderness, both of which encourage approach and engagement. Future 
studies should incorporate stimuli from a range of emotion categories, to investigate whether 
particular emotion categories have unique effects on propositional language production.  
Continuing with the cognitive neuropsychological approach in the current thesis, future 
research should also extend the investigation of the attention-emotion-language interface to other 
clinical populations. In particular, it will be important to consider propositional language in 
populations without aphasia, but that may have disruptions to other cognitive processes associated 
with language. For example, patients with traumatic brain injuries frequently suffer from attentional 
and executive dysfunction, which can persist beyond the acute phase (e.g., Finnanger et al., 2013; 
Marsh, Ludbrook & Gaffaney, 2016). This may affect propositional language production. 
Additionally, individuals with autism spectrum disorders process emotional information differently 
(Hill, Berthoz & Frith, 2004), which may affect their ability to produce propositional language. 
Experimental investigations into mechanisms of message formulation across a range of clinical 
disorders will allow for a fuller understanding of the nuanced relationship between broader 
cognition and language.  
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Finally, brain stimulation techniques, such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), are potentially exciting tools for the investigation of 
propositional language. The primary advantage of brain stimulation methods is that neural activity 
can be reversibly altered, which allows causality to be inferred. Previously, Nozari et al. (2014) 
demonstrated that tDCS to the left prefrontal cortex was associated with fewer errors of 
propositional language in a task that required the description of shape movements. Future research 
should extend this idea to emotional stimuli, and also to other ecologically valid spontaneous 
speech tasks. 
Conclusion 
The study of spoken language has traditionally focused on core operations (e.g., phonology, 
grammar, naming, repeating), which map onto different types of aphasia. However, the production 
of propositional language does not simply reflect the sum of its core skills. The purpose of 
propositional language is to convey thoughts, ideas and emotions, to direct action and to tell stories. 
It is multifaceted, and is fundamental for everyday communication. Importantly, it is dependent on 
broader cognition. The interface between attention and language is inherently complex, but 
absolutely critical if we are to understand how propositional language is produced and becomes 
impaired.  
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the role of attention and emotion in the formulation 
of a message for propositional language. We have provided evidence that frontal attentional 
processes, in particular energization and monitoring, influence message formulation. Moreover, for 
the first time, we have documented that the emotional content of stimuli plays a role in 
propositional language production. It is clear that message formulation involves a range of cognitive 
processes, operating in flawless synchrony to produce propositional language. As Chrysippus (280-
207BC) said, ‘thought is the fountain of speech’. 
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Appendix A. Background Details for Stroke Patients. (Re: Chapter 2) 
Patient Sex Age Handedness Educationa Chronicityb LH/ RH Clinical Neuroimaging Summary # 
1 F 76 R 15 193 LH Left fronto-parietal + basal ganglia  
2 M 54 R 15 334 LH Left fronto-parietal (CT) 
3 F 54 L 16 202 LH Left  parietal + basal ganglia  
4 M 64 R 16 343 LH Left thalamus 
5 M 84 R 9 124 LH Left thalamus + Left temporo-occipital (CT) 
6 F 67 R 12 494 LH Left thalamus + occipital + cerebellar  
7 F 78 R 18 326 - Bilateral WM lesions + small Left posterior frontal 
8 M 54 R 23 209 - Bilateral WM lesions + small Left pons 
9 M 78 R 10 44 - Left posterior frontal + old Right occipital 
10 M 79 R 14 95 - Right frontal + old Left cerebellar   
11 F 60 R 15 212 RH Right frontal + temporal + basal ganglia (CT) 
12 F 47 R 10 445 RH Right thalamus +  temporal + basal ganglia (CT) 
13 M 65 R 13 205 RH Right temporo-parietal   
14 M 64 R 10 684 RH Right fronto-temporo-parietal + basal ganglia (CT) 
15 M 73 R 10 249 RH Right  parietal + basal ganglia (CT) 
16 M 68 R 12 497 RH Right  temporo-occipital + bilateral WM lesions  
17 F 66 R 11 371 RH Right parieto-occipital + bilateral WM lesions 
18 M 53 R 10 94 RH Right pons  
Note. F = Female; M = Male; L/R = left-handed/right-handed, LH/RH = Left/Right Hemisphere Stroke Group; - = no Stroke subgroup; # = 
aetiology is infarction for all cases; imaging type is Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) except where CT (Computed Tomography) is indicated. 
aEducation in years. bChronicity (time since stroke) in days. 
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Appendix B. Definitions and examples of the categories of cohesive ties from Halliday and Hasan 
(1976) (Re: Chapter 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Type Subtypes Examples 
Reference 
An item which cannot be 
interpreted semantically in 
its own right, but makes 
reference to preceding 
speech for its 
interpretation.  
 
 
 
 
Personal reference is the use of personal 
pronouns and determiners such as he, she, 
his, her, one, we, you, they, it. 
 
Demonstrative reference is identification 
of the referent by locating it on a scale of 
proximity using determiners such as 
this/these, that/those, here/there and 
now/then. 
 
Comparative reference is identification of 
the referent as one of sameness, similarity 
or dissimilarity. It is concerned with 
comparison of quality and quantity. 
 
Cinderella went to the ball// 
she danced with the prince// 
 
 
Cinderella lost her glass 
slipper// and that made her 
sad// 
 
 
 
 
Cinderella helped her sisters 
clean// but they were not quite 
as nice// 
Conjunction 
An item that specified the 
way in which the utterance 
following it was 
connected to what had 
gone before. 
 
Additive conjunctions aim to add new 
examples or make a restatement to support 
a previous argument and include ‘and, for 
instance, nor, or, furthermore, likewise’. 
 
Adversative conjunctions contrast two 
arguments or bring attention to another 
important message and include ‘yet, but, 
however, in fact, on the other hand, 
instead, rather, anyhow, in any case’.  
 
Causal conjunctions signify a cause-effect 
relationship and include ‘so, consequently, 
as a result, because, it follows, otherwise, 
in this respect’.  
 
Temporal conjunctions link two arguments 
in a time sequence and may signal change 
and include ‘then, previously, at once, 
meanwhile, next, first...then, finally, from 
now on, to sum up, briefly’. 
 
A pumpkin was turned into a 
coach//and the mice into white 
horses// 
 
 
The fairy godmother said 
Cinderella could go to the 
ball// but she would have to be 
home by midnight// 
 
 
The ugly stepsisters were 
furious// so they tried to hurt 
Cinderella// 
 
 
 
First Cinderella washed the 
dishes// then she swept the 
floor// 
Lexical 
The repetition of various 
forms of lexical items 
through repetition, 
replacement, or use of a 
synonym, near-synonym, 
or a superordinate name. 
  
Cinderella lost her glass 
slipper// but she was too upset 
to care about the shoe// 
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Appendix C. Ethical approval granted by The University of Queensland Behavioural and Social 
Sciences Ethical Review Committee.  
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Appendix D. Amendment approved by The University of Queensland Human Research Ethics Committee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Project Title: The Role of Attention and Emotion in Message 
Generation - 30/01/2017 - AMENDMENT 
 
Chief Investigator:  Ms Megan Barker  
 
Supervisor: Dr Gail Robinson, Dr Nicole Nelson 
 
Co-Investigator(s): Dr Gail Robinson, Dr Nicole Nelson, Amie Willis 
 
School(s):   Psychology 
 
Approval Number:  2015000853  
 
Granting Agency/Degree: APA Scholarship; PhD 
 
Duration:   30th June 2018 
 
Comments/Conditions:  
 
• Removal of Phoebe Pincus and addition of Amie Willis as investigator. 
• Inclusion of patients with Progressive Supranuclear Palsy 
• Addition of "media release" consent form 
 
Note: if this approval is for amendments to an already approved protocol for which a UQ Clinical Trials Protection/Insurance Form was 
originally submitted, then the researchers must directly notify the UQ Insurance Office of any changes to that Form and Participant 
Information Sheets & Consent Forms as a result of the amendments, before action. 
Name of responsible Committee: 
University of Queensland Human Research Ethics Committee A 
This project complies with the provisions contained in the National Statement on 
Ethical Conduct in Human Research and complies with the regulations governing 
experimentation on humans.  
Name of Ethics Committee representative: 
Professor Emerita Gina Geffen 
Chairperson 
University of Queensland Human Research Ethics Committee A 
Registration: EC00456 
 
 
 
 
 
    17/03/2017 
 
Signature   __________________________            Date   _____________________
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Appendix E. Ethical approval for patient testing granted by the Royal Brisbane and Women’s Hospital 
Human Research Ethics Committee.  
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Appendix F. Brief description of neuropsychological tests.  
 
Test Description 
Advanced Progressive 
Matrices (APM) 
The task requires the participant to identify a missing piece of a 
pattern from eight alternatives. Each item increases in 
complexity and abstraction. 
Digit Span The Digit Span task is a subtest from the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale. The experimenter reads aloud strings of digits 
of increasing length, and the participant repeats the digits either 
forwards (e.g., 1,4,5,6 = 1,4,5,6) or backwards (e.g., 1,4,5,6 = 
6,5,4,1). 
Graded Naming Test (GNT) This task requires the subject to name a series of 30 black and 
white line drawings of objects graded from high (e.g., 
scarecrow) to low frequency (e.g., cowl). 
Hayling Sentence Completion 
Test 
A sentence frame is presented with the final word omitted. The 
task is to complete the sentence with a single word that either 
makes sense (Section A: initiation) or is unrelated to the 
sentence (Section B: suppression). For example, ‘The old house 
will be torn…’ down (Section A) or apple (Section B). There are 
15 sentences in each section.  
Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (HADS) 
This self-report scale is comprised of 14 items: 7 related to 
depressive symptomatology (e.g., I still enjoy the things I used to 
enjoy) and 7 related to anxious symptomatology (e.g., I can sit at 
ease and feel relaxed). The response format is a 4-point scale 
from 0 (not at all/seldom) to 3 (most of the time/definitely). 
Participants were asked to respond to statements to the extent 
that they applied to them over the past week. 
Incomplete Letters This task is a subtest of the Visual Object and Space Perception 
Battery and requires the participant to identify a series of 20 
degraded and fragmented letters. 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI) 
This questionnaire comprises 28 statements related to subjective 
experiences of empathy. Participants respond according to how 
well each statement describes their personal experience. The 
response scale is a 5-point scale from A = does not describe me 
well to E = describes me very well. 
National Adult Reading Test 
(NART) 
This task contains 50 words with irregular grapheme to phoneme 
conversion. The participant is instructed to read each word 
aloud. 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Test (RMET) 
This task presents 36 pictures of eyes, and the participant is 
required to select a word from 4 multiple choice options that best 
describes how the person is feeling. 
Sentence Repetition Participants are required to repeat 10 verbally presented 
sentences of increasing complexity (3, 4, 5 and 6 words). 
Examples: I like peanuts; The pond was frozen 
Stroop Test There are two parts to the Trennery et al. (1989) version of this 
task: 1) read aloud 112 colour words, and 2) name the colour of 
the ink in which 112 colour words are printed (e.g., ‘red’ printed 
in green ink – correct answer is green). 
Synonym Test A card with 50 target words (25 concrete; 25 abstract) is 
presented, and subjects are required to select one of two words 
with a similar meaning (e.g., JAVELIN = SHIELD or SPEAR).  
Test of Everyday Attention: 
Elevator Counting (EC) 
This task requires the participant to count auditorily-presented 
strings of tones.  
Test of Everyday Attention: 
Elevator Counting with 
Distraction (ECD) 
This task requires the participant to count a series of auditorily-
presented low tones while ignoring interspersed high tones. 
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Test of Everyday Attention: 
Telephone Search Dual Task 
Decrement  
The time taken to search for and highlight double symbols in a 
mock ‘yellow pages’ is recorded. Participants then repeat the 
same visual search task while simultaneously counting strings of 
tones. The difference in performance between the visual search 
with and without tone counting is calculated. 
Word Fluency: Phonemic and 
Semantic 
Phonemic fluency: Participants are asked to orally generate as 
many words that begin with a particular letter in one minute 
(e.g., F, A, S).  
Semantic fluency: Participants are required to orally generate as 
many items as possible belonging to a category (e.g., animals) in 
one minute. 
 
